FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Carlos Romero-Barceló

Strategy in the 1980s—*Paul H. Nitze*

Do Negotiated Arms Limitations
Have a Future?—*Barry M. Blechman*

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Mr. Solzhenitsyn and His Critics

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EDITOR'S NOTE

In the vernacular of the recent Democratic convention, *Foreign Affairs* is an "open" magazine. As we have noted before, with the exception of the wholly commissioned *America and the World* year-end issue, we depend for fully three-quarters of our articles on authors who come forward on their own.

The result can be, and was in this instance, a fairly hectic last month in our cycle. Roughly 20 promising manuscripts were in our hands by mid-July, and in several instances we suggested possible major revisions to authors. Then, in the last phase, one of these, Mr. Teitelbaum's comprehensive treatment of immigration policy, emerged in our judgment as a potential landmark piece that caught a major issue "on the rise" and that simply had to be included despite its (we felt necessary) length. When Mr. Solzhenitsyn decided at the same time to reply in this issue to his critics, the space problem became even more acute. The result was the uncomfortable experience of deferring or rejecting several pieces we felt were wholly worthy of presentation to our readers.

With the agenda of "foreign affairs" now reaching into issues ranging from the Constitution itself to Puerto Rican self-determination, there may be no escape from this kind of occasional bind. As always, we shall try to choose on the basis of our judgment of what can best contribute to informed public debate and understanding—sometimes through superior analysis or insight on already evident issues, sometimes giving weight to the "on the rise" factor, and always with due attention to special timing elements such as the issues likely to be argued in a presidential campaign.

All three have played a part in the selection of this issue. We hope that our readers will find in it, according to taste, nuggets of lasting value. But we apologize to them, and especially to the authors whose work we decided not to include at least for now, for the fact that we cannot cover everything.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

Foreign Affairs is published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., Editorial Office, 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Cable address Foraffairs, New York. Payments and inquiries concerning subscriptions should be sent to *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, Colorado, 80322. Subscription price U.S. $18.00—Foreign $21.00 per year. Subscription air mail rates are available upon request. Inquiries concerning permissions and reprints should be sent to the New York office.

Foreign Affairs is a member of The Leadership Network advertising group located at 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Telephone Robert F. Sennott, Jr., (212) 682-4500, in Suite 321.

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Eric Rouleau

KHOMEINI'S IRAN

From the very beginning of the Iranian Revolution, the West—and particularly the United States—seems to have been struck by a peculiar sort of political blindness. The first signs of revolt passed unnoticed. The explosions of rage in the spring of 1978, first in Tabriz and then in Qum, were attributed to "obscurantist mullahs" hostile to the Shah's agrarian reform. The immense demonstrations by millions of Iranians, as well as the strikes in the administrations, factories, schools, universities and oil fields which paralyzed the state and in the last analysis caused the monarch's inglorious departure, were attributed to the "fanaticism" of the Iranian people. How could it have been otherwise, it was asked at the time, since the population was following a reactionary old cleric in revolt against a man who had devoted his entire life to modernizing his country?

Rare were those who suggested that modernity is not necessarily synonymous with progress or well-being, or that the concepts of economic development current in the West—where quick material gain is often the only valid criterion—does not necessarily correspond to the true needs and interests of developing nations. Rarer still were those who pointed out the pitfalls of labeling an entire people fanatics simply because they were virtually unanimous in expressing their will. Even a study of Iranian history and psychology would have revealed that the Iranians, while believers, are at the same time one of the least observant and most tolerant in the region. A mosaic of ethnic groups and religious communities, Iran has nonetheless been the scene of an astonishingly small number of strictly religious conflicts over the past two centuries.

If such is the case, how could Islam have played the role of prime mover in the Iranian revolution? To ask this question is to forget that other religions in other times and places have also provided an ideological dimension to political movements, and on occasion have been used to form states. The Italian preacher Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498) rose against the French invaders before establishing a regime in Florence which was at once

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theocratic and democratic. Jean Calvin (1509–1564), acting in the name of the Reformation, burned his religious and political opponents alive in the theocratic republic he headed in Geneva, but his ethic—which among other things glorified work and justified interest-bearing loans—contributed to the rise of capitalism, the development of political democracy and Western cultural values. Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) and the Puritans swept away the English royalty to establish the " Republic of the Middle Classes." These three men serve as examples to illustrate the revolutionary role religion has played at one time or another in the West. All occupy prominent places in our history books, yet each was reviled by his contemporaries as cruel, sectarian, fanatical.

In seeking to evaluate Imam Khomeini's movement, Westerners, and particularly Europeans, have remembered only the French Revolution, a comparison which was comforting to those who judged the Iranian Revolution retrograde. Hadn't the French clergy, allied to the nobility and Louis XVI, opposed the forces of progress by opposing the demands of the Third Estate? And wasn't the Iranian Revolution led, organized and oriented by clerics incensed by reform? It is true that the Catholic Church is not, generally speaking, known as a liberating force and that in our societies the notion of secularism is inseparable from that of democracy.

In any case, despite any parallels or analogies which might legitimately be established, the Iranian revolution is like no other. It is *sui generis*. Hence, the difficulty of understanding its day-to-day evolution.

II

The rise of the Shi'ite clergy is rooted in the history and ideology of Shi'ism. Ever since the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam in the ninth century, no temporal power has been legitimate or equitable in its eyes. Justice will not reign in the Muslim community until the "great occultation" (as the Twelfth Imam's disappearance is termed) ends with his return to earth (the resurrection).[1] Every ruler—or ruling party—is by definition a usurper, since by the very act of ruling he is substituting himself for the Twelfth Imam, the only one with the right to execute the

[1] It is interesting to note that when the *ulemas* (doctors of Islamic law) demanded at the beginning of this century the election of a parliament, they called it the "house of justice" (*adalatkhaneh*).

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divine will. The Shi'ite clergy's natural tendency has thus been to contest the authority and actions of the various dynasties that have governed Persia, and especially to contest the royal power every time it tried to open the country to foreign influences apt to "pervert" Islam or introduce customs contrary to Muslim culture and tradition.

Thus, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Shi'ism emerged as a kind of early anti-imperalist movement. In 1826, the *ulemas* declared a holy war against Russia. Three years later they had the members of an official delegation from St. Petersburg assassinated. They brought about the cancellation of the incredible monopoly for the exploitation of mines, forests, railroads, banks, customs and telegraphic communications granted to Baron Julius de Reuter in 1872. Their 1891 prohibition on tobacco consumption—largely observed by the population—led to the withdrawal of the tobacco monopoly accorded the previous year to a certain Mr. Talbot. Part of the clergy actively participated in the 1906 revolution aimed at establishing a constitutional regime. They did so not in the name of democracy—a "Western" notion abhorred even then—but to better control a royal power which favored European penetration. It was for the same reason that an important segment of the clergy under Ayatollah Kashani sided with Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1951 when the latter nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's interests in Iran.

The three favorite themes of the militant clergy—foreign domination, despotism, injustice—were precisely the evils suffered by the Iranian people under the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah. The Shah's agrarian reform benefited only a minority of the peasants, who, in any case, were soon taken over by big companies engaged in large-scale industrialized agriculture. The massive importing of agricultural goods, especially wheat from the United States—coupled with the absence or inadequacy of protective tariffs—contributed to the ruin of countless small farmers, aggravated rural unemployment and swelled the migration to the cities.

The Shah's modernization program—which created less an authentic development than a consumer society for privileged elites—quickly enriched the members of the royal family and the court, the entrepreneurs (almost all subcontractors for the large Western firms), the powerful merchants, the importers of spare parts and consumer goods, the speculators fostered by an unbridled capitalism worthy of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, those who suffered were legion: the small manufacturers

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and craftsmen squeezed by foreign competition, the workers (albeit well paid), the rapidly expanding middle classes, the millions of wage earners whose buying power was being eroded by a galloping inflation (over 50 percent in the two years preceding the fall of the monarchy).

The recession, which hit Iran as of 1976, increased the regime's unpopularity. Slumping oil sales and rising costs in imported materials forced the Shah to reduce considerably the credits allocated to development, giving rise to disillusionment commensurate with the grandiose hopes elicited by the oil boom of 1973–74. The austerity measures adopted seemed all the more unjustified in that the Shah continued to sink billions of dollars into useless military hardware, mainly from the United States, which piled up in his arsenals.

The middle classes wanted a constitutional system which would assure them the material security and political stability threatened by the arbitrary nature of the regime. The entire population demanded an end to the terror perpetrated by SAVAK, the formidable secret police. During the 37 years of Mohammed Reza Shah's reign, over a half million people are estimated to have been arrested, imprisoned or detained, briefly or for longer periods. Thousands of opponents or suspected opponents were packed off to the special courts; thousands were the victims of summary executions or assassinations, or died under the systematic practice of torture.

Most Iranians readily equated the regime which oppressed them with the United States, accused of having restored Mohammed Reza Shah to his throne in 1953 and keeping him there through the many forms of aid—political, economic, military and police—it supplied. It was notorious that the CIA worked closely with SAVAK, and that the Pentagon helped equip and train the imperial forces and advised them on a regular basis. American firms "pumped" the petrodollars out of Iran in exchange for needless armaments, industrial products and consumer goods. In the eyes of many Iranians, these "sales" were just another means of looting their country's resources.

III

In light of the above, one can more readily understand the dual nature of the uprising of 1978–79—dual in that it was directed as much against "American imperialism" as against the despotism of the Shah, considered two sides of the same coin. Largely spontaneous, the movement could very well have been taken in

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hand by Marxists or nationalists of the Mossadeq stamp. But the Shah's repression had pulverized the secular parties, traditional and otherwise. The National Front which came to prominence during the revolution was nothing but a collection of harmless notables—self-proclaimed heirs of Mossadeq who had somehow lost his prestige along the way. The leftist parties, such as the People's Mujahidin (progressive Muslims) or the People's Fedayeen (Marxist-Leninist), had concentrated too much on urban guerrilla activities and suffered too many human losses to be able to play a political role of far-reaching consequence. The Shi'ite clergy was thus a timely force, offering—in addition to its mobilizing ideology—the leadership and structure which was to assure the success of an enterprise that would otherwise have been doomed to failure.

The role of the clergy in Iranian society is considerable. Far more than the Sunni sheikh who is generally appointed and paid by the state, the mullah draws his livelihood from contributions of the faithful, with whom he shares prosperity or poverty, joys and sorrows. In the mosque or at the traditional gatherings he attends in private homes, virtually any issue of concern to the community is discussed; religion and politics are inseparable in Islam as in Judaism. The mullah can thus be a friend, confidant, adviser or guide for his flock, and acts as a moral support in times of adversity.

Using the sometimes considerable funds it collected (up to a fifth of the revenues of the faithful), the clergy established medical clinics for the needy, schools, and other social and philanthropic institutions during the Shah's reign. The preachers spoke out against social injustice, moral decay and corruption (understood to refer to that of the palace and its American advisers). They called for Islam's return to its roots as a way of defending national virtue and identity against the rape by Western technology. A good many men of the cloth experienced the Shah's prisons. Among the higher clergy, Ayatollah Taleghani, who died a few months ago, Ayatollah Mountazeri, considered to be the successor to Imam Khomeini, and Ayatollah Muhtazeri Rafsandjani, elected President of the parliament in July, suffered torture at the hands of SAVAK agents.

Imam Khomeini, who found refuge in the holy city of Najaf in Iraq, remained the distant symbol of this diffuse resistance. The political vacuum made him successively the standard bearer, catalyst, and finally the guide of the revolution. As a result of the positions he took during his 15-year exile, he appeared to embody

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the aspirations of various categories of the population. Shortly before his expulsion from Iran in 1964, he had become famous by publicly condemning both the Shah's violations of the Constitution and the granting of extraterritoriality to American civilian and military advisers and their dependents. "You have extirpated the very roots of our independence," he wrote from Najaf in 1967 to Prime Minister Hoveida.

This text, like so many others, was recorded and circulated clandestinely throughout city and countryside on tapes. In them, the Imam designated the United States as "the head of the imperialist serpent," accused the international monopolies of "looting" Iran's resources, complained of "domination" by foreign capital and the squandering of public funds in massive arms purchases. During the sumptuous festivities at Persepolis in 1971 marking the 2500th anniversary of the monarchy, he denounced the "insolent luxury" in which the Shah and his family lived. From the outbreak of the uprising in January of 1978, he incited the people to pursue their struggle until the fall of Mohammed Reza Shah. Disregarding many of his advisers, he insisted that the battle be waged without recourse to arms, and never tired of repeating that the Shi'ite faith would prevail over brute force. His calculation proved well founded: a year later, the imperial army—the most powerful in the Middle East after that of Israel—succumbed to "bare-handed revolutionaries" who had sacrificed tens of thousands of martyrs while achieving their victory.

IV

The second phase of the revolution opened shortly after Imam Khomeini's return to Iran in February 1979. It marked the beginning of the "anarchy," as the West called it—that classic phenomenon wherein the "sacred union" achieved around a common goal (in this case, the overthrow of the monarchy) explodes under the pressure of the centrifugal forces reflecting the interests, aspirations and political leanings of diverse groups of the population. Life more or less returned to normal. The ethnic minorities of the Shah's empire—Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turkomans and so on—were all the more pressing in their demands for self-determination in that most of them did not belong to the Shi'ite community. The Marxists—orthodox communists, Maoists, Trotskyites, and so on, who had marched in the demonstrations under the green banner of Islam while chanting the name of Allah—now set up shop on their own under the insignia of the hammer and sickle. The middle classes formed in the

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Western school raised the standard of secularism, advocating the maintenance of a liberal (social democratic) economy and the establishment of a parliamentary system based on the Western model. The Muslims themselves were divided among rightist, centrist and leftist factions, each under the patronage of an ayatollah of like persuasion. Finally, despite its apparent allegiance to Imam Khomeini, the Shi'ite clergy was just as divided as the secular political world which indeed it more or less faithfully reflected.

It has often been written that Imam Khomeini is an intransigent man who, by ideological conviction as well as by temperament, brooks no half-measures. Hadn't he rejected all offers of compromise with the Shah, despite the insistence of many of his followers? And again, hadn't he refused, in the immediate wake of the monarchy's collapse, the proposals for a government of national unity which would surely have reduced the futile and costly disorders which ensued? But Imam Khomeini does not identify himself with Iran as General de Gaulle did with France. As the head of Shi'ite Islam, he could not and cannot conclude "tactical alliances" with forces contesting or—worse still—opposing the dogmas he is duty-bound to defend.

This does not alter the fact that the "guide of the Islamic Revolution" has shown himself as capable of maneuvers or even ruses as any secular politician when he considers such indirect means necessary to achieve critical objectives. The appointment of Mehdi Bazargan as head of the provisional government on February 5, 1979, was perhaps one of these instances. Otherwise, why would Imam Khomeini have chosen a man whose ideas were so far removed from his own? It is true that Bazargan had been imprisoned four times for opposition to the Shah and that he had supported Khomeini in exile. But by his own admission he was no revolutionary.He had gone to Imam Khomeini's retreat at Neauphle-le-Chateau to plead the case of a "step-by-step" policy, which implied the maintenance of the monarchy. In short, he advocated a path similar to that taken by Shahpur Bakhtiar, a friend whom he never wanted to condemn as a "counterrevolutionary" or "traitor."

The government put together by Mr. Bazargan was strongly tinged with conservatism. His ministers belonged to the moderate wing of the National Front and included the Mossadeqists so despised by Khomeini, former officers of the imperial army, and middle-class businessmen who had grown rich under the Shah. As of his first days in office, he publicly expressed his disgust with the

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institutions born of the revolution: the "Komitehs," the Islamic militias, the revolutionary courts dispensing high-handed justice on royalist dignitaries and SAVAK torturers. The summary trials and hasty executions repelled him. Mehdi Bazargan was a man of order: he wanted to conserve the instruments of the old regime—army, police, state administration—keeping purges to a minimum so as not to lose "estimable and irreplaceable elements." A worthy representative of the "bazaar"—a term widely used to designate the merchants and middle classes—the head of the provisional government also did not intend to alter the bases of the economy: it was under some pressure that he decreed the nationalization of the banks, insurance companies and large industrial complexes. He also tried, unsuccessfully, to resist the "unauthorized" occupation of the great agricultural estates by landless peasants and the election of "workers' councils" to take charge of the factories.

Mehdi Bazargan is also a pious and practicing Muslim, but he never shared Imam Khomeini's view that "Islam should take precedence over Iran." He complained of the insidious infiltration of "ignorant and arrogant" mullahs into the administration. He voted in favor of the "Islamic Republic," but shortly before his resignation he confided to the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci that he feared a "dictatorship of the clergy."[2]

Two "mortal sins" precipitated Bazargan's fall: he opposed the Islamic constitution drawn up by the "assembly of experts" (composed almost entirely of clergymen), and he strove to normalize relations with the United States, Imam Khomeini's "Great Satan." It was on the Imam's orders that he reluctantly broke off diplomatic ties with Egypt after the peace treaty was signed with Israel in March 1979. He barely protested when the Shah was admitted to a New York hospital on October 22 and did not consider it useful to publicly demand the former monarch's extradition. A week later, he was shown on Iranian television engaged in cordial conversation in Algiers with Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in order to obtain, among other things, a resumption in the supply of matériel and spare parts for the Iranian army. That was the reason—or the pretext—invoked for the occupation of the American Embassy and the seizure of its diplomats four days later by some four hundred "Islamic students following the Imam's line."

[2] "Everybody Wants To Be Boss," *The New York Times*, October 28, 1979, p. 66.

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V

Imam Khomeini—who apparently had been informed that some such action was to be taken—had thus forced Mr. Bazargan to resign. Why had he waited nine months to do so? Hadn't he known from the very beginning that his prime minister was neither a "revolutionary" nor an enemy of the "Great Satan"?

Everything seems to indicate that the choice of Mr. Bazargan as prime minister was dictated by tactical considerations at a time when the Imam, recently returned to Iran, feared that the situation could slip from his control. The imperial army was still intact (and was not to collapse until February 12, one week after the provisional government was formed), as were the police force, the gendarmerie, the state administration. The Marxist parties (particularly the People's Fedayeen) and the People's Mujahidin were armed to the teeth and sought to outflank the Islamic movement, which was powerful at the popular level but completely lacking in the structures needed to exercise power (the Komitehs and Islamic militias were institutionalized only later). The middle classes, influential in the economy and in the government machinery, could easily slide into a dangerous passivity or seesaw among the moderate parties of the National Front.

Only Mehdi Bazargan seemed capable of juggling all these perils. The "bazaar"—Muslim and relatively conservative—was devoted to him. The leftist formations (especially the Mujahidin) thought they could count on his liberalism to secure a legal status in the young republic. A number of high-ranking officers—some of whom had secretly negotiated a compromise with him—had confidence that he could assure the army a smooth transition from empire to republic. In appointing him prime minister, Imam Khomeini thus hoped to buy time, the time needed to establish a "true revolutionary government." But this did not mean he gave him any real power. Mr. Bazargan was permitted to make endless declarations and protests over radio and television, but the essential decisions came from the clergy-dominated Council of the Revolution. It was Mr. Bazargan himself who, in the interview with Oriana Fallaci, best described his situation: "They've put a knife in my hand, but it's a knife with only a handle; others are holding the blade."

The seizure of American diplomats as hostages in Tehran sounded the death knell of the Bazargan government. It also brought into the open the conflict between Iran and the United States, which had lain dormant since the collapse of the monarchy.

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Imam Khomeini had not forgiven the seven Presidents who have occupied the White House during the past 30 years for their unfailing support of the bloodthirsty dictator most Iranians saw in Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Nor was the Imam prepared to forget that Mr. Carter had tried to save the Pahlavi dynasty to the bitter end. The ex-Shah's admission to the United States in October 1979 confirmed him in his suspicions that the American Administration was seeking to reestablish the fallen monarch on his throne. The American gesture, praised as "humanitarian" and "courageous" in the West, was perceived in Tehran as a new and intolerable provocation. As Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh remarked to this writer: "It is as if Franco's Spain had offered to treat Hitler for cancer immediately after the Second World War." The only merit of the image is that it reflects the frustration and anger felt by the Iranians. The United States had seriously underestimated their potential reaction, just as it had seriously underestimated the profound motivations of the revolution itself.

In the view of certain observers, the Carter Administration committed the same error before and after the hostage crisis: it believed it could clear up the Iranian-American dispute by dealing with the "moderate" leadership in Tehran—first with Mr. Bazargan and his ministers, then with President Bani-Sadr and Mr. Ghotbzadeh. Washington believed this to be the most accessible route, but in reality it was blocked. It is true that the new chief of state and his foreign minister disapproved of the Islamic students' occupation of the American Embassy and favored normalization with the United States. But it was precisely these inclinations that undermined their credit with Imam Khomeini, at the same time weakening them in the face of their adversaries, particularly within the clergy.

In the last analysis, the American government could have played the "moderate" card successfully if it had been prepared to make enough concessions to give the moderates credibility in the eyes of Iranian public opinion. President Bani-Sadr had dropped his demand for extradition of the Shah. In exchange, he asked that the United States admit its responsibility in the crimes committed by the Shah and that it undertake not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs again. It is not to be excluded that Bani-Sadr could have delivered had his demands been met. At the very least, the climate would have changed significantly enough to open the way for the release of the hostages. But the White House did not understand that a price had to be paid for normalization. President Carter wouldn't even dissociate himself from the CIA-

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led coup of 1953 which restored Mohammed Reza Shah to power. If it is true that a great power cannot permit itself to be "humiliated" in such a fashion, one can ask oneself how a compromise could have been concluded without satisfying at least the minimal demands of the other side. Surely no one expected to obtain the hostages' release with nothing given in return.

To explain the failure of the negotiations, it has often been said that the multiplicity of power centers in Tehran made serious dialogue impossible. But once again, if such were the case, why undertake negotiations with one of these centers instead of waiting for the internal struggles to resolve themselves with the establishment of a homogeneous and responsible government? It seems that the low profile the Carter Administration has been observing since the abortive rescue mission of April 1980 flowed from an analysis which could have been supported as of last November: the Islamic students' occupation of the American Embassy was at least as much—if not more—a domestic political maneuver as an operation directed against the United States.

Indeed, it was clear from the outset that Imam Khomeini was going to utilize the widespread anti-American feelings to mobilize the population under his banner. Popular discontent—due mainly to economic problems and the duality of power—had reached alarming proportions by October 1979. The government (along with the secular nationalists and most of the leftist parties) was preparing to resist the adoption of the draft Islamic constitution then being drawn up. The occupation of the American Embassy thus came at the perfect time, pushing divisive factors to the background and uniting the people against the Shah's protectors. The same mechanism applied after the rescue mission of April 25: the U. S. attempt provided Khomeini with tangible evidence that the principal danger threatening the Iranian people was foreign intervention.

VI

The third phase of the revolution—following those of the uprising against the imperial regime and the founding of the Islamic Republic under a provisional government—was opened by Mr. Bazargan's resignation. Immediately after the seizure of the hostages, Imam Khomeini labeled the new phase the "second revolution." The patriarch of Qum had clearly decided that his faithful prime minister had outgrown his usefulness: the imperial army, decapitated and purged by the Islamic Komitehs, no longer represented a danger for the republic; the large industrialists who

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had controlled the economic power had been dislodged from their positions by various measures, including massive nationalizations. All that remained was to neutralize the representatives of the middle classes, the "moderate nationalists" who had been reviled publicly as "Westernized liberals" ready to "compromise with imperialism."

The task of ferreting out this new enemy fell to the Islamic students. They were doubly popular in the country at the time: they had defied all-powerful America—a role magnified by the importance conferred upon them by the American mass media and Administration—and they projected themselves as being at once the conscience and the instrument of the revolutionary movement. They were thus in a position to proceed, under the discreet protection of Imam Khomeini, with the elimination of the opponents of the Islamic regime.

Using more or less convincing documents—but impressive insofar as they came from secret archives of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran—the Islamic students succeeded in having numerous politicians or parties who passed for pro-Western in the Iranian Revolutionary context arrested or discredited. Mr. Amir Entezam, successively Deputy Premier and Ambassador to Stockholm under Bazargan, was detained as a "CIA agent." Accused of the same infamy, Hassan Nazih, former director of National Iranian Oil Company, and Rahmatollah Moghadam-Maraghi, head of the small Radical Party, both of whom had supported if not actually fomented the December 1979 rebellion in the Azerbaijani capital of Tabriz, were obliged to flee the country. Ayatollah Shariatmadari, a rightist liberal in whose name the Azerbaijani sedition had erupted, was reduced to silence after "compromising documents" were mysteriously circulated in Tehran. The Muslim People's Republican Party, led by Shariatmadari's son, was obliged to close its doors after dozens of its members were executed or arrested. A number of elected deputies lost their parliamentary seats, again thanks to documents from the U.S. Embassy, making it possible to charge them with "intelligence with the enemy." Men such as Khosrow Kashgai, chief of the powerful tribe of the same name, and Admiral Ahmed Madani, a moderate who won more than two million votes in the presidential elections last January, were driven from the political scene. The list of the Islamic students' victims, too long to enumerate, testifies to their decisive role in the "second revolution." It also demonstrates the futility of Mr. Carter's efforts to end the Embassy occupation

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without being prepared to make Imam Khomeini any substantial offer.

The hostage affair rapidly became the principal cleavage separating Right from Left in domestic politics: all those who supported the Islamic students were in the good camp, on the side of anti-imperialism and the revolution, all the others could safely be labeled pro-Western counterrevolutionaries. In light of this, it is hardly surprising if few dared publicly to take a stand against the Embassy's occupation. The People's Mujahidin would have preferred the alternative of officially repudiating the some 900 agreements and contracts it claimed still tied Iran to the United States. Still, it saluted the November 4, 1979 event, although it later came to criticize the behavior of the Islamic students. The People's Fedayeen, who had ridiculed the superficial nature of Imam Khomeini's anti-imperialism in the early months, threw its entire weight behind the Embassy's occupiers after a few much remarked-upon hesitations. The moderate parties and public figures for the most part remained silent or adopted an attitude sufficiently ambiguous so as not to attract accusations of defending the United States. Only Mr. Bani-Sadr had the courage—or the imprudence—to state, as of November 6, that he disapproved of the seizure of hostages both on Islamic moral grounds and in the interests of the revolution. He lost no occasion to reiterate this opposition, and his relations with Imam Khomeini have not ceased to deteriorate since.

Paradoxically, Bani-Sadr—who had so vigorously fought Bazargan as head of the provisional government—has steered himself on a course strongly resembling the one which led the former premier to his ruin. He has thus laid himself wide open to his opponents, mainly the Islamic Republican Party and, above all, its President, Ayatollah Beheshti, who wasted no time relegating him to the dishonorable "liberal" camp. Predictably, they criticized him for his conciliatory attitude toward the United States, but also for his "illusions" concerning the possibility of close cooperation between Iran on the one hand and Europe and Japan on the other. Even his insistence on denouncing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was considered suspect, despite the fact that it was in keeping with the "neither East nor West" dogma of the militant clergy. In so doing, wasn't he trying to justify an indispensable normalization with the West in order to better cope with the peril from the East?

At the domestic level, Bani-Sadr has turned out to be as much

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a man of order as Bazargan. Immediately after his election as President of the Republic on January 25, 1979, he announced his intention of dissolving the Islamic committees and the "guardians of the revolution" (the militias) as soon as he had reorganized the armed forces, gendarmerie and the police. Two weeks later, he obtained the release of Mr. Minashi, the Minister of National Guidance who had been arrested as a CIA agent at the request of the Islamic students. Bani-Sadr later tried to protect other moderate figures such as Admiral Ahmed Madani and Khosrow Kashgai, but failed. Opposed to political violence on principle, Bani-Sadr declared on July 27: "Denunciations, slander, torture, violence, massacres, prisons, are nothing more than manifestations of a Stalinist society."

A good Muslim but marked by French culture, as was Mr. Bazargan, Bani-Sadr entertains mixed feelings about the Shi'ite clergy. At the "assembly of experts" formed to draw up the new constitution, he surprised friends and enemies by vigorously protesting against the wide powers proposed for the fagih (the religious guide of the state, presently Imam Khomeini). Despite his denials, he was later accused of having abstained from the vote on the constitutional article dealing with the fagih's powers, even though these were reduced compared to those provided for in the initial draft.

Whatever the case, Bani-Sadr has clearly taken a stand for the separation of powers and the non-interference of the clergy in affairs of state, to the point of deriding "the Richelieus and Mazarins who crowd the Iranian political scene." Just after his election to the presidency, he told this writer that he owed his "victory to the people," before adding that he thanked "the lower clergy for its support." The higher clergy, for him, is that which supports the Islamic Republic Party of Ayatollah Beheshti, his bitter enemy.

On the morrow of his election, Bani-Sadr proclaimed Ayatollah Beheshti "politically dead." His optimism did not seem unfounded at the time. Ayatollah Beheshti had just suffered three important setbacks: he had wanted to be a candidate in the presidential elections, but Imam Khomeini had forbidden religious leaders to seek this office. Next, he had put forward the candidacy of Jalaleddine Farsi, but Farsi was disqualified on account of his Afghan origins. Finally, he had backed the candidacy of Hassan Habibi, who got a mere ten percent of the vote against Bani-Sadr's 70 percent.

So when Bani-Sadr took office last January he thought he had

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won the final round. He asked Imam Khomeini's permission to form a second provisional government to last until the election of parliament. Such a measure would have enabled him to edge out the Revolutionary Council—principally made up of Ayatollah Beheshti's friends—and to carry on with the political and economic reforms of his choice. But Imam Khomeini refused to grant his request, and Bani-Sadr had to be satisfied with the limited "privilege" of presiding over the Revolutionary Council's meetings. Ayatollah Beheshti used his dominant position within the Council to thwart all of Bani-Sadr's initiatives and to build his own power base. He succeeded in getting the majority of the parliamentary seats attributed to his party in March 1980. Next, he got himself appointed head of the supreme court. Having thus wrested control of the judiciary and the legislature, he set out to capture the executive power. As a means of stripping the President of the last vestiges of his authority, reducing him to a mere figurehead, he demanded that the President's nominee for prime minister receive the prior endorsement of his party.

President Bani-Sadr resisted at every step. He contested the results of the legislative elections, but Imam Khomeini judged them "fair." He opposed new purges Beheshti's party called for in the administration and the various branches of the security forces, but he was obliged to yield when the Imam launched his appeal for a "cultural revolution" aimed at ridding the state of "counter-revolutionaries" and "Westernized liberals." In any case, the radicalization of the Islamic Republic had become inevitable after the American rescue mission last April 25, which highlighted the passivity or, as some claim, the complicity of the armed forces. In the six weeks following the American expedition, seven distinct plots were uncovered and several hundred officers arrested.

VII

The dangers threatening the Islamic Republic this summer were real enough. So was the overall deterioration of the political, economic and social situation. This journalist, in chance encounters with all strata of society—well-off and poor, urban and rural—heard nothing but complaints. The new agrarian reform decreed last winter had still not been applied in many regions of the country. Compared to the year preceding the revolution, state investments in agriculture had dropped by 20 percent, those in industry by 50 percent. Deprived of capital, spare parts (a consequence of the Western embargo) and competent managers, the factories of the public sector are operating on the average at less

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than half their capacity and for the most part are showing serious deficits.

The precise number of unemployed is unknown, but estimates vary between two and four million out of an active population of 11.5 million. The state pays a modest subsistence allowance to 800,000 of them, the others living by their wits or on the resources of their families. The inflation rate, officially estimated at 25 to 30 percent, in fact is believed to approach the level which set the middle classes against the Shah: 50 percent or more for the well-off housewife's consumer basket. Rents, which had dropped considerably after the fall of the monarchy, are almost as high today as they were in 1977–78. Prices of certain food items such as fresh vegetables, flour, meat and fruit have soared to unprecedented levels.

The middle classes suffer more than others from the rising cost of living because of their consumption patterns. Wage earners, like government employees (1.4 million, including members of the armed forces), have seen their buying power seriously reduced not only by inflation but also by the halving of higher salaries and the elimination of overtime and various benefits—measures which were adopted with an eye both to fairness and economy. Indeed, the state has been running at a deficit since the reduction of oil exports. The total revenues of the government, $21 billion this year, were not even sufficient to pay the civil servants. Unable to sell more oil, the government was obliged to take out loans or dip into its reserves, reduced to some $7 billion since the Iranian assets in American banks (about $8 billion) were frozen.

The economic situation has thus sharply deteriorated since the fall of the Bazargan government, despite the instructions Imam Khomeini issued immediately afterwards, enjoining the authorities to "assure the well-being of the *mostazefin*" (the disinherited). The Imam refrained from appointing a new government and thus gave free rein to the Council of the Revolution and the high dignitaries of the clergy who had his confidence. It was at that point that mullahs were appointed everywhere—in the armed forces, the police, the administration, in large industrial complexes and in almost all the ministries—to supervise and check up on the secular authorities. Anarchy grew as a result, and, as one highly placed official remarked to this writer, "no one was obeying anyone anymore."

The state administration was virtually paralyzed by the inertia—voluntary or otherwise—of civil servants, many of whom no doubt consciously sought to undermine the regime. Strikes mul-

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tiplied in state factories and public services. Daily cuts in electricity and running water antagonized the inhabitants of Tehran and other cities. The *pasdarans* (Islamic militias), loyal to rival decision centers, most often acted as they pleased. Certain army units refused to fight the Kurdish insurgents. During the summer the state was in an advanced state of decomposition while a series of military coups were uncovered, with ramifications in the political arena. Most serious of all was the possibility that popular discontent would be directed at the clergy, who would be held responsible for the deterioration of the situation.

Against this background Imam Khomeini's declaration of July 21, 1980, is more readily understood: "None of the present ministers is a revolutionary . . . and if the next government resembles this one, we can give the Islamic Republic up for lost, for we will be beaten." One also understands the significance of the massive purges, the arrests, the collective executions, the attacks against the offices of political parties, both Right and Left—those very parties that would benefit from the collapse of the Islamic Republic.

The moderate nationalists, principal targets of the "cultural revolution" unleashed in July, are considered the most dangerous. Indeed, their influence is pervasive in the economic centers, the state administration, the armed forces, the universities—in short, those areas traditionally dominated by the middle and upper middle classes, by the "Westernized" elites hostile to clerical power and socioeconomic upheavals. Their discontent—diffuse within the country because in the circumstances there is no figure to voice it—has been given focus in opposition groups abroad. Two daily broadcasts, one in the name of General Oveissi, the other in the name of Shahpur Bakhtiar, are beamed into Iran from "clandestine" radios in Iraqi territory and are very widely listened to by the population. It is no secret that Oveissi and Bakhtiar, among others, maintain close relations with the tribes and with civil and military groups—groups which, given more favorable circumstances, could possibly bring down the regime.

Despite the significant strides made by the Left these past months, its prospects are not bright—at least not in the foreseeable future. Unlike the Right, its social base is relatively limited. The Islamic movement, symbolized in the person of Imam Khomeini, has not lost the support of the less favored classes despite the disappointment and frustrations accumulating since the founding of the republic. The workers have not forgotten that their salaries in most cases have doubled since the revolution. Peasants receive

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generous subsidies—an average of 50 percent higher than they received under the Shah. Those who do not yet own land have not lost hope of benefiting from future agrarian reforms. As a result of the abundant rainfalls last winter and spring, the harvests are expected to be 20 to 30 percent greater this year than last. Above all, the *mostazefin* now feel they are living in "their own" republic, protected by Imam Khomeini.

Nonetheless, the People's Mujahidin, a Muslim movement with a very radical ideology, has managed within a few months to become a mass party, particularly feared by Imam Khomeini, to judge from his denunciations of "Islamo-Marxists." This June, the head of the movement, Massud Radjavi, was able to assemble 150,000 followers and sympathizers in a public meeting which had not even been announced by the mass media. The prestige of the Mujahidin is high, both because of the armed struggle it waged against the Shah, and because of the positions—resolutely favorable to the poorest class—it has adopted ever since the birth of the Republic. Nonetheless, the youth and inexperience of its cadres, coupled with the political errors they have committed, limit their possibilities of action, at least for the time being.

The Tudeh (communist) Party is smaller and has a much more limited following, but its influence has on several occasions proved far more decisive. Its cadres, generally trained in Eastern Europe, are of high quality. Perfectly informed about the international situation, capable of clearly formulating strategy and tactics and of applying them with unwavering discipline, they have been able to take advantage of the anti-American tide that has engulfed Iran in order to make friends and allies, even within the clergy. It has been noted that Imam Khomeini has never attacked the Tudeh by name—at least not as of mid-August 1980. When he denounces the communists, whom he sometimes calls the "American Left," he is especially aiming at the People's Fedayeen (Marxist-Leninist) which took up arms against the authorities in Kurdistan and elsewhere. His seeming indulgence for the orthodox communists can be explained by at least three facts: they have consistently supported him ever since his departure for exile in 1964 (their "clandestine" radio, probably located in East Germany, regularly broadcast his declarations recorded in Iraq); they are determined, like him, to "extirpate the very roots of American imperialism" in Iran; they have offered their help in defending and consolidating the Islamic Republic.

Two events occurring in rapid succession last June increased the Tudeh's margin of maneuver: the People's Fedayeen and the

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Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) were both shaken by internal dissent. After long and arduous debates, the majority of the Fedayeen's leadership decided to adopt an "anti-imperialist" political line practically identical to Tudeh's. The same took place within the KDP, triggering the schism of the minority faction, which accused the majority (led by Abdel Rahman Ghassemlou) of cooperating with Iraq and NATO. The importance of these divisions is that they strengthened the Tudeh's authority and hence its ability to come to the rescue of a tottering republic.

Imam Khomeini certainly does not wish to be dependent on any non-Islamic group, particularly a Marxist one. His behavior from the very beginning of his political struggle in the 1960s shows his intention of reserving the monopoly on power for the "authentic Muslims." Whether or not he will be able to achieve this goal remains to be seen. The Islamic Republican Party, on which he seems to want to lean, is not a structured mass party, but rather a collection of various religious and secular individuals and groups with diverging if not actually contradictory tendencies. Ayatollah Beheshti's party has consequently been unable to come up with a political, economic and social program, which is indispensable for any government party. More important, he cannot count on the support of a sufficient number of cadres to administer the state. The Iranian intelligentsia, refractory or hostile to the Islamic regime from its very outset, is split between the liberal Right and the Left, Marxist and otherwise.

VIII

Given Imam Khomeini's apparent determination not to share power with either of these two currents, the situation seems to be heading toward an impasse. A coup d'état in the immediate future seems doomed to failure. The high echelons of the army are divided, and the rank and file remains—until proof to the contrary—loyal to the Imam.

The question of how Imam Khomeini's eventual disappearance from politics would affect the Iranian situation has often been raised. At the very least, the response to this question is risky. The plethora of forces on the political scene, each one obeying its own internal and evolving dynamic, makes it impossible to hazard any valid prognosis for the medium or long term. The most that can be done is to evaluate the balance of forces such as it exists today and could remain for the near future.

As of mid-August, three phenomena could be noted: the decline in the prestige of the clergy as an instrument of government; the

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strengthening position of the leftist parties as a whole, but no where near the point of offering a credible alternative to Islamic rule; and the persistent influence of the moderate nationalists and the Right—liberal or otherwise—in the state institutions and economic centers of decision. This last category would thus appear the only one with a serious chance of taking control in the event of Khomeini's disappearance, especially since in all probability it would be supported by a good part of the army and a not inconsiderable part of the clergy. It should not be forgotten that the other five "grand ayatollahs" besides Khomeini all either disapprove of or are hostile to the Imam's religious and political concepts.

Yet for all that, a victory of the Right would by no means be assured. A great deal would depend on its own actions. If it follows Khomeini's "anti-imperialist line," satisfies the demands of the minorities, and guarantees the continued existence of the leftist parties, its chances of success would be increased. Otherwise, the obstacles in its path would probably be insurmountable. The Muslim and Marxist Left, supported by segments of the ethnic minorities and part of the clergy, is strong enough to keep the country in a state of anarchy comparable to that prevailing at present.

The role of the U.S.S.R. could weigh heavily in this regard. Up to the present, Moscow has treated Khomeini's republic with kid gloves, generally restraining itself from responding to the criticisms, attacks and threats showered upon it, particularly concerning Afghanistan. The Kremlin's tactic seems to have been to wait for the end of the power struggle in Iran while hoping to reap the fruits of America's errors. If a definitely unfriendly—i.e., pro-American—government took over in Tehran, undoubtedly the Soviet Union would no longer hesitate to support all the forces hostile to the new rulers. The major leftist movements—the Mujahidin, Fedayeen and Tudeh—already favor a tactical or strategic alliance with the socialist camp. Moreover, pro-Soviet sympathies are far from negligible in the provinces of Kurdistan, Guilan, Mazanderan and even Azerbaijan. In the light of all this, the civil war which would be triggered by the installation of any Pinochet-type regime would undoubtedly be long and, perhaps, even dangerous to world peace.

Thus, the prospects with or without Khomeini seem bleak indeed. The wisest course for the international community is surely patience, and most especially nonintervention in a country still in the throes of revolution. All things considered, the lesser of all evils for the Western powers is surely to leave to the Iranians themselves the freedom to determine their own future.

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Michael S. Teitelbaum

RIGHT VERSUS RIGHT: IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

There is now a growing realization that immigration and refugee issues may prove to be among the most important and troubling world problems of the next decade. The recent large flows of refugees or expellees from Indochina, Afghanistan and Cuba, all typically treated as short-term crises, instead may be harbingers of long-term trends of profound proportions. The same may be said for the accelerating trend of international migration, both legal and illegal.

Control over entry by non-citizens is generally considered one of the two or three universal attributes of national sovereignty; no government has ever explicitly abrogated this sovereign right, although on occasion a state has asserted the right of its citizens to enter another. Hence it is evident that problems of international migration, which are already large and of increasing magnitude, go to the heart of our collective definition of modern nation-states and of relations among them.

Immigration and refugee policy is of special and rapidly growing political importance in the United States. The debate is an increasingly unpleasant one, with anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments apparently strong and growing. The most recent national poll on the subject of refugees showed only 19 percent supporting President Carter's decision to double the admission of Indochinese refugees to 168,000 each year, while 46 percent actually wanted a reduction from the previous level of 84,000 per year. In a later poll, 91 percent of the sample supported "an all-out effort to stop the illegal entry into the United States of 1½ million foreigners who don't have entry visas" and 80 percent wanted to "reduce the quotas of the number of legal immigrants who can enter the U.S. each year."[1] In 1977, the Carter Admin-

[1] Roper Poll, September 1979 and June 1980.

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istration made a set of limited proposals that promptly dropped out of sight in the Congress. Now a national commission chaired by Theodore Hesburgh and including strong congressional representation is scheduled to come up with a new analysis and recommendations in early 1981. The problems can hardly fail to be faced in some fashion early in the next Administration.

The many critics of current U.S. immigration policies cannot be simply dismissed as xenophobic restrictionists. Even unthreatened and non-xenophobic people with progressive and humanitarian instincts differ greatly, sometimes vituperatively, in their perceptions of and prescriptions for American immigration policy. In large part this is because the debate is a contest of "right" versus "right." Excluding the kooks on the fringes, all sides advocate human rights and justice; none supports persecution and injustice. The disagreement is about which basic rights have precedence over which other basic rights; consensus in such a setting is, unsurprisingly, elusive.

II

Extensive international migration is far from peculiar to our time, but in two important aspects the modern epoch is unique. The first is the enhanced importance of the nation-state in the twentieth century; throughout most of human history, national boundaries (where they existed) were far more permeable to the temporary ebb and flow or permanent movement of peoples than they are today.

The second is the rapid increase in the size of human populations, which has magnified greatly the potential for mass movements across borders, and led to the exhaustion of relatively open spaces for new occupation. In the post-World War II period the rapid rise of population in the developing countries has greatly outstripped the rates of increase that prevailed in Europe during its most rapid period of growth and migration (chiefly to America).[2]

A further new factor is the revolution in international communication and transportation. Modern communications have brought the relative attractiveness of life in the developed world to the attention of quite remote populations in the developing

[2] At its peak growth during the latter part of the nineteenth century, the population of Europe was doubling every 70 years or so, as compared, for example, to doubling times of only 20–25 years for Mexico and Central America today. The total outflow from Europe between 1840 and 1930 numbered at least 52 million, or 17 percent of the estimated 1850 population of about 310 million.

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world, and the speed and availability of international travel have sharply reduced the barriers to international movement. The same modern communications have brought vividly before the world's conscience the suffering of refugees on the high seas or in hastily erected encampments, suffering of which most of us would have been unaware in the past.

In addition to these broad historical trends, there is general agreement that the world of the 1980s is a less stable place, both in political and in economic terms, than it has been for much of the postwar period. Domestic or international conflicts may produce real or only pyrrhic victors, but they always produce refugees. Increasing strife, coupled with populations that are today more than twice as large as those of 1950, portends burgeoning numbers of refugees seeking asylum in the coming decades.

The United States is a nation of immigrants, and most of us look with pride upon the invigoration and pluralism that immigrants continue to provide. We have not fully lived up to the poem inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, but the concept of a melting pot of many national origins, however lumpy we know it to be in practice, is still an American ideal. Today, however, the U.S. situation is unique both in world terms and in terms of our own history, by reason of five central facts—and one near-certain projection—that are not always widely grasped:

1) This country is by far the world's largest receiver of refugees and immigrants for permanent settlement; indeed it accepts on the order of twice as many as the rest of the world combined.

2) Immigration and refugee flows to the United States in the late 1970s were at or near the highest levels ever experienced, including the period before immigration was first broadly restricted in the 1920s.

3) There is much dispute as to the numbers of illegal immigrants in the United States, but no responsible group believes there are fewer than several million, and the consensus range is from four to six million as of the mid-1970s. Of these, about 50–60 percent are thought to be from Mexico, with many other countries providing the rest.

4) While immigration reforms since 1965 have had the laudable intent of eliminating discrimination and promoting diversity among immigrants, the reality has turned out differently. The actual working of the law and the sharp increase in illegal entry have produced an unprecedented concentration among a single linguistic group—Spanish-speakers.

5) There is every indication that the pressures of unemploy-

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ment, poverty and political instability in much of the developing world will increase greatly in the 1980s and 1990s, and despite conspicuous possible exceptions will tend toward an even greater concentration of immigrants in the groups already dominating current flows.

6) Enforcement of American immigration law by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is remarkably poor; under present circumstances the chances are very low of even detecting, much less apprehending, violators who show a little persistence.

Each of these points warrants brief elaboration, to be followed by discussion of how and why they are at once accepted and perceived quite differently (even emotionally) from different perspectives. The concluding discussion concerns the policy implications of both the facts themselves and the political realities of divergent perspectives.

III

The United States is by far the world's largest receiver of refugees and immigrants for permanent settlement. In 1978, the last year for which official statistics are available, over 600,000 legal immigrants and refugees were admitted for permanent residence in the United States.[3] (The 1980 figure seems certain to rise to 700–800,000 or even higher under current policies.) The 1978 total represents not only the largest number accepted by any nation in the world in that year, but perhaps twice as many as were received by all other countries combined.[4]

In addition to the legal flow, the United States is currently experiencing a large "illegal" or "undocumented" influx.[5] As with all clandestine processes, it is almost impossible to obtain accurate data on such migration. While there are extreme claims on both

[3] This figure excludes those entering the U.S. under a small legal temporary-worker program. In continental Western Europe, by contrast, the overwhelming bulk of legal entry in recent decades has been under such temporary-worker ("Gastarbeiter") programs; in very few cases are such entrants expected to become citizens. In the United States, of course, it is assumed that the great bulk of those admitted for permanent residence eventually will become U.S. citizens.

[4] A minor caveat is in order for the specific year 1978; in that year the People's Republic of China, not ordinarily a country of immigration, admitted an unknown number of Vietnamese nationals of Chinese origin on a one-time basis.

[5] A word on nomenclature is in order here. Persons present in the United States in violation of immigration laws are described by a variety of terms, including illegal aliens, undocumented workers, and illegal immigrants or migrants. None of these several terms is entirely appropriate. The term "illegal" is offensive to some who believe it attributes blame to the victim. The term "undocumented" is offensive to others, who consider it a euphemism. The term "alien" has other-worldly connotations to some. The term "immigrant" assumes permanence of settlement that may not occur, and the term "migrant" has a connotation of non-permanence that may not be true. These various imperfect terms are used interchangeably in this article, with no offensive connotations intended.

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sides, most observers would agree that the annual inflow of illegal migrants is considerably larger than that of legal migrants and refugees, that the return flow is also considerably larger, and that the net inflow (i.e., those remaining after return migrants are subtracted) is perhaps roughly equal to the net legal flow.

Thus, a statistically conservative conclusion would be that in the past several years the United States has been receiving a net inflow, legal and illegal, amounting to at least one million persons per year—a minimum of 600,000 legal in-migrants, less perhaps 100,000 legal out-migrants, plus a comparable net flow of illegal migrants. The 1980 figures no doubt will be larger still.

Net immigration on this scale is at or near the highest levels ever experienced in American history. In the 1901–10 decade, the previous peak, legal immigration averaged 880,000 annually, and there was little known illegal entry. With a present U.S. population more than double what it was then, the current inflow represents a considerably smaller numerical ratio. On the other hand, the current record-low fertility of the U.S. population (lower even than in the depression years of the 1930s) means that international migration is accounting for a greater share of total population increase than ever before. If the above estimate of total annual net immigration is near the mark, it represents at least 40–50 percent of annual U.S. population change.

Estimates of the number of "undocumented" or "illegal" migrants presently in the United States range from as low as 2 million to as high as 12 million, with most responsible observers coalescing on a range of 4–6 million as of the mid-1970s, probably with substantial increases since then.[6] The absence of firm evidence has made this subject a popular one for demagogues. Some have tended to exaggerate the numbers radically and speak of a "silent invasion"; others have sought to downplay the magnitude, claiming that it is insignificant in size and impact. But the consensus estimate of 4–6 million as of five years ago is, by any measure, very large and important.

The concentration of the modest enforcement efforts of the Immigration and Naturalization Service along the Mexican border has given rise to a popular impression that almost all illegal migrants are Mexicans. Most objective observers believe that the Mexican percentage is closer to 50–60 percent, with the other 40–

[6] *The New York Times* (January 16, 1980, p. A1) quotes unnamed "authorities in the State Department" as estimating that as of 1980 "the number of illegal aliens in the United States is at least 10 million, and these ranks are swelling at a rate of about two million a year." The 4–6 million range as of the mid-1970s has been accepted as reasonable by such responsible sources as former INS Commissioner Leonel Castillo, the Select Committee on Population of the U.S. House of Representatives, and senior demographers at the Bureau of the Census.

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50 percent coming from the Caribbean, Central and South America, Asia and Europe. Mexico is by far the largest single source country, but the problem is wider.

American immigration flows have come to be dominated to an unprecedented degree by immigrants speaking a single foreign language—Spanish—contrary to the intention of recent immigration reforms to encourage all forms of diversity and pluralism. The 1965 reforms of the Immigration and Nationality Act did away at last with the blatantly racist nature of the quotas developed during the 1920s. Under the 1965 and 1976 reforms, each individual nation now has an equal ceiling of 20,000 potential immigrants per year, which however does not include those who are eligible for admission because of immediate family ties to U.S. citizens. Under these laws the *national* diversity of immigration to the United States has increased dramatically in the past decade.

Linguistic diversity is another matter. The 1965 Act also provided for a regional ceiling of 120,000 immigrants from the whole Western Hemisphere, and for a ceiling of 170,000 from all other areas together. In practice, however, the family ties provision has meant that the number of legal immigrants from Hemisphere Spanish-speaking countries has steadily grown and has itself usually exceeded the regional ceiling substantially.[7] More important, the recent heavy influx of illegal migrants has been heavily concentrated, as we have just noted, among Spanish-speakers. The INS reports that, in the period 1968–77, approximately 35 percent of all legal immigrants to the United States were Spanish-speaking. If one adds to this figure plausible estimates of Spanish-speaking illegal immigrants, it becomes clear that over the past decade perhaps 50 percent or more of legal and illegal immigrants to the United States have been from a single foreign-language group.[8]

Such linguistic concentration is quite unprecedented in the long history of U.S. immigration. While there were substantial concen-

[7] The unpredictable, and sometimes large, numbers of Cuban refugees admitted under special arrangements in particular years make it difficult to choose a "normal" year. But in 1977, for example, the total of legal immigrants from the Western Hemisphere was about 223,000, of whom perhaps 30,000 (from Canada, Jamaica, Haiti and Brazil) were non-Spanish-speaking. Mexico, the largest single source country, was responsible that year for 44,079 legal immigrants, of whom more than half came under the family ties provision. (For unrelated and probably temporary reasons, the 1978 figures, the latest available, for Mexico were even higher—see footnote 10.) By comparison, all of the countries of Africa, taken together, sent an average of only about 7,000 legal immigrants per year to the United States during the past decade.

[8] One of the reviewers of this article, Dr. Charles Keely of the Population Council, has reminded me that there is also a very high concentration of his fellow Catholics among current immigrants and refugees from Latin America and Asia, and suggests that this pattern, if continued, will engender important social dynamics within the Church and its hierarchy in the coming decades.

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trations of a particular language group in past decades (e.g., 28 percent German-speaking in 1881–90 and 23 percent Italian-speaking in 1901–10), previous immigration flows generally were characterized by a broad diversity of linguistic groups ranging from Chinese to Polish to Spanish to Swedish. Furthermore, those concentrations that did occur proved to be short-lived.

The pressures for international migration can be expected to increase greatly over the coming decades. Moreover the trend in U.S. immigration flows is almost certain to be toward even greater concentration among already predominant groups. According to the International Labour Organization, the developing world will have to generate between 600 and 700 million new jobs in the next 20 years merely to absorb the rapid growth in its labor force and keep its unemployment rate from increasing. This number of new jobs is more than presently exist in the whole of the industrialized world taken together.[9]

Even more to the point are the high rates of population increase in prospect for almost all the developing countries that in recent years have been primary sources of migrants to the United States.[10] With the exceptions of Jamaica and Cuba, all of these nations can expect population growth ranging from a third to nearly 90 percent over the next 20 years. While measures to limit population growth could have an increasing impact on longer-term population trends in these countries, the great bulk of these 20-year increases are foreordained by births that have already taken place.[11]

In rough terms one may assess the prospects for emigration pressures in four groupings of countries that have been leading sources of legal immigrants in recent years:

The first group, developed or near-developed countries with low rates of population increase—e.g., Canada, Italy, the United

[9] International Labour Organization, *Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950–2000*, Second Edition, Volume V, (Geneva: 1977), Table 6.

[10] In Latin America and the Caribbean, prominent source countries include Mexico (92,367), Cuba (29,754), the Dominican Republic (19,458), Jamaica (19,265), and Colombia (8,272*). In Asia, they include the Philippines (37,276), South Korea (29,288), Taiwan (21,315), and India (20,753). Finally, among developed countries are the United Kingdom (14,245), Canada (12,688*), Portugal (9,657*), Greece (7,838*), and Italy (7,510*). The numbers in parentheses are the latest tabulations of legal immigrants by country of origin available from the INS, which is so tardy in its reporting that these are 1978 figures (1977 when asterisked). In addition, there were in 1978 88,543 Vietnamese refugees whose status was adjusted to immigrants.

[11] Examples of projected 20-year population increases are 89 percent for Mexico; 64 percent for the Philippines; 58 percent for both Colombia and the Dominican Republic; 45 percent for India; 34 percent for Taiwan and South Korea; and 27 percent for both Jamaica and Cuba. In contrast, the comparable figures for developed countries are: Canada, 21 percent (including substantial immigration); Portugal, 17 percent; Greece, 10 percent; Italy, 7 percent; and the United Kingdom, 1 percent. All figures are rounded and based on data from the United Nations and the World Bank, as compiled in Population Reference Bureau, *1980 World Population Data Sheet*, Washington, 1980.

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Kingdom, Portugal and Greece—seem unlikely to experience great continuing emigration pressures, barring political or economic upheavals.

In the second group of countries, large developing nations from areas other than Latin America, India deserves special mention. Although India has no long history of large-scale out-migration here (as it has to the U.K.), the numbers in recent years have been substantial and a "critical mass" may be emerging that could lead to increased flows, especially from family ties. India's population is projected to increase by 45 percent, or 300 million, over the next two decades. Depending on its economic and political fortunes, it may or may not produce heavy pressures for immigration to the United States. India is officially English-speaking, albeit with multiple regional languages.

The third group consists of a number of smaller Asian developing countries with close historical ties to the United States and with varying levels of political instability—e.g., South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Most already have more or less well-established patterns of out-migration to the United States, with the Philippines and South Korea routinely oversubscribing available visas. Threats of international hostilities, civil war or internal convulsions face many of these countries more or less vividly. If such developments were to occur, strong pressures would arise for admission of large numbers of refugees, as in the recent cases of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. English is a relatively popular second language in most of these countries.

It is the fourth group about which one can state with assurance that all indicators favor the rapid escalation of pressures for out-migration to the United States. This group consists of the relatively contiguous countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, including Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Jamaica. Most are predominantly Spanish-speaking (with obvious exceptions in Haiti, Jamaica and many small Caribbean islands), with generally little prevalence of English as a second language. Most of the countries in this group have long-established patterns of substantial out-migration to the United States; their rapid population growth and the high proportion of young people (typically 45 percent or more under age 15, as compared to 22 percent in the United States) portend daunting rates of labor force growth. As a study prepared at the Inter-American Development Bank puts the problem:

> Stated briefly and in comparative terms, the United States in its best year

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since the Second World War (1977) created four million jobs; but Latin America, with one-fifth to one-sixth the economic base (GDP) must from now to the end of the century annually create four million jobs, just in order not to fall behind in its present high rate of unemployment. Does anyone truly believe they can do this?[12]

Mexico, for example, is hard put at present to provide jobs and sustenance for its 68 million people, even with millions having emigrated already to the United States. Yet Mexico is projected to add more than 60 million to its population in the next two decades. Over the near future, 700,000 new jobs per year will have to be created if already high unemployment rates are not to rise, yet even optimistic official forecasts predict only about 350,000 new jobs per year.[13] Colombia, often considered one of the success stories of Latin America in attempts to lower rapid population growth, will nonetheless increase by over 15 million from its present 27 million by the year 2000. Unless there is great success in generating jobs for these additional millions, the already large pressures for illegal migration of Colombians to Venezuela and to the United States can be expected to increase accordingly.

Enforcement of American immigration law is remarkably lax by any standard of assessment. The open land borders of the United States have received far less enforcement attention than would be considered normal policing effort in any town or city. Although the INS concentrates the bulk of its small Border Patrol forces along the Mexico-U.S. border, during an eight-hour period there are on average only 350 border patrolmen assigned to this 2,000-mile unfortified perimeter—less than the normal force of police assigned to guard the U.S. Capitol and its office buildings, comprising in total 103 acres.

The entire fleet of INS aircraft used to survey the lengthy borders and coastlines of the world's leading producer of aircraft consists of three leased helicopters (one of which was downed and destroyed recently by smugglers or illegal aliens) and 28 Piper Cubs and Cessnas. The U.S.-Canadian border, thought to be an important entry point for illegal aliens from the Caribbean and Asia, is punctuated with many small road crossings where the only official presence is represented by a road sign requesting border crossers

[12] "Urbanizing Latin America," paper presented by Robert W. Fox of the Inter-American Development Bank at the Global Conference on the Future, Toronto, Canada, July 21, 1980. The International Labour Organization projects labor force growth for Latin America of between 86 million and 95 million over the 20-year period 1980–2000. *Op. cit.* footnote 9, Vol. 3, Table 6.

[13] Peter H. Smith, *Mexico: the Quest for a U.S. Policy*, New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1980, p. 25.

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to kindly report to the nearest INS office.

Enforcement of U.S. law regarding those entering legally on temporary visas is equally lax, both at ports of entry and internally. Of the more than eight million persons entering the United States on such visas in 1977, the archaic INS administrative system was unable to account for the departure of 15 percent, or over 1,200,000; no one knows how many of these stayed on illegally. Despite abundant evidence of widespread visa abuse by nationals from Caribbean countries (especially from the Dominican Republic), the State Department continues to issue "shopping passes" (known as annotated visas) that allow applicants unable to qualify for tourist or business visas to enter Puerto Rico only, for purposes of "furthering the inter-island economy." Yet once a person holding an annotated visa enters Puerto Rico, there is no effective mechanism in place to determine if he/she ever departs the island, or to bar a domestic flight from Puerto Rico to the U.S. mainland.

There is also considerable evidence that both the issuance and use of student visas have been subject to widespread abuse. Most Americans, even members of Congress, would be surprised to learn that profit-making technical training schools (e.g., for beauticians and auto mechanics) have been authorized by the INS to issue the Form I-20 that generally results in the immediate issuance of a student visa. Even the respectable non-profit education sector has seen the emergence of unscrupulous foreign student recruiters and a black market in visa forms, especially as small and financially strapped colleges have a harder time finding domestic students willing and able to pay high tuition fees.[14]

While in most countries it is a violation of law for employers to hire persons without legal visas or working papers, in U.S. law the so-called Texas Proviso specifically exempts employers from the legal proscriptions on harboring illegal aliens.[15] This bizarre provision, adopted in 1952 apparently at the behest of Texas agricultural interests, injects an obvious asymmetry into law; a person

[14] *The New York Times* of January 15, 1980 reported that these recruiters charge fees of up to 15 percent of first-year tuition payments, and that blank I-20 forms signed by U.S. college officials were on sale for $700 to $1500 on the black market in Iran. The president of as respectable an institution as Bennington College admitted to the *Times* that his college issued such blank presigned forms, which he "supposed it wasn't the moral thing to do."

[15] The Texas Proviso makes interesting reading: Any person who "willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, in any place . . . any alien . . . not duly admitted . . . shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs: *Provided, however, that for the purposes of this section, employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.*" (Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 274(a), emphasis added.)

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without proper papers is not permitted to obtain employment in the United States, but it is quite legal for his employer to employ him.

In addition, the substantial internal controls on resident noncitizens in most developed countries (e.g., compulsory annual police registration in Great Britain, and such registration coupled with identity papers in France and West Germany) do not exist in the United States.[16] Finally, the investigative staff of the INS, responsible for detecting, apprehending and processing several million undocumented migrants, numbers only about 1,000 persons nationwide.

In summary, the 2,000-mile Mexico-U.S. border and the 4,000-mile Canada-U.S. border are essentially porous, and the administration of visas for tourists, students, "shoppers," and other temporary visitors is such that anyone able to enter on such a visa can stay on permanently and obtain employment if so desired.

IV

Although a high level of emotionalism is characteristic of all sides of U.S. debates on immigration, most advocates would probably accept as factually correct the six propositions stated above. The differences center in part on other social and economic issues, but inextricably intertwined with these are deep underlying issues of political principle and political power, as well as the interests of special groups.

Ideologies, both coherent and incoherent, have long loomed large in American immigration policy. When the historic policy of openness was abandoned in the late nineteenth century, the first targets were Chinese; in 1870 their naturalization was forbidden, and a series of later measures culminated in the total exclusion of working-class Chinese. Then, in the 1920s, the first comprehensive immigration laws adopted by the Congress were blatantly and self-consciously racist, products of the political stirrings and pseudoscientific excesses of Know-Nothings, Eugenicists, and Social Darwinists. Two examples suffice: the laws essentially excluded all Asians (even in the 1950s the annual quota for Chinese immigrants was 105 and for Japanese 185;[17]) the quotas were deliberately designed to favor immigrants from Northern and Western Europe and to limit severely the number of immi-

[16] Present U.S. law does require address notification by all aliens via completion of a postcard to be sent to the INS each January. While many aliens comply with this requirement, many do not, and there is no effort at enforcement.

[17] Presidential Proclamation 2980 of June 30, 1952, implementing Sections 201(b) and 202 of the McCarran-Walter Act.

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grants from Southern and Eastern Europe, many of whom were Catholic or Jewish and deemed to be of "inferior racial stock." The 1952 McCarran-Walter reforms retained many of these features, added restrictions of a more political (anti-communist) nature, and shifted emphasis heavily toward reunification of families and toward the highly skilled.

The reforms adopted in 1965 represented a substantial victory over the discriminatory principles of the 1952 Act. The exclusionary treatment of Asians was eliminated entirely. Principles of fairness and pluralism in immigration policy were affirmed by allocation of an equal ceiling of 20,000 per year for each nation, whether or not it had been the source of substantial numbers of immigrants in the past.[18] In 1980 the Refugee Act eliminated the narrowly anti-communist tone of the McCarran-Walter definition of refugees and applied equal criteria to refugees from all forms of repression and discrimination.

Overall, then, the intention of legislative reform over the past 15 years has tended ideologically toward nondiscriminatory immigration policies favoring a plural mix of immigrants and refugees from diverse ethnic, political, national and racial groups. In recent years, various groups have pushed the case further, contending that a "right to immigrate" should be accepted as a part of individual human rights, seeking to redefine the term refugee to include "economic refugees" escaping poverty, or urging a vision of a new world order of open borders. Other arguments have turned on whether the United States should have a conscious policy as to its eventual overall population size, and if so the bearing of immigration on such a policy. That the United States should remain a plural society hospitable to immigrants from all nations is today seldom explicitly questioned; we have come a long way, both in principle and in practice, from the dark days of the 1920s. But it would be misleading to pretend that the prejudices of earlier times are totally dead, and they too are sometimes expressed in ideological terms.

Beyond (and often behind) such deep-seated arguments of principle or ideology are real differences of perceived political or economic advantage and cost among different advocates and interest groups. Some employers see large-scale immigration (and especially continued illegal immigration) as providing an opportunity to increase their profits by "disciplining" the work force as to wages, hours, conditions and productivity. Most labor leaders,

[18] Initially countries in the Western Hemisphere were not subject to this 20,000 per country provision; this was changed by amendment in 1976.

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not surprisingly, see the same phenomenon as undercutting the hard-won gains and future prospects of domestic workers. While some ethnic and religious leaders see large flows of immigrants of their own group as adding to their political influence and economic power, others of the same groups see such flows as threatening the achievements and social advancement of already resident members. Some leaders of other ethnic groups see such large-scale flows as threats to the status and welfare of those they seek to represent, while others see the new arrivals as potential political allies. Those who favor slowing the rate of growth of the population or of the labor force see accelerating immigration as frustrating that goal; those who favor continued or accelerated population or labor-force growth see immigration as compensating for the present low levels of U.S. fertility.

Since the available evidence on the consequences of current immigration is weak, each advocacy group is able to find some form of nominally "scientific" corroboration for its own posture—provided too often by advocate-scholars whose research findings seem determined by personal ideological commitments. In such a setting, it is difficult indeed for the interested and concerned observer to distinguish truth from misrepresentation, and to assess the merits of alternative policy approaches. The remainder of this article therefore seeks to review available evidence on the costs and benefits of large-scale immigration as objectively as possible, with full attention paid to the limits and ambiguities of our knowledge, and to suggest at least the outlines of alternative policy approaches.

V

We begin by emphasizing that today's heated debate is concerned solely with *large-scale* immigration and refugee flows, of the magnitudes that have been experienced in the United States during the past several years, i.e., numbers on the order of a million or more legal and illegal immigrants and refugees per year, or nearly half of total population growth. Similar disputes do *not* arise regarding moderate levels of legal immigration such as those of the 1950s, which averaged about 250,000 per year and 10 percent of population growth, or those of the 1960s, which averaged about 330,000 per year and just over 15 percent of population growth. To the author's knowledge, no responsible group opposes continued immigration at such levels, which are moderate by U.S. historical standards, although admittedly very high by comparison with most other countries.

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Historically, a primary motivation for a policy permitting or encouraging large-scale immigration into the United States has been the need for labor in a burgeoning continental nation with a rapidly expanding economy. For the immigrants, a prominent attraction of the United States (in addition to political and religious freedom) was the easy availability of jobs providing high remuneration by the standards of the sending countries.[19]

The question in 1980 is whether the contribution of large-scale immigration to the U.S. labor force continues to be as important and productive as in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or whether in changed economic and technological conditions it no longer contributes substantially to the economy. A related question is whether large-scale immigration benefits some groups but has high costs for others, and if so how to balance these interests.

There can be little doubt that the millions of guest workers who migrated to some Western and Northern European countries in the 1950s and 1960s were an important factor in the economic miracle experienced by those countries in that period. In the face of a shortage of labor to staff the rapidly expanding economic structure, primarily in the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Switzerland, many governments chose to import temporary workers from labor-surplus countries such as Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Algeria, with the view that these workers would stay for only a year or two and then return to their home countries with accumulated savings and know-how that would make them more productive there. In the meantime, the intention was to encourage automation and higher productivity in the sectors employing such foreign labor so that it would not be required in the future.

As is well known, this "temporary" migration grew to be far more permanent than intended; at the present time, there are five million guest-workers and seven million dependents in Western and Northern Europe,[20] in spite of an almost universal policy shift in 1973 seeking to avoid recourse to foreign labor and to encourage return migration by those already present. The underlying reason for this policy shift in Western Europe was the increasing social costs of the guest-worker program that became visible in the late 1960s and early 1970s, although the proximate explanation given was fear of recession after the 1973 oil embargo and quadrupling

[19] During the high unemployment years of the 1930s, legal immigration averaged only 53,000 per year—the lowest level by far of any decade after the 1820s.

[20] OECD, SOPEMI, 1980.

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of oil prices. There were also domestic political backlashes (including racial or ethnic antagonisms in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and a national anti-immigration referendum in Switzerland that failed only narrowly). In short, as social and political costs grew while economic growth declined and unemployment increased, the short-term economic justification that underlay European immigration policy waned. Although a large proportion of the temporary workers remain (having in some cases resisted strong pressures for repatriation), their employment is increasingly in clearly defined areas and the trend is toward reduction rather than increase.

Similar economic forces led to sharp downward revisions in immigration quotas at about the same time in most other Western countries receiving large numbers of immigrants, e.g., Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The only exception to this pattern in the Western world has been that of the United States, in which the number of legal immigrants has actually increased substantially over the 1970s, as apparently has the number of illegal or undocumented immigrants.

A major question for future U.S. policy therefore arises: What are the impacts of current and prospective patterns of immigration on the U.S. labor market and economic system? Opinions on this subject range widely among labor economists and other experts. The predominant view is that while continuation of a significant flow of immigrants with scarce skills can represent an important contribution by filling gaps in the American labor force, there is no longer economic justification for large numbers of relatively unskilled and ill-educated immigrant workers and their dependents. In this view, the U.S. economy is now a highly advanced one in which relatively high or specialized levels of education and work skills are virtual necessities for productive employment. While jobs can be found by unskilled workers willing to accept low pay and poor conditions of employment (a maid in El Paso is said to earn $30–$40 per week, with no limits on hours worked and no social security or other benefits), a large pool of such workers contributes little to productivity. Indeed, in this view the fact that most illegal aliens are employed in low-skill occupations represents a self-fulfilling prophecy: the large number of compliant workers generates market demand for such labor by retarding the upgrading of wage and working conditions that would make the same jobs attractive to Americans and encourage investment in labor-saving technologies.

As to the future, projections of the balance of demand and

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supply of labor are clouded in uncertainty. It seems clear that the fertility decline in the United States since the 1960s will mean a tapering off of the rate of growth of indigenous young labor force entrants in the coming decades: specifically, the labor force is projected to still be growing by about 1.2 million per year in the mid-1980s, down from the recent annual increase of 1.5 million. However, if labor force participation of women continues to increase more rapidly than previously anticipated, as has been the case over the past decade, and if political and economic forces lead to a gradual increase in the average age of retirement, as seems likely, the native-born labor force of the United States may well expand more rapidly than projected.

On the other side of the supply-demand equation, there is consensus that it is quite impossible to predict the demand for labor in the U.S. economy beyond the next few years. Fundamentally this is true because no one is able to predict the future of the American economy as a whole, with uncertainties about energy, inflation and capital formation looming large. Moreover, the demand for labor is itself closely related to the supply. For example, if unskilled labor were to become relatively scarce, then its price would rise in relative terms, thereby encouraging mechanization of tasks otherwise performed by unskilled laborers, and also stimulating labor force participation by potential workers who under previous wage conditions found little work incentive as compared to other sources of support available to them.[21]

Under these circumstances of simultaneous uncertainty about both supply and demand, it appears to be beyond the realm of our capacity to predict accurately the tightness or looseness of U.S. labor markets very far into the future. Undaunted, some have tried nonetheless, and on the basis of their results have argued that much-expanded immigration is a necessity for future American economic growth.[22] Such efforts notwithstanding, there is no supportable evidence that U.S. labor markets require large-scale immigration now or in the coming decades, although periodic and objective reassessments must be made as conditions change.

[21] See, for example, Michael Wachter, "The Labor Market and Immigration: the Outlook for the 1980s," in *Staff Report Companion Papers*, Interagency Task Force on Immigration Policy, Departments of Justice, Labor and State, August, 1979, p. 222. Also, Vernon Briggs, "Mexican Workers in the United States Labor Market: A Contemporary Dilemma," *International Labour Review*, November 1975, pp. 351-58. Also, Michael J. Greenwood, "The Economic Consequences of Immigration for the United States: A Survey of the Findings," in *Staff Report Companion Papers*, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[22] See, for example, Clark Reynolds, "Labor Market Projections for the United States and Mexico and Their Relevance to Current Migration Controversies," paper presented to the American Assembly on Mexican-U.S. Relations, 1979.

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A different view—essentially a different philosophical stance—is taken by a minority of labor economists and other commentators, who hold that there exists a "dual economy" in modern industrial societies, which requires a substantial and growing number of low-paid and unskilled workers in the "secondary labor market." In this view, these jobs will continue to be necessary but so undesirable that they cannot attract enough members of the domestic labor force, no matter what their wages and conditions, and unskilled labor from abroad must therefore be imported to fill them.[23] Hence they see large-scale immigration of unskilled workers as a structural requirement of industrialized capitalist states.

A subsidiary issue is whether immigrants contribute to the productivity of the U.S. economy because they are more hard-working and energetic than are citizens of the United States. The legal immigrants in the 1950s and early 1960s were relatively well educated and highly skilled, and appear to have done well as measured by income, eventually surpassing the average income levels of members of the domestic population with equal educational attainment; the one exceptional group that did not do well economically was immigrants from Mexico, who were predominantly unskilled.[24] Unfortunately, there is no comparable evidence on the considerably different legal immigration flows of the late 1960s and the 1970s, as these must await data from the 1980 Census. Furthermore, legal immigration over the 1970s, as already noted, has been substantially augmented by illegal or undocumented immigration of perhaps the same order of magnitude. Since this latter flow appears to be largely unskilled and poorly educated, it would appear that immigration in the 1970s was increasingly concentrated in the groups least likely to do well.

To summarize, it is apparent that immigration can contribute substantially to economic welfare under conditions of rapid economic growth and low unemployment, as in the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. Such benefits are far less likely to have occurred under the conditions that have prevailed in the United States since the early 1970s: low economic growth and high unemployment, especially among those with the lowest educational and

[23] A prominent example of this perspective may be found in Wayne Cornelius, *Mexican and Caribbean Migration to the United States* (Ms., University of California at San Diego, 1979). See also Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

[24] Barry Chiswick, "The Economic Progress of Immigrants: Some Apparently Universal Patterns," in William Fellner (ed.), *Contemporary Economic Problems, 1979*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979.

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skill levels. The predominant expert view, therefore, is that large-scale immigration of low-skill workers cannot be expected to contribute to overall economic well-being over the foreseeable future, though there is economic evidence favoring continued openness to persons with needed skills. (A few examples are technicians, nurses, computer programmers, and successful small business entrepreneurs. Note that such skills do not imply an "elitist" admissions policy based on levels of education alone; while literacy and numeracy do seem important to an individual's economic success in the advanced U.S. economy, there is actually a current surplus of Ph.D.'s and other highly educated professionals.) What is needed from an economic standpoint is a moderate flow that emphasizes individuals in fairly clear job categories.

As indicated above, a related economic question is whether large-scale immigration, whatever might be its contribution to aggregate economic performance, may contribute differentially to the economic well-being of different social groups. Here there seems to be a general consensus among economists that to the extent that there are beneficiaries of immigration, they are the immigrants themselves and the employers and middle-class consumers who tend to benefit from cheap labor in the industrial, agricultural, service and domestic sectors. The possible losers appear to be the lower-income groups of the U.S. population—relatively disadvantaged citizens and recent immigrants who are affected by a growing population of energetic and sometimes even desperate foreign workers willing to work under wage and working conditions that to domestic workers are unattractive but for the immigrants far exceed anything they have experienced.[25]

Despite emotional claims to the contrary, there is general agreement that only moderate direct displacement of labor occurs through one-on-one competition between citizen and immigrant for a particular job, since most citizens are unwilling even to apply for jobs with poor wages and working conditions. However, it is also generally agreed that large-scale inflows of unskilled and compliant labor tend to depress (or to retard improvement of) the wage and benefit conditions of the jobs that are the only ones available to many domestic labor force entrants, especially mi-

[25] For example, the average hourly wage in the United States is currently five to ten times that of Mexico, and the prospects for employment in Mexico are far poorer than in the United States. From the point of view of an unskilled Mexican, U.S. job and wage prospects, even at or below legal minimum wage levels, are highly attractive. From the point of view of a poor minority group member in the United States, such wages yield a living standard not substantially higher even than the modest levels provided by income transfer benefits, "underground-economy" activities or family support.

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norities, youth, women and recent immigrants.[26] Hence the pattern is predominantly one of indirect effects, through relative distortion downward as wages and working conditions in affected markets do not change while those in other jobs continue to improve.[27]

VI

There has been much discussion regarding the use by immigrants, legal and illegal, of expensive social services, with consequent effects upon the budgetary problems of federal, state and local governments. Here there have been especially extreme claims on both sides. Those seeking to minimize the impact of migrants claim that there is little or no utilization of such services, especially by illegal immigrants who are said to be fearful of applying for benefits. Those who seek to maximize the perceived impacts of immigration in these sectors appeal to the widespread dismay among the American public regarding the rapid growth of governmental spending, and of welfare, health and education spending in particular, and seek to blame these expansions very largely on immigrants.

A calmer statement of what we know would look something like this. Immigrants, legal and illegal, do make use of social and educational services at levels varying from high to low. Legal immigrants (and especially refugees) initially make substantial use of many such services, though most appear to become productive labor force participants within several years of arrival.[28] With regard to illegal immigrants, the available evidence (admittedly from record systems not designed to record legal status) suggests that publicly financed health services (especially emergency, obstetric and pediatric services) are widely employed; educational

[26] A further issue of unknown significance but considerable concern to disadvantaged groups in the United States is the extent to which affirmative action programs are benefiting the many immigrants who fit their criteria rather than the indigenous U.S. minorities and women who were their intended beneficiaries.

[27] For a discussion of these effects, see Greenwood and Wachter, *op. cit.*, footnote 21.

[28] The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that legal immigrants may be deported if they become a "public charge" within five years of arrival due to a medical or other condition preexisting their arrival. Furthermore, sponsors of legal immigrants (usually family members) are often required to complete a notarized "Affidavit of Support" swearing to their ability and willingness to provide economic support for the prospective immigrant they are sponsoring. However, several court and administrative rulings have neutralized these provisions, providing that the "public charge" provision cannot be applied to government support that does not require repayment, i.e., to virtually all welfare and public-subsidy benefits, and that "Affidavits of Support" are not legally binding documents. A recent amendment to the Social Security Act introduced by Senators Percy and Cranston would require that the sponsor's income and assets be counted in considering a newly arrived alien's application for Supplemental Security Income (S.S.I.), a quasi-welfare benefit for which only low-income persons who are over 65, disabled, or blind are eligible.

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(especially remedial and bilingual) services used substantially; unemployment insurance used but not disproportionately; welfare less so; and social security retirement benefits very little. At the same time, immigrants both legal and illegal do pay taxes to support such services, though in the case of the low-paid workers who apparently predominate among illegal immigrants, such taxes are of course very low.[29]

Each of these social service sectors is clouded in controversy and litigation. The County of Los Angeles has sued the federal government for $87.9 million in unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by illegal immigrants there. There is presently a highly publicized judicial battle in the state of Texas regarding the obligation of local and state governments to provide free education to illegal immigrant children. (The Federal District Court in Houston ruled recently that such services must be provided; the case surely will be appealed.) Welfare fraud by illegal immigrants was considered such a problem in New York City that it now requires welfare applicants claiming to be Puerto Rican but with inadequate documentation to obtain certification from the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. While some argue that recent immigrant workers are subsidizing the social security retirement system because they have payments withheld but draw little in retirement benefits, others note that this is apparently due primarily to the youthful nature of the immigrant population, and that in the future lower paid immigrants who retire in the United States are likely to become net beneficiaries of the Social Security system.[30]

To summarize the state of knowledge regarding social service costs, immigrants both legal and illegal cannot be blamed for the rapid increase in governmental expenditure on such services, but their impact also cannot be dismissed as trivial. Use of such benefits by immigrants range from high to low, depending upon

[29] Advocates of continued illegal immigration have been impressed by data from David S. North and Marion F. Houstoun, *The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study*, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, 1976, showing that 73.2 percent of apprehended illegal aliens report having had income taxes withheld from their pay. It is worth noting, however, that the relatively low wages paid most illegal immigrants mean that any income taxes withheld are small. For example, a single person earning the minimum wage would pay less than $500 a year in federal income tax; if the person is married, with one child, the tax would be $4 a year. Such a worker would of course pay modest Social Security contributions and local taxes as well.

[30] Social security retirement benefits are deliberately redistributive, with higher relative payments going to lower paid workers. Hence to the extent legal and illegal immigrants are concentrated among the lower paid, eventual social security payments will be redistributive in their favor. This fact renders implausible arguments by some that social security deficits can be eliminated by increasing immigration flows of young, unskilled workers.

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the benefit examined and the characteristics of the immigrant population.

Marginal or incremental costs may be quite high in some areas of health care, remedial education and bilingual education, and in overall educational expenditures in areas with rapidly growing enrollments (e.g., Texas, California), while simultaneously quite low in long-term medical care and in school districts with declining enrollments and hence surplus capacity (e.g., New York City). In all discussions of this set of issues, due attention must be paid to the average age and income of immigrants insofar as these affect their present and future demands on health services, social security, and other age- and income-related services.

VII

The controversies about large-scale immigration and refugee flows extend well beyond economic cost/benefit calculations to weighty issues concerning the distribution of political power and the size, composition and coherence of the American populace. One such controversy surrounded by uncharted political and jurisprudential shoals is that currently under review by the federal courts—whether persons present illegally in the United States are constitutionally entitled to full congressional representation and, ultimately, even to the vote. This extraordinary issue was joined in the buildup to the 1980 Census, when the Census Bureau decided to make intensive efforts to enumerate undocumented aliens. This stimulated a law suit (by an advocacy group, several members of Congress, and several states) seeking to enjoin the Census Bureau from including persons illegally present in the United States in congressional reapportionment calculations, on the ground that citizens and legal residents of states with few illegal residents would lose congressional seats to which they were entitled. In its defense brief, the Justice Department argued not only that illegal aliens are constitutionally entitled to be counted for purposes of receiving full representation in the U.S. House of Representatives, but also that "nothing in the Constitution forbids a state from permitting even illegal aliens from voting for Representatives."[31] The case is presently before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

The demographic implications of immigration have been ex-

[31] Department of Justice Memorandum submitted in *Federation for American Immigration Reform* (FAIR) *et al.* v. *Klutznick et al*, unreported, Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 79-3269, February 26, 1980, p. 10.

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aggerated in opposing ways, with assertions by some that the U.S. population can never cease growing unless illegal immigration is stopped and legal immigration is severely curtailed, and others arguing that current immigration flows represent a miniscule percentage of the U.S. population and are relatively lower than in preceding periods this century.[32]

In this area one is closer to ascertainable fact and reliable projection. If total net immigration into the United States, legal and illegal, is over one million per year at the present time (it surely will be much higher in 1980, as indicated above), then immigration today is contributing at least 40–50 percent of population increase. In addition to this crude estimate, one must add the indirect future effects of the immigrants' fertility behavior, which is likely to be somewhat higher than that of the domestic population since a high percentage of U.S. immigrants are now coming from high-fertility countries. If U.S. fertility rates stay at current low levels, then the proportionate contribution of immigration to total population increase will rise rapidly, although the size of the total increase itself could be declining.[33] Authoritative demographic analyses[34] have shown that substantial net immigration—400,000 per year, or about the level of legal immigration in the early 1970s—is consistent with an eventual stabilizing of the U.S. population well into the next century, if domestic fertility averages slightly below two children per woman.[35]

A further demographic fact is that the Hispanic population is the most rapidly growing subgroup of the U.S. population, due to the unintended predominance of Spanish-speaking immigrants described earlier, coupled with higher than average fertility among some Hispanic groups. Many politically active members of this growing minority group (which is normally defined so as to include many Spanish-speaking U.S. citizens from Puerto Rico)

[32] See. for example, the paper by staff members of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy entitled "Immigration: How Many?," p. 2 and the same Commission's *Newsletter*, No. 4 (Feb., 1980), p. 8.

[33] The "proportion of population growth" calculation can be misleading if growth is near zero, since even a small number of net immigrants would then account for nearly 100 percent of population growth. However, under the assumptions specified here, U.S. population growth would not approach zero until the middle of the next century.

[34] Ansley J. Coale, "Alternative Paths to a Stationary Population," Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Demographic and Social Aspects of Population Growth*, edited by Charles F. Westoff and Robert Parke, Jr., Washington: GPO, 1972, pp. 589–603. There is of course no national consensus as to the desirability of a non-growing U.S. population.

[35] Note that the above fertility assumptions are qualified by "if." Some reputable demographers expect a continuation of recent record-low fertility (e.g., Charles F. Westoff, "Marriage and Fertility in the Developed Countries," *Scientific American*, *239* (6), December 1978), while others anticipate a new baby boom (e.g., Richard A. Easterlin, *Birth and Fortune*, New York: Basic Books, 1980).

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are outspoken in describing their common language as a symbol of cultural pride and a force for ethnic unity and power, and therefore have pressed strongly for bilingual educational, legal, police, fire and other governmental services.[36]

These trends in turn have engendered growing concern about increasing bilingualism and political polarization along linguistic lines. Expressions of such fears have included references to the unhappy histories of countries such as Belgium and Canada, where linguistic divisions have led to persistent political problems and demands for linguistic separatism. In response to these concerns, supporters of Spanish bilingual services assert that they will in no way lead to a polarization along linguistic lines, and that the analogy to Canada and Belgium is quite misleading. They point to the large numbers of school dropouts among Hispanic teenagers, and argue that only through bilingual education programs can these children be provided with an adequate educational experience. There is a sometimes bitter dispute between those proponents who see intensive bilingual programs as contributing to a "transition" to English primacy within a few years and those who support "maintenance" of Spanish as a coequal language throughout the educational experience, but both groups state that English competence is one of the goals of such programs.

There is, finally, the issue of political power and the political shifts that result from immigration patterns. Among ethnic groups, the primary advocates of large-scale legal or illegal immigration have tended to be the most politically active. This is particularly true among Chicanos or Mexican-Americans. Although this group as a whole appears to be sharply divided over the issue of continued illegal immigration from Mexico, some Chicano political leaders strongly oppose any measures to reduce such immigration. A minority of radical leaders openly refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the U.S.-Mexico border, arguing that the Southwest and California were "stolen" from Mexico in 1848; others favor continued illegal flows in the expectation of enhanced Chicano political power—a position not strongly welcomed by leaders of other ethnic groups. Still others oppose restraint more in terms of the spinoff impacts they believe policing measures would have on the domestic Mexican-American population,

[36] The bilingual debate is usually discussed in terms of a multiplicity of first languages other than English, but in fact bilingual services are provided overwhelmingly to Spanish-speaking residents of the United States. For example, while federally supported bilingual education is provided in fully 72 languages, 70–75 percent of the students participating are Spanish-speaking. See National Center for Education Statistics, Bulletin 78B-5, August 22, 1978.

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which they assert would be discriminated against and harassed by efforts to control illegal migration.

That present and future immigration trends and policies have important implications for political coherence and for ethnic and race relations in the United States cannot be sensibly doubted. Furthermore, there is clear risk that growing opposition to immigration and refugee flows that are widely perceived to be excessively large, insufficiently plural, and heavily illegal may overwhelm existing domestic support for a truly humane and generous set of policies.

VIII

The requirements of a humanitarian immigration and refugee policy go well beyond domestic concerns, and should be a central component of the nation's foreign policy. For example, it is clear that most of the world's 13–16 million officially designated refugees are likely to remain for a long while in the countries of first asylum. The burden of providing sustenance and decent living conditions for refugees cannot fall solely upon those often very poor countries. Hence the world community, and especially the United States, given its traditional concern for refugees, must contribute most generously to multilateral efforts to relieve the immediate suffering of refugees in first-asylum countries. Moreover, strenuous efforts are needed to assist those millions of refugees to become self-sustaining contributors to development in first-asylum countries, rather than drains on their already struggling economies and fragile social and political structures.

In addition, these refugee flows often have serious political implications. The presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Eritrean refugees in the Sudan, Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, and Cambodian refugees in Thailand is a major source of heightened international and domestic tensions in these regions. And the recent examples of Vietnam and Cuba have demonstrated how forced mass expulsions can be used as a direct weapon in foreign policy, and how thorny the resulting foreign policy problems can become. Some of these cases may call for concerted pressures on the countries responsible, so that the refugees can return to their home countries. But for the great mass of refugees fleeing as a result of military or political conflict, there is no escape from the need for sustained multilateral assistance efforts.

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At least as serious, in the coming decades, is the problem of those voluntarily seeking to migrate in order to escape intolerable living conditions. In the long run, genuine economic and social development in the Third World is a sine qua non for moderating the rapid expansion of pressures for international movement by immigrants and refugees. Recent and prospective trends are not encouraging. Continued price escalation for oil and manufactured goods, the growing pressures for protectionist trade practices by developed countries, and the tendency to reduce bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance in real terms may compound the array of dismal prospects already facing developing country leaders. The recent report of the Brandt Commission has highlighted the gravity of these and other problems, and the need for increased efforts by all parties to meet them.

On the other hand, assertions by some that development assistance, and not more effective immigration laws and policies, is the only answer to problems of illegal immigration to the United States require us to note that development is a long-term process which is in no way sufficient to deal with the problems of immigration in the 1980s, or even in the 1990s. And the preference of many developing countries for capital-intensive development producing little employment is evidence that much depends upon their own internal decisions. Iran is a vivid example, and it is evident that Mexico has encountered serious difficulties in using its oil wealth for the kind of investment that will provide decent jobs for its people.[37]

But even if the process of economic development moves much more rapidly than it has in the past, the sheer pressure of population growth in the developing countries is bound to generate demands for greater freedom of migration than now exists in most of the world. At the level of foreign policy rhetoric, the following comment of the late President of Algeria and leader of the Group of 77, Mr. Boumédienne, reflects one view of the future in memorable if somewhat provocative words:

No quantity of atomic bombs could stem the tide of billions . . . who will some

[37] A Mexican government official is quoted as stating recently that "twelve million rural Mexicans were undernourished, fourteen million lacked drinking water, half earned less than 435 U.S. dollars a year, and 44 percent of those who had work could only find it for three months in the year." A study by the Mexican National Bank of Rural Credit suggested that "of the seven and a quarter million *campesinos* of working age some five million were unemployed or underemployed." The Mexican national unemployment rate is estimated at 35 percent, with an income distribution that leaves 50 percent of the population with less than 17 percent of national income. See Peter Cleaves, Michael Redclift and Nanneke Redclift, "Mexican Development: Problems of an Oil-Rich Neighbor," (Ms., The Ford Foundation, Mexico City, 1980).

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day leave the poor southern part of the world to erupt into the relatively accessible spaces of the rich northern hemisphere looking for survival.[38]

President Lopez Portillo of Mexico characteristically puts the case in far more measured terms. "It is not a crime to look for work," he has stated repeatedly regarding undocumented Mexican migration to the United States, "and I refuse to consider it as such."[39]

Such statements may seem extreme to U.S. citizens and others in the developed nations. But they highlight the potential depth of feeling in developing nations. Reconciling national sovereignty with current international realities and with a world order of enhanced international cooperation and fairness does require a less exclusively nationalistic perspective on immigration and refugee matters than has been the rule in many countries for much of this century, especially among those industrialized countries that have long bridled at granting permanent residence to immigrants and refugees. (Japan, for example, has settled a total of 276 Indochinese refugees, as compared to the 373,747 settled by the United States.) Such movement toward enhanced openness would reduce or at least distribute more evenly the burden now heavily borne by the United States and a few other countries.

But in the case of the United States itself the case for continued openness can be carried to extremes. There are those who argue that U.S. action to enforce its immigration laws would be an unfriendly act directed against Mexico and other neighboring states from which there are now large flows of illegal immigrants. If the United States were to close its borders completely and refuse to admit any immigrants from its neighbors—which no group in this country proposes—then indeed there might be a reasonable claim that the United States was acting at variance with what it has urged other nations to do, and certainly the political reaction would be serious. But to enforce immigration laws in an equitable manner, under an overall framework that will surely remain the most generous to be found anywhere in the Western Hemisphere (or the world), can hardly be construed as an unfriendly act.

The possible linkage between continued large-scale immigration from Mexico and that country's oil and gas exports to the United States raises more difficult questions. Such a linkage has in fact

[38] Cited in Otis L. Graham, Jr., "Illegal Immigration and the New Reform Movement," Immigration paper II, Federation for American Immigration Reform, Washington, D.C., February 1980, p. 11.

[39] Smith, *op. cit.*, footnote 13, p. 26.

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been expressed or strongly implied in statements by Mexican leaders.[40]

Yet on a closer analysis it seems likely that Mexico will determine its overall level of oil exports in terms of basic calculations of how much revenue it can use to good effect. Oil is a fungible product, available in a worldwide market, and if Mexico should decide for political reasons to curtail sharply its oil sales to the United States, the result would surely be greater availability of oil in other parts of the world market. As for price, while Mexico is not a formal member of OPEC, on past performance its price policies will closely follow those of OPEC in any event.

In the case of natural gas, pipeline shipments to the United States entail far lower transportation costs than liquefaction and supercooled tanker shipping of natural gas to other markets. Moreover, much of Mexico's natural gas is produced as an inevitable part of oil production, and would be wasted if it were not exported or consumed domestically.

There is every foreign policy reason for the U.S. government, including the Congress, to be sensitive to Mexican concerns, which include trade restraints as well as oil and gas issues and the level of immigration to the United States. But for the United States to refrain from reasonable measures concerning immigration because of its current need for imported oil and natural gas is both questionable in principle and probably exaggerates the actual extent of Mexican leverage. Overall U.S. dependence on imported oil is a heavy burden on our foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere; so long as that dependence remains high, the need for Mexican oil and gas cannot be left out of account in any revision of U.S. immigration policy. To allow it to foreclose sensible changes in policy, however, would surely strike most U.S. citizens as intolerable.

Finally, there are those who contend that any U.S. restraint on immigration from neighboring Latin American countries would remove the political safety valve of out-migration for the young and dispossessed, thereby encouraging Castro-type or right-wing revolutions. But surely this argument cuts both ways. Such flows may be viewed as assisting these countries in coping with their political and economic problems, or in the alternative as allowing their elites to export dissension and thereby resist democratic

[40] The apparent currency of such arguments in some State Department circles is suggested by a devastating Herblock cartoon in *The Washington Post* (December 15, 1978) showing four foreign policy experts in a situation room before a map of the Mexico-U.S. border, with one exclaiming in a flash of insight, "What if we asked each illegal alien to roll a barrel of oil in with him?"

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political pressures for overdue reforms. Hence, equally plausible cases can be made that continuation of illegal immigration either reduces or increases the chances of unfriendly revolution in Mexico and other sending countries. Given the demonstrated difficulty of predicting revolutions, it would seem judicious to consign this argument to the "neutral" or "don't know" category.

IX

The choices available to U.S. policymakers are diverse and complex; each set of choices involves a different array of international and domestic implications, and each is characterized by a set of distinctive differences of opinion and political constraints.

The first obvious policy choice, and the one with the fewest immediate political constraints, is to do nothing. The present incoherence of policy has its political attractions, since it leaves difficult value choices inexplicit, allows the most committed interest groups to pursue their interests unimpeded, and yet avoids explicit endorsement of their aims which might offend the majority of the electorate. A policy of inaction would allow employers seeking compliant labor to continue to import migrant workers easily, other countries to continue to export their surplus populations to the United States, interested ethnic activists to continue to strive to maximize their numbers through immigration, and civil liberties advocates to continue to assure themselves that new policies would not threaten civil liberties.

The risks are those common to all such strategies of inaction, that the negative consequences will increase and become harder to control, and that the political risks will increase in proportion. An obvious political risk of inaction is the stimulation of an uncontrollable backlash that would go well beyond the issues of policy incoherence and lax enforcement, and would threaten the basic openness of American society to access by immigrants and refugees. Such nativist, even racist, reactions have been common in the history of the United States, and have also occurred recently in otherwise liberal countries such as Great Britain and Switzerland. (These include racially motivated changes in immigration laws promulgated by both Labour and Conservative governments in Britain since 1968, and a nationwide referendum in Switzerland that failed narrowly but would have had the effect of expelling many foreign workers.)

The second broad option is effective enforcement of existing law. While it might seem surprising at first glance that this would face vocal opposition, this is the case and has much to do with the

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present lax enforcement situation. Under existing law, it is unlawful to enter the United States without permission, to overstay the terms of temporary visas, or to obtain employment under such visas unless authorization to work has also been granted. Hence enforcement of existing law would require effective policing of entry points, adequate follow-up of legal visitors to assure that they depart promptly, and sufficient enforcement of employment prohibitions to make it reasonably difficult to violate them.

It is certain that effective policing of U.S. borders would be criticized by the government and press of Mexico and possibly several other sending countries, by some ethnic activists, by prospective employers of illegal aliens, and by some religious and civil liberties groups. In the past, even the replacement of a collapsed 30-year-old border fence in El Paso has been characterized by domestic and Mexican critics as the building of a "Tortilla Curtain," with ready parallels to the Berlin Wall and exaggerated claims as to the dangers it would pose to law violators. Many advocates go so far as to assert that effective enforcement is impossible without the adoption of police-state tactics.

Former Commissioner of the INS Leonel Castillo, a Chicano politician not generally considered a strong advocate of enhanced enforcement efforts, was not of this view. In 1978 congressional testimony, the following illuminating colloquy occurred between the Commissioner and Chairman James H. Scheuer (D-NY):[41]

MR. SCHEUER. Can we regulate illegal entry into this country by means that are reasonably appropriate and acceptable to us? I don't think the American public would like to see a 20-foot high Berlin wall erected on that 1,950 mile border with submachineguns and police guards and sirens and watch towers. Can we do it with means and technology that are not obnoxious to us?

MR. CASTILLO. I believe so. I don't believe that it would be that technologically difficult or technically difficult to severely or dramatically curtail the number of persons entering the United States without documents.

MR. SCHEUER. You believe that can be done?

MR. CASTILLO. I'm convinced it can be done. I was not of this opinion before I got this job, but having looked at it a little bit more, we know, for example, that more than 50 percent of the entries that are made into the United States without documents are made at or near three locations: San Diego, Calif., El Paso, Tex., and Yuma, Ariz.

If we simply increased our resources at those three locations we'd have an enormous impact just in three places, a total of less than 40, 50 miles, and if

[41] U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Select Committee on Population, "Immigration to the United States," No. 5, Washington: GPO, 1978, p. 139.

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we did that there would be, of course, some spillover to other parts of the country. . . .

Except that it's much harder for people to make the decision to cross along the inhospitable parts of the border. To go from one urban area in Tijuana, Mexico, to an urban area in San Diego involves a short jog or sprint or move. But to cross a 100-mile desert takes a lot more, plus it's easier for us to see them by flying over. Enforcement's a lot easier.

A third option is a thoroughgoing revision of present law and practice regarding immigration and refugee policy. Such was the intent of congressional action in 1978 establishing the commission now chaired by Father Hesburgh of the University of Notre Dame. Entitled the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, it was charged under Public Law 95-412 with the evaluation of all existing laws, policies and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees and the preparation of legislative and administrative recommendations to the President and Congress. The Commission, due to report in early 1981, has a distinguished membership consisting of four members each of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, including Chairmen Rodino and Kennedy, four Cabinet officers (Justice, State, Labor, and Health and Human Services), and four public members including its Chairman. A commission of this high quality and political influence ordinarily could be expected to carry considerable weight. Unfortunately, the Select Commission has been plagued from its inception with serious staff problems that are now widely known, and it will require strong efforts by the Commissioners themselves to build internal consensus and external support for the Select Commission's recommendations when they are put forward.

Ultimately, any reforms will depend upon the Congress, which historically has exercised its prerogatives strongly in the immigration and refugee field.[42] The congressional process will, in turn, depend upon a complex and virtually unpredictable confluence of domestic and international political considerations, economic circumstances, and the increasingly Byzantine internal politics of the Congress itself and of its various committees. Despite such uncertainties, the broad outlines of alternative reforms are reasonably clear, and much can be gained by stepping back from the ongoing fray for a dispassionate assessment of the trade-offs that

[42] The 1952 McCarran-Walter Act was passed by Congress over President Truman's veto—the only postwar case of a Democratic Congress overriding a Democratic President until the rejection of President Carter's "oil conservation tax" in June 1980. Conversely, President Carter's 1977 initiative on illegal immigration sank without a trace in Congress.

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must be made among conflicting values and interests.

In analytical terms, a humane and realistic immigration policy for the United States (or for any other country) must meet several basic requirements that are constant, and include decisions (explicit or implicit) regarding certain variable factors that fit within the constants. The constant basic requirements may be separated analytically into three overarching principles:

1) The policy must be an expression of dominant national interests and humanitarian values, representing a broad political consensus rather than the views of special interests, and recognizing that the concepts of borders and citizenship are central to national sovereignty.

2) The policy must protect the basic civil liberties and human rights both of citizens and of the immigrants and refugees legally admitted.

3) The de jure policy must be enforceable in practice in the real world; if it is not, it will be a different policy de facto.

Within these broad baseline requirements, policy determination requires a set of balanced choices, including: overall numbers to be admitted; the proportion of these who may be political refugees as opposed to normal immigrants (and how these loosely used categories can be tightly defined); the degree to which labor migrants may be temporary or permanent; the level of immigration law violation that is deemed tolerable; the composition of overall immigrant flows as to skill level, national origins, ethnic/religious/linguistic group, and kinship ties to citizens as distinct from "new seed" immigrants; and the relative weights that should be given to foreign and domestic concerns in determining immigration policy.

While it would be relatively easy to attain agreement that the above principles and choices are central, their application and the trade-offs inevitably required are another matter. Full agreement surely is impossible given the high level of special interest group advocacy in this field. What could be hoped for is a broad-based consensus that anticipates continued sniping from the fringes, and which might look something like the following:

1) With regard to basic principles, U.S. policy on immigration and refugees should sustain the long-standing American value of openness to immigrants and refugees from diverse sources, and should enhance the trends of the past 15 years away from discriminatory criteria for admission. This means that xenophobic and neo-isolationist tendencies should be rejected and the traditional values of openness and hospitality affirmed. It does *not* mean that

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immigration or refugee flows should be unlimited, or indeed that they should continue at the near-record levels of the legal and illegal immigration over the last few years. As we have seen, the United States is now receiving the bulk of the world's refugees and immigrants, and immigration at such levels is having substantial impacts in U.S. labor markets, is coming to dominate U.S. population change, and is stimulating large and growing opposition to immigration itself. Under such circumstances, attempts to sustain immigration levels or expand them even further may threaten the basic value of openness. Ironically, in this sense the well-intentioned advocates of "open borders" or unlimited refugee admissions may actually represent the most serious of the various threats to a truly open and humane U.S. policy on immigration and refugees.

2) The protection of basic civil liberties in the formulation and implementation of an immigration policy will require careful and balanced attention. To date the leading proponents of civil liberties have failed to approach the subject comprehensively, but instead have reacted piecemeal to perceived abuses arising out of current or proposed laws or practices, without offering effective approaches as alternatives to those they oppose.[43] Unless civil libertarians do provide constructive alternatives, they may unintentionally reinforce the proponents of unlimited legal and illegal immigration in encouraging a backlash against the very rights and liberties they seek to defend.

Awareness of this problem is growing among leaders of some civil liberties groups, and hence in the future we can hope for a reasoned set of proposals that preserve and protect the most basic of civil liberties, while enabling the nation to exercise its sovereign right to enforce its immigration laws effectively. Such proposals, when carefully considered, are likely to recognize that a sincere respect for civil liberties does not require, for example, that all civil and constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and legal immigrants be granted immediately to persons clearly present in violation of law. Surely illegal immigrants are entitled to all basic human rights, e.g., the right to humane treatment while in custody, the right of *habeas corpus*, and so on. Yet, realistically, if every technical aspect of legal due process, including the right of appeal right up

[43] The policies of the American Civil Liberties Union are instructive: ACLU opposition is expressed toward sanctions against employers hiring aliens unlawfully in the United States (Board Policy No. 327); use of a social security card or any other governmentally issued document as a condition of employment (*ibid*); deportation of any minors illegally in the United States (No. 329); raids on workplaces suspected of employing illegal aliens (*Ramos* v. *Anderson* suit in Texas); and so on.

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to the Supreme Court, is to be guaranteed persons observed walking across an open border or landing in a small boat on an unpatrolled beach, enforceable immigration laws cannot exist in a practical sense. Furthermore, support for such an absolutist position implies an elemental unfairness—the full panoply of legal rights are to be granted to persons willing to violate the law, but similar rights of appeal are not given to others who respect the law and apply for legal entry, but have not yet entered the country.

A careful analysis of civil liberties concerns is also likely to lay to rest opposition to some form of effective sanctions against employers who systematically and repeatedly employ persons who are violating U.S. immigration law, since the jobs made available by these individuals and firms are apparently the primary "pull" factor encouraging illegal immigration. In effect such an approach would represent a simple repeal of the atavistic "Texas Proviso" described earlier.

To protect U.S. citizens and legal resident aliens of Hispanic origin, such sanctions will require enhanced enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and regulations, and the use of a forgery-proof identification procedure to be required of all job applicants equally. There are a number of alternative identification approaches worthy of consideration; one example is a modest bolstering of the present practice that requires a job applicant to give his/her social security number, by requiring in addition simply the physical presentation of a revised social security card that is not easily counterfeited. The uses of such a document would have to be carefully circumscribed by strong legal prohibitions on its use in sectors other than employment, to prevent its evolution into a universal "identity card"—a matter of justifiable concern to those committed to limiting governmental intrusion into private aspects of American life.

The matter of amnesty for persons already in violation of U.S. law is often raised in discussions of reforming immigration law and enforcement practice. Any proposal for amnesty is bound to be controversial, since it in effect rewards with permanent residence (and eventually with citizenship) those who have violated U.S. immigration law in the past, while giving no comparable rewards to those who abided by these laws. For humane reasons, however, some form of limited amnesty must eventually be granted to persons who have lived many years of their lives illegally in the United States and have established deep personal and familial roots in this country.

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It seems unwise, nonetheless, to link amnesty for illegal residents closely to present discussions of policy reform. For those presently intending to stay only temporarily, such discussions of amnesty represent a significant incentive to change their minds. Reduced availability of employment through repeal of the Texas Proviso presumably would encourage others to return home voluntarily. Finally, premature talk of amnesty acts as a powerful magnet for accelerated flows of new illegal aliens, seeking to enter before enforcement is made effective, a process which will take several years at least.

Proposals for limited and carefully screened amnesty will become more sensible once the dust has settled: when effective law enforcement measures are in effect, when employer sanctions are in force, and when undocumented workers desiring to earn a nest egg and then return to their homelands have been given reasonable time to do so.

3) The principle that immigration policy must be enforceable as a practical matter requires a realistic view of the problems faced by all law enforcement, and of the particular realities favoring immigration law violation, and must be infused with basic American abhorrence of police-state tactics. The goal of immigration policy must not be to eliminate illegal immigration entirely (to "seal" the borders and ports of entry), but instead to bring the present pervasive violation of immigration laws within reasonable bounds, and to assure the bulk of prospective offenders that they are likely to fail. If the incentives to law violation are rendered low and the risks high, the rate of such violations must surely decline. At the present time, the balance is the reverse: incentives are high for both the illegal migrant and his/her employer, and the risks are low for the migrant and nil for the employer.

The realities of present and prospective enforcement efforts are disheartening.[44] The Immigration and Naturalization Service and its associated Border Patrol have long been both the whipping boys and the laughing stocks of the executive branch. It is notorious that they are—simultaneously—underfunded, mismanaged, undermanned, inadequately supplied, riven by internal dissension, and politically manipulated, yet they are also routinely

[44] Some INS limitations have an Alice in Wonderland quality. Two examples: first, INS investigators who receive reliable but confidential information from informants about places of work or residence harboring large numbers of illegal aliens are prohibited by Justice Department directives from inspecting these premises. Second, due to budget problems, Border Patrol stations in Texas suffered a 60-70 percent cut in their gasoline allocations for at least one month of 1980, leading to a ration of 4-6 gallons per (gas-guzzling) patrol vehicle for each eight-hour shift in one important border sector.

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pilloried for failures to fulfill assigned missions under such impossible circumstances.

At a minimum, the standards applied to other law enforcement agencies should be applicable to the Border Patrol. The recommendations of former INS Commissioner Castillo seem eminently reasonable, one might even say elementary: to concentrate adequate personnel, barriers and equipment along the border points and coastlines known to account for the bulk of illegal entries. There is no need for a "Berlin Wall" or a fortified border. What is needed is a law enforcement effort that would be demanded as minimal in any town or city in this or any other country.

More than a few small helicopters and Piper Cubs, a few hundred personnel, and essentially no physical barrier would seem to be in order for regulating 6,000 miles of frequently penetrated border, plus the long coastlines of Florida, Puerto Rico and other areas known to be entry points. More than a thousand investigators would seem to be needed to provide even minimal chances of apprehension of millions of illegal residents. More than an archaic non-automated record system would seem to be in order to keep track and assure the prompt and lawful departure of eight million tourists and others admitted annually for temporary visits.

Such minimal enforcement efforts would be consistent with practices in every other country, including the major source countries of illegal immigrants, and with all the basic values of our nation. Money would be required, but only relatively modest sums are involved. The entire INS budget for fiscal year 1980, including all its routine processing activities (e.g., naturalization of legal immigrants) was only $337 million. The budget of the entire U.S. Border Patrol is only about $77 million—less than that of the police department of the City of Baltimore alone ($95 million) and less than half that of Philadelphia ($221 million).[45]

4) As to the various decisions requiring trade-offs among competing goals and values, the following appear attractive to this author:

First, it is clear that advocacy of unlimited immigration into the United States cannot be taken seriously in a world in which three billion people are very poor and their numbers increasing rapidly. At the same time, the present numbers of legal immigrants and refugees—290,000 immigrants under ceilings, unlimited immigration of immediate family, 50,000 "normal flow" of refugees, undefined numbers of "emergency" refugees—are wholly arbi-

[45] International City Management Association, *Municipal Yearbook 1980*, Washington, 1979, p. 120.

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trary, numbers picked out of a hat, so to speak, during the course of congressional consideration, and expanded by the accretion of various legislative amendments and judicial and administrative decisions since 1952.

In the abstract, no single number is "correct"; much depends upon the social, economic and demographic circumstances of the nation at any given time. In a period characterized by low levels of racial and ethnic tensions, high economic growth, apparent shortages of labor, and substantial natural increase of the domestic population, an increased number of immigrants and refugees can be beneficial and cause no serious dislocations or antagonisms. On the other hand, during times of high social tensions, a slack economy, high unemployment, and low or negative natural increase of the domestic population, the economic benefits of large-scale immigration are absent and the maintenance of domestic tranquillity and of support for continuing openness to immigrants and refugees requires the reduction of their numbers.[46]

Whatever the overall number of immigrants and refugees that is set for a given period, it should encompass all forms of immigration and refugee flows. Hence if a particular refugee emergency seizes the attention and sympathy of the nation, increased admissions as a result of such circumstances would have to be balanced by decreased admissions in other categories. This would require that explicit trade-offs be made, that the notion of limits be acknowledged, that the demands of a particular set of special-interest advocates not be treated in isolation from the demands of others. In short, it would represent a form of discipline such as the Congress imposes upon itself in the formulation of its Budget Committees and Budget Resolution process, based on the recognition that its past willingness to increase expenditures in one area without trading off some other expenditures was a prescription for irresponsible fiscal policy.

In an ideal world, it might be possible to devise a flexible system that would adjust immigration numbers to changing national and international circumstances in a responsive and objective manner. Yet realistically this seems quite impossible in the political system of the United States today. The prerogatives of the Congress in immigration matters, coupled with the pressures on its time and its acknowledged responsiveness to special interest groups, necessarily restricts it to the role of setting broad policy outlines for

[46] In this respect, recent policies of the U.S. government—both permitting dramatically increased refugee flows and curtailing law enforcement against illegal immigration during a period of severe economic stresses—must be adjudged to be lacking in prudence by long-sighted supporters of continued openness in immigration policy.

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some other entity to implement in a flexible manner. At the same time, postwar experience in the executive branch and with semi-autonomous commissions has seen the capture of key regulatory bodies by the most interested of special interest groups (albeit with some notable reversals of this trend in recent years), which in the case of immigration matters might be even more divisive than the present disarray of policy.

Hence a system of what might be termed "periodic flexibility" seems preferable. Firm numerical limits for all immigration and refugee admissions would be set, with strictly circumscribed latitude for emergency admissions beyond these limits, e.g., through a requirement of affirmative support by both houses of Congress before such admissions could be allowed.[47] These limits could be subject to a "sunset" clause that would require periodic legislative resetting based upon economic, social, political and demographic conditions that may have changed. Given the slow-changing nature of most of these conditions, a ten-year cycle like that for congressional reapportionment might not be overly rigid, although a shorter cycle might be preferred.

Various proposals for a new, large temporary-worker program have been promoted as a means of regularizing the current flow of illegal immigrants, providing low-cost seasonal labor for employers, and offering a quid pro quo to Mexico for accepting effective enforcement of American immigration law. The pros and cons of such proposals go well beyond the scope of this article, as the plans differ greatly in size and form. At a minimum, any consideration of such proposals must be informed by the extensive European experience with guest worker programs over the past 30 years, discussed above. This includes recognition that such programs have optimal impacts when unemployment rates are very low; that unanticipated social and political problems can be generated and must be taken into account in assessing costs and benefits; and that temporary migration often proves to be more permanent than temporary.

5) In the long term, it will be important to ensure that no single national, ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic group comes permanently to dominate American immigration—in short, we shall have to find fair-minded ways to assure the true diversity among immigrants to the United States that has been the intention, if

[47] Since 1952, as former Attorney General Griffin Bell has noted, the present "parole" authority of the Attorney General has frequently been exercised in circumstances not envisaged by the Congress. The problem has recently been highlighted by the widely criticized handling of the so-called freedom flotilla from Cuba.

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not the effect, of much of the legal reform realized over the past two decades.[48] In this sense, the large flows of refugees from Indochina in recent years have been salutary; they have enriched the cultural diversity of the United States, while maintaining its leadership as a haven for those facing political persecution.

X

The factors affecting immigration flows are normally visualized as a confluence of "push" factors in the sending country, "pull" factors in the receiving country, and "barriers" between them that take a legal, geographical or economic form. A comprehensive effort to regularize and control immigration to the United States must consider all three types of factors. The "push" factors are increasingly the poverty and political instability of the developing world—problems that can be confronted only through foreign policy initiatives, development assistance, and trade and economic policies affecting the developing world. The "pull" factors are said by most illegal immigrants to be primarily economic—the ready availability of relatively attractive jobs. The reduction of this primary "pull" factor requires the elimination of the Texas Proviso, with proper safeguards to protect civil rights and liberties. Finally, the "barrier" factors, which overall have been declining due to cheaper and easier transportation and improved communication, can only be regulated through more effective enforcement of legal provisions. Approaches to all three factors are eminently the province of policymakers.

Part of the confusion that characterizes the ongoing debate is due to the fact that immigration and refugee policy is one of those few subjects in which the liberal-conservative continuum is utterly meaningless. Some conservatives have favored unrestrained immigration to cheapen labor and reduce the power of unions, while others have opposed it on xenophobic or racist grounds. It is easy to identify liberals who have supported unlimited immigration in the spirit of humanitarian concern for the poor of the world, and others who have opposed it in the spirit of humanitarian concern for the poor of the United States. The array of political forces favoring continued large-scale illegal immigration include such unlikely bedfellows as agribusiness and industrial interests seeking

[48] To this end, the immigration policies of Canada and other leading countries of immigration would appear to be worthy of our careful examination. The Canadian policy includes a "point system" that scores applicants for immigration simultaneously according to various criteria, including family ties to Canadian citizens, competence in one of the nations's two official languages, occupation, education, etc., instead of the far cruder preference system of current U.S. law.

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cheap and compliant labor, religious leaders promoting global egalitarianism, ethnic activists seeking supporters, liberal unions recruiting new members, and idealists desiring a world without borders. Opponents of illegal immigration include many members of disadvantaged minority groups, liberal labor unions, and racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. Such bizarre coalitions defy all normal political logic, and help explain why so many prefer to avoid the issues entirely—no matter what position one adopts, one is agreeing with the views of highly unattractive new allies, while antagonizing old or potential allies in other important causes. Willingness to deal sensibly with immigration issues is further diminished by the ready use of unfair accusations of "prejudice" or "racism" against those urging that immigration flows be regularized and brought under more rational control.

Yet it is clear that there is an overwhelming national consensus favoring effective efforts to curtail widespread abuses of immigration law and, one would hope, a continuing (if declining) openness to controlled legal flows of immigrants and refugees. Hence the prospects for a sensible set of trade-offs are not as implausible as the loose rhetoric of advocates make them sound.

In the long term, the only humane and sustainable policy regarding immigration and refugees must be one that accurately reflects American national interest and humanitarian values, protects the civil liberties and rights of citizens and immigrants alike, and recognizes the importance of trade and foreign assistance policies for developing countries. Such a policy can continue to admit very substantial numbers of legal immigrants and refugees and to be firmly nondiscriminatory and pluralistic in its orientation. And a comprehensive approach designed to bring large-scale illegal or undocumented immigration under reasonable control would go far toward promoting several desirable goals at once: assuring that immigration policy does not unfairly burden disadvantaged Americans; reestablishing the plural mix of immigrants and refugees of which most Americans are justifiably proud; and reversing the widespread belief that American immigration policy is out of control. By so doing, it would represent the single most important contribution toward a rebirth of America's historical commitment to a liberal immigration policy.

In the coming year the task will fall to the next President and Congress to formulate legislation that will embody such an immigration policy, and to find the will to enforce it. Ignoring the uncompromising extremism of the fringes, such reforms can be forged and implemented with no damage to the basic values of American life.

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Carlos Romero-Barceló

PUERTO RICO, U.S.A.: THE CASE FOR STATEHOOD

"The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a political and economic anachronism."

With that one-sentence paragraph, Rubén Berríos-Martínez began an article in the April 1977 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, entitled, "Independence for Puerto Rico: The Only Solution." But the President of the Puerto Rican Independence Party was too kind: "commonwealth" as a political status is not even an anachronism; it is a *myth*.

For 400 years, Puerto Rico was a colony of Spain. Then, after the Spanish-American War, sovereignty over the island was transferred to the United States, a nation which, in deference to its own revolutionary origin, eschews the use of the term "colony" in describing its dependencies. Thus, as the nineteenth century ended, Puerto Rico ceased to be known officially as a "colony," and instead was euphemistically redesignated an "unincorporated territory."

So it has remained to this day.

In this article I intend to show why "commonwealth" is a myth, and why the time has come for Puerto Rico to enter the union as the 51st state. I am convinced, both as a Latin American and as a U.S. citizen, that statehood for Puerto Rico would constitute a boon for the nation, as well as for the island.

II

Article IV, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution invests Congress with the "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." Under that clause, Congress saw fit to confer American citizenship upon the Puerto Rican people through a 1917 law commonly known as the Jones Act. In 1952, as Mr. Berríos correctly observed:

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the U.S. Congress enacted Public Law 600, giving the island the power to draft its own Organic Act which was to be called "the Constitution." All the provisions of the Jones Act, which governed the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, remained unaltered but were now to be known as the Federal Relations Act. *Puerto Rico obtained absolutely no additional economic or political power, except the right to design the structure of its internal government, under the ever-watchful eye of the U.S. Congress.* (Emphasis added)[1]

It was this Organic Act, this local constitution, which was heralded in Puerto Rico as representing a "compact" between the "peoples" of the United States and Puerto Rico. In Spanish the "compact" would be known as the Estado Libre Asociado (a deliberately deceptive misnomer if ever there was one, since its sponsors knew full well that Congress retained the constitutional right unilaterally to alter or even terminate the so-called free association at any time), and in English by the comfortingly less autonomous-sounding label of "commonwealth," the name by which states of the union such as Kentucky and Massachusetts are formally chartered.

In an era of worldwide decolonization, the myth of the "Estado Libre Asociado" served the interests both of the U.S. government and of the then dominant Popular Democratic Party (PDP) in Puerto Rico. In 1953, just a year after the "Commonwealth" was established, the United States was successful in persuading the United Nations to remove Puerto Rico from its list of non-self-governing territories. And by arranging to have the island's new constitution take effect on July 25 (the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of 1898), together with the simultaneous adoption of an official flag and anthem long associated with the independence movement, Puerto Rico's charismatic Governor, the late Luis Muñoz-Marín, succeeded in placating separatist elements within the PDP, so that he could thereafter proceed, without serious internal opposition, to develop the Puerto Rican economy in close harmony with American business interests.

The "commonwealth" concept, then, constituted the means by which a Governor, who throughout most of his life had made no secret of his own separatist sympathies, chose to go about the task of solving a problem in practical politics: such an interim compromise on the status issue had become essential, since Muñoz had decided to give top priority to economic development, and to postpone indefinitely (for reasons we shall discuss presently) any attempt to pursue the sovereignty question.

[1] "Independence for Puerto Rico: The Only Solution," p. 566.

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Thus the cosmetic virtues of the "commonwealth" arrangement seemed quite substantial at the time in San Juan and Washington alike, especially since relatively few Puerto Ricans were at that point convinced of the efficacy of actively pursuing either statehood or independence.

Today, however, the situation is very different. Nearly 30 years have passed, and the Puerto Rican people have become increasingly aware of the inadequacy of our existing political status, call it what you will. In 1952 industrialization was in its infancy; Puerto Rico remained a largely rural, geographically remote society. In the intervening years, the island has evolved a multi-billion-dollar economy, with high-technology manufacturing enterprises. Jet aircraft and satellite communications keep us in constant contact with the mainland and the world. The tropical island whose inhabitants four decades ago endured an average life expectancy of 46 years, and an annual per capita income of less than $200, now enjoys the highest standard of living south of the Río Grande and a life expectancy level which actually exceeds the U.S. national average. Remarkable though it may seem, we also have a higher per capita enrollment of young people in institutions of higher learning than the United States as a whole.

Puerto Rico has undergone a radical transformation. Economic and social ills still remain, to be sure, but by and large we have emerged as a people justifiably possessed of optimism and self-confidence—a people no longer willing to continue tolerating political inferiority.

In 1952, we were told that a noncontiguous territory could never become a state; that an island far removed from the mainland could never become a state; that a predominantly Catholic, or predominantly non-Anglo, community could never become a state. The admission of Alaska and Hawaii and the election of President John F. Kennedy destroyed those arguments.

Then we were told that a Hispanic culture would inevitably pose an insurmountable barrier to acceptance. But we have since looked on as the United States took action to require that bilingual election material be provided in mainland jurisdictions where as few as five percent of the voters speak a language other than English. Yet far more impressive has been the rise of fellow Puerto Ricans to positions of prestige and influence throughout the nation: a Congressman from New York, a federal district judge in Connecticut, a state senator in Kansas, the mayor of Miami, the deputy secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, a state supreme court justice in Colorado, the

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President's personal military aide, a U.S. Ambassador to Spain, and many more.

We were told that America is a land of prejudice, but as blacks and women and Hispanics have made tremendous strides over the past two decades, we in Puerto Rico have come to realize that the United States, despite the tensions inevitably resulting from its enormous racial and ethnic diversity, has become perhaps the least bigoted nation in all history.

Finally, within just the past four years, we have for the first time witnessed Presidents and the Congress itself go on record in unequivocal support of our right to statehood. President Gerald Ford broke the ice with his strong 1976 declaration in favor of Puerto Rico statehood. Jimmy Carter followed that up just days later when, as President-elect, he sent a message to be read at my inauguration wherein he pledged publicly to support whatever political status we might choose. In August 1979, without a single dissenting vote, the Congress adopted a joint resolution acknowledging the right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination, specifically including statehood. The 1980 platforms of both the Democratic and Republican Parties reaffirm support for the statehood option.

As these epochal events were unfolding on the mainland, there were momentous changes underway in the Caribbean as well. Since the 1950s, the new world's few remaining colonies, one after another, have been laying claim to their right to political dignity, most of them through independence. Cuba, since joining the Soviet bloc, has exploited this trend aggressively, launching virulent and perennial assaults on the United States through the United Nations and other international forums, alleging that Puerto Rico is being subjected to "colonial bondage" under "American imperialism."

With the exception of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (who as U.N. Ambassador in the mid-1970s forthrightly told the Russians in no uncertain terms that so long as they continued to hold a half-dozen nations in Eastern Europe—not to mention Cuba itself—in a state of total captivity, they would have no ethical basis whatsoever upon which to point the finger at anyone else), America's representatives have tended to hem and haw on the issue. In 1978, I finally went before the United Nations Decolonization Committee myself (the first Governor of Puerto Rico ever to do so) and stated flatly that we Puerto Ricans are fully capable of resolving the dilemma of our political status by ourselves, and will brook no intervention of any kind from outside, because we

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have confidence in the good faith of the United States. And I added that if we ever had occasion to doubt the good faith of the United States, then it would not require a Fidel Castro to bring the issue before an international forum: "the freedom-loving people of Puerto Rico would virtually lay seige to this building in their clamor for redress of grievances. And I should emphatically add that I myself would not hesitate to stand at the forefront of such a movement."

This, then, is the historical context in which the Puerto Rico statehood movement has come of age.

Luis Muñoz-Marín, despite the personal magnetism and gifted leadership which won him admiration and renown throughout the Americas, as well as establishing him as the undisputedly preeminent political figure in Puerto Rico for over a quarter of a century, never pursued from public office his youthful dream of independence. He refrained from doing so because he came to realize early on, after traveling throughout the island and talking to men and women from every walk of life, that the Puerto Rican people, even amid the grinding poverty of the late 1930s, deeply valued their American citizenship. Until recently, to be sure, there were misgivings about seeking statehood, because there was fear that statehood would require the surrender of Puerto Rican values: our language, our lifestyle, our culture. The political opponents of statehood fed on those fears at every opportunity, in what for a long time proved to be a highly successful effort to discourage the emergence of a vibrant statehood movement.

Yet as the United States has become a more open and compassionate society, and as Puerto Ricans have grown increasingly dissatisfied with a political status which they now realize amounts to little more than "candy-coated colonialism," the scare tactics of the anti-statehood forces have lost their impact.

In 1952, amid the euphoria surrounding the adoption of "commonwealth" status, the pro-statehood political party polled only 12.9 percent of the vote in the general election. Even the independence party did better, polling 19 percent. Since then, the pro-statehood vote has risen in each and every quadrennial election, reaching 48.3 percent in 1976, when the pro-independence vote totalled only 6.4 percent. Today, statehood advocates control not only the governorship, but both houses of the Legislative Assembly and a majority of the city halls throughout the island. And that noteworthy beachhead was established *before* the statehood welcome mat was rolled out by Presidents Ford and Carter, and by the Congress.

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The trend is clear. Our pro-statehood New Progressive Party expects to win this November's general election, and then about a year later to hold a political status plebiscite, the first one since 1967. Upon gaining a majority vote in that plebiscite, we shall formally petition Congress for admission to the union.

III

Very few Puerto Ricans favor independence, and even those who defend "commonwealth" acknowledge openly that it is an unsatisfactory arrangement in its present form. Indeed, any remaining illusions to the effect that "commonwealth" might constitute some form of unique "compact between peoples" were shattered on May 27 of this year, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in *Harris* v. *Santiago* that Puerto Rico is, after all, nothing more than a territory under the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution, regardless of the name under which its local government functions. That decision affirmed that the Congress can legally discriminate against American citizens who reside in Puerto Rico *simply because* they reside there.

Nothing in the U.S. Constitution ever prohibited Puerto Rico from adopting a local flag or anthem to accompany the national flag and anthem, and nothing in the U.S. Constitution ever prohibited Puerto Rico from maintaining its local language and culture or adopting a local constitution in consonance with the U.S. Constitution. No "compact," no "free associated state" was ever required. And now the highest court in the land has confirmed that neither did the creation of a "commonwealth" in any way change the fact that Puerto Rico is simply a territory of the United States.

Statehood is the solution to our dilemma, and nationwide public opinion polls have revealed that two-thirds of the American people (including majorities in every section of the country), are prepared to accept whatever political status the Puerto Rican people prefer, including statehood.

Nevertheless, skepticism persists among some segments of the mainland academic and foreign policy community. "Scholarly conferences" on Puerto Rico at universities and "think tanks" have tended frequently to be heavily weighted in favor of anti-statehood elements. "Learned papers," including one published last winter in *Foreign Affairs* (not to mention the partisan treatise by Mr. Berríos which appeared in these pages in 1977), have likewise been inclined to view the growth of the Puerto Rico

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statehood movement as some sort of aberration or problem which should, if possible, be circumvented or corrected.

In this regard, since it would be impractical to attempt to comment on a wide variety of published materials, I shall concentrate on the Puerto Rico discussion by Professor Alfred Stepan of Yale University, which is contained in his article entitled, "The United States and Latin America: Vital Interests and the Instruments of Power," published in the special "America and the World 1979" edition of *Foreign Affairs* last February. I shall focus my discussion on the several decidedly questionable assumptions upon which the article's principal arguments are based.[2]

The essential thrust of Professor Stepan's essay is as follows: (1) Puerto Rico's status is certain to change; (2) statehood leaves a lot to be desired; (3) independence might well be the most constructive solution, especially from the point of view of American foreign policy.

In examining the author's analysis, I must begin by remarking on a point he makes repeatedly: that I myself am on record as advocating independence for Puerto Rico should the island be denied statehood. The context in which I made that statement to CBS News in May 1977 was the following: I was asked what my position would be if Puerto Rico were formally to request statehood and if the response of the Congress were a categorical and unqualified denial, not subject to reconsideration. The question was, of course, hypothetical, since the denial of statehood by one Congress could not legally oblige a future Congress to do the same. Nevertheless, by way of illustrating my refusal, as a firm believer in democracy, to tolerate indefinitely a political status which denies me and my people equal participation in the affairs of the nation of which we are citizens, I replied that if I were to knock on the door of my brother's house and his response were to lock the door, telling me to go away and not come back, then I would have no alternative but to build my own house.

In making the statement on which Professor Stepan placed so much emphasis, I did not, as the readers of *Foreign Affairs* might have been led to infer, characterize independence as an *acceptable* alternative to statehood, but rather as the *only* alternative to

[2] Although it is not my purpose to call into question the accuracy of the author's research, it should be noted, to give an idea of the carelessness with which facts were used, that Professor Stepan erred on at least three basic points: our next election is scheduled for November 4, 1980, not November 12; the last year in which a governor of Puerto Rico won reelection was 1960, not 1964; and the 98th Congress (under the 20th Amendment to the Constitution) is scheduled to convene on January 3, 1983, not January 20.

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continued colonialism in the event that the door to statehood were to be closed forever. But I went on to say in that same interview that I foresaw no possibility that Congress would deny us statehood, because to do so would contradict everything the United States has traditionally stood for in the world community. How, I asked, could America preach democracy and human rights anywhere on earth after having flatly denied political equality to a community of its own citizens? Furthermore, in addition to being mocked as massively hypocritical, the United States would under such circumstances almost certainly also be accused of blatant bigotry, since the target of its rejection would have been a people seeking admission as the nation's first and only predominantly Spanish-speaking state.

So let no one be misled: the commitment of Puerto Rico's statehood advocates is absolute. In no way are we open to "persuasion" by any mainland "policymaker" who might be toying with the idea of selling us on independence as an "acceptable" second choice.

Another section of Professor Stepan's essay questioned the "validity" of any victory statehood might achieve in the forthcoming plebiscite. While some may sympathize with his frustration at the limitations of the electoral process as a means of determining accurately the sentiments of an entire population, I submit that in a free society there can be no legitimate alternative to political mandate by secret ballot. Insofar as the wording of the status alternatives on the plebiscite ballot itself is concerned, we recognize the necessity of ensuring not only that all parties be permitted to participate fully, but that the entire process be conducted with absolute fairness, openness and credibility. In that regard, I have stated on numerous occasions that we would welcome the presence of observers, be they from the United States or abroad, to witness the legitimacy of the voting process and the counting of ballots.

To juggle figures, however, as Professor Stepan did, in an apparent attempt to discredit the final outcome in advance through an exercise in sheer conjecture, strikes me as profoundly cynical, if not actually arrogant. Never before will a prospective state have conducted a statehood referendum in which not two but three alternatives appeared on the ballot: statehood, independence, "commonwealth." If such a referendum produces an absolute majority (not a plurality) in favor of statehood, then its validity cannot be questioned.

To propose, as Professor Stepan does, that some kind of public

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opinion survey subsequently be undertaken to determine the sentiments of Puerto Ricans who may choose to abstain from participating in a status plebiscite is as absurd as to poll nonvoters in a U.S. presidential election before deciding whether to grant the winner the privilege of taking office. Election results may not provide a perfect reflection of the public will, but in a democracy they are the only appropriate test we have, and in a community invested with Puerto Rico's exemplary record of adherence to the democratic process, it is insulting to suggest that the results of a freely contested plebiscite should be taken with a grain of salt.

Equally out of place were the author's allusions to Quebec, Ulster and other jurisdictions where militant separatist movements have posed grave problems. One need not be an authority on world affairs to discern that no plausible analogy can be drawn between these examples and the situation confronting Puerto Rico. In each and every trouble spot cited in the article, a minority group has been subjected to centuries of real or imagined mistreatment by a traditional ethnic or religious rival. (In Ulster, just to mention two instances of blatant de jure discrimination, the British long prohibited Roman Catholics from owning land in their own country, and imposed rigid quotas on the number of Catholics who could receive advanced schooling.)

The "liberation" movements in these regions of unrest are without exception relatively large and enjoy the sympathy, and often the active support, of sizable segments of the local population. The enmities run very deep, and the drive for separation in each case is motivated at least as much by ancient hatreds as by a rational commitment by the dissidents to improving the individual and collective well-being of the inhabitants of the affected communities.

In Puerto Rico, by contrast, American "conquest" took the form of a virtually bloodless invasion which a majority of the Puerto Rican people perceived at the time to be in itself a liberation from four centuries of neglect and occasional abuse by Spain. Evidence of this is the fact that in 1900, in the first election held after the change of sovereignty, both Puerto Rican political parties then in existence were pro-statehood. That statehood sentiment waned thereafter was the direct consequence of ill-advised federal policies which did not really begin to be remedied until after Franklin D. Roosevelt became President.

Eighty years later, Puerto Rico (once known as the "Caribbean Poorhouse" because it was even more destitute than such nations as Haiti) not only possesses the highest standard of living in all of

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Latin America, but ranks first in the United States in meeting the enlistment goals of the all-volunteer Army, and produces massive electoral majorities every four years in favor of maintaining permanent ties to the United States. Not since 1956 has the pro-independence vote amounted to as much as eight percent of the total.

This is Quebec? This is Ulster? On the contrary, the fallacious Quebec/Ulster analogy is simply another myth: a myth promulgated by the opponents of statehood in a calculated effort to alarm the ignorant. The so-called Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and other equally tiny fringe groups are no more representative of political sentiment in Puerto Rico than were the Symbionese Liberation Army or the Weatherman faction representative of public opinion in the United States.

If a free society permits its public policy to be subverted to the slightest degree by terrorist threats, then the terrorists are the winners, and the free society will henceforward cease to be truly free. As recent history has eloquently demonstrated, terrorism is a form of tyranny, and tyranny cannot be appeased: no sooner does the victim of terrorism yield to one series of "non-negotiable" demands, than a new list of equally non-negotiable demands is brought forth. I trust that our fellow American citizens will not weigh the Puerto Rico status question in terms of the threats and rhetoric of fanatics.

Allegations to the contrary notwithstanding, however, the truth is that the socio-economic and political conditions which have spawned so much tragic bloodshed in Northern Ireland, the Basque region of Spain, and other places, simply do not exist in Puerto Rico. So long as individual rights—including those pertaining to our language and culture—continue to be respected in Puerto Rico, there will be no civil disorder, nor any significant upsurge in terrorism.

The fact is that Puerto Rico is a remarkably stable society. I know of no other sizable political jurisdiction in our entire Hemisphere where no government has ever been overthrown by internal revolt, dating all the way back to the sixteenth century. And since all but a tiny handful of even the independence advocates in Puerto Rico are outspokenly committed to the democratic process, there is no reason whatever to suppose that the advent of statehood would result in any significant upsurge in violence. Indeed, history suggests just the opposite: during the wave of decolonization drives over the past 35 years, violence has tended to increase as a colony moved toward independence—factional

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infighting among groups striving to lead the independent government—whereas colonies moving toward political integration with the "mother country" have in general remained tranquil.

Those who employ the Northern Ireland analogy do so in full awareness that the mainland public possesses very little real knowledge of Puerto Rico, and that words and deeds identified with so-called Puerto Rican liberation invariably receive prominent news media coverage there. But as any student of journalism can attest, a guiding principle of the profession tends to be, "Good news is no news." The virtues of a society are seldom touched on by the media.

Let me illustrate that.

Economically depressed areas of the continental United States occasionally erupt into violence, as occurred earlier this year in Miami. By mainland standards, much of Puerto Rico remains economically depressed, despite the strides we have made in recent years. Moreover, the island's population density is 15 times as great as that of the nation as a whole. Yet in Puerto Rico we have never experienced a riot of the kind that occurred in Watts and Liberty City.

It is despair and a sense of helplessness that lead people to form guerrilla armies or to riot in the streets. Puerto Ricans, as a group, feel no such sense of alienation. Instead, we participate, as evidenced by the fact that 99 percent of our eligible voters are registered, and by the fact that 85 percent of them go to the polls. Our people respect the democratic process: when the majority chooses statehood, the minority will respect their decision, although you would never guess that from a casual glance at the headlines of the national press.

IV

Resuming our review of Professor Stepan's article, we come to the matter of international opinion. Professor Stepan makes the case that much of Latin America appears to favor independence for Puerto Rico, and that accordingly, in the interest of establishing warmer relations with neighbor nations, it might behoove the United States to endeavor to nudge Puerto Rico gently in the direction of an amicable divorce.

At best, this line of thinking reflects a shopworn world view which painful past experience should long since have taught us is utterly without validity: to wit, the notion that we can best gain the respect and cooperation of other nations by directing much of our foreign policy toward doing what they say they want us to do.

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When put into practice, this naïve concept has repeatedly proven counterproductive, in no small part because what foreign governments *say* they want us to do, and what they really would *like* us to do are by no means always identical.

For example, within virtually every nation in Latin America there exists a highly vocal anti-American political faction. The governments in these nations usually find themselves obliged to steer a careful course between ideologically hostile factions, some of which may also be prone to violence. One method employed by many such governments to keep the anti-American elements from becoming overly restless is to indulge periodically in "Yankee-baiting": i.e., denouncing or even overtly confronting the United States over some issue of conveniently minor genuine bilateral significance.

Puerto Rico constitutes an ideal target for such gestures. To stage a show of solidarity with the cause of Puerto Rican independence costs little or nothing in real diplomatic terms, and occasional expressions of sympathy on the subject offer Latin heads of state a superb opportunity to pay lip service to a cause dear to the hearts of anti-American political groups in their own countries. Also contributing to the tendency of foreign nations to "favor" independence for Puerto Rico is the fact that the island's own independence advocates, discouraged by their consistent failure to attract public support within Puerto Rico itself, have been very active in going abroad in an attempt to rally international backing for their cause.

For the above reasons, therefore, it would be a serious mistake to conclude too readily that the concept of an independent Puerto Rico truly enjoys broad and deep support among Latin American governments. Closer scrutiny would likely reveal that leaders in this Hemisphere actually harbor reservations about the idea, on the grounds that the long-term stability of the Caribbean basin might be significantly jeopardized if the U.S. presence in the Caribbean were to be further diminished in the wake of the withdrawal from Panama. Given the influential role of nationalist sentiments in Latin America, however, we cannot reasonably expect such ambivalence to be articulated publicly.

Overlooked too in connection with all of this has been the matter of the United States' own self-respect. I am at a loss to understand how Professor Stepan can place so much emphasis on the outspoken preferences of Latin American nations vis-à-vis Puerto Rico's status, without taking into account the fact that these same nations would unquestionably react with indignation

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and outrage if the United States ever presumed to lecture them in the same fashion on how to deal with a group of their own citizens. So long as the United States continues to tolerate a double standard in matters of this kind, our neighbors will rightly perceive us to be, on the one hand, condescending, and on the other, weak.

V

A chronic problem for the United States in Latin American affairs has been the pervasive feeling among Latin American nations that the *norteamericanos* feel superior—culturally and politically, as well as economically and militarily. The resentment spawned by this feeling has again and again complicated American foreign policy, by breeding suspicions and by exacerbating nationalist sentiments.

Today, Puerto Rico serves only to reinforce those feelings: as second-class American citizens, Puerto Ricans are dismissed as "colonial lackeys of the Yankee imperialists." To be sure, independence for Puerto Rico would remedy that problem. But statehood for Puerto Rico would accomplish much more: by accepting Puerto Ricans as true equals, by respecting and embracing the island's Spanish language and Afro-Caribbean culture, the United States would offer Latin American republics tangible evidence that North Americans do not look with disdain upon Hispanic peoples, but on the contrary are capable of ratifying unconditionally the creation of an actual state of the union comprised of Hispanics.

Lest anyone doubt that Puerto Rico can contribute significantly to the enhancement of America's image on the international scene, let me cite some tangible evidence of what our pro-statehood administration has accomplished already, in spite of the shortcomings of our present political status.

As President Carter's representative at the U.S. Independence Day celebration in San Juan this year, Mrs. Lillian Carter brought with her an official message from the White House which included the following passage:

> Recent events have demonstrated how Puerto Rico's contribution to our nation can become even more valuable in years to come. Exactly one year ago this week, Puerto Rico welcomed athletes as host of the Eighth Pan American Games. Nowhere else in the United States could peoples from North and South America and the Caribbean have come together in a setting so ideally suited to the many traditions and cultures which they collectively represent.

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A few weeks after the Pan American Games ended, Hurricane David devastated our neighbors in the Dominican Republic. With its customary humanitarian concern, the United States rushed in military units to offer medical help to the storm victims, and to distribute food and other supplies. But the language barrier proved a significant handicap in the delivery of vital services—particularly in treating the sick and injured, and in assisting in the search for missing persons.

It was then that I suggested to Washington that the Puerto Rico National Guard be sent in, and the Carter Administration's response was immediate and positive. In a step never before taken in peacetime, our National Guard was called to active duty and promptly dispatched to the Dominican Republic. There, the common language shared by the Dominican people and the U.S. troops from Puerto Rico, together with our personnel's familiarity with Caribbean island terrain and the social mores of the population, produced an immediate bond of brotherhood and constructive interaction which greatly increased the efficiency of the hurricane relief effort. The resulting goodwill was directed to the United States as well as to Puerto Rico, for those Puerto Rican Guardsmen were wearing U.S. Army uniforms, flying U.S. Army helicopters, and distributing food, medicine and shelter bearing U.S. markings.

In referring to that episode this past Fourth of July, Mrs. Carter's message on behalf of the President read as follows: "Puerto Rico responded with promptness and with patriotism. Units of your National Guard won the profound admiration of the Dominican people for the service they rendered in the name of the United States of America." In the fall of 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance expressed similar sentiments in a letter he sent me. Mr. Vance cited "the outstanding performance of the Puerto Rico National Guard elements which participated in disaster relief operations in the Dominican Republic," and noted "the major and constructive contribution their activities made to United States foreign relations." The Secretary's letter continued, "President Guzmán, as you know, singled out these units in expressing his thanks for our intensive relief efforts following the devastation created by the hurricane."

Earlier this year, the Puerto Rico National Guard was again called into action to serve the national interest, as units were dispatched to the mainland to assist in the processing of refugees from Cuba. The White House Fourth of July message also touched upon that subject: "Your National Guard played a key role in

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our response to the emergency created by the influx into the United States of more than one hundred thousand Cubans fleeing intolerable conditions in their homeland. Once again, the Spanish language and Caribbean heritage of Puerto Ricans proved invaluable."

But Puerto Rico's role as America's gateway to better relations in Latin America and the Caribbean is by no means limited to emergency assistance by military personnel. As the most technologically and economically advanced community in the region, we can offer much in the areas of commercial, educational and technical interchange.

On the one hand, despite the enormous burden we bear in having to import foreign petroleum to generate 99 percent of our electricity, Puerto Rico has succeeded for three consecutive years in registering increases in its favorable balance of foreign trade, thereby reducing to some degree the overall U.S. foreign trade deficit. And on another front, there was the conference held in San Juan last June by representatives of 14 mostly English-speaking islands in the Lesser Antilles, at which significant progress was made toward the establishment of better preparedness measures for dealing with the growing threat of oil spills along the heavily traveled supertanker routes through the eastern Caribbean. That meeting, which was attended by officials from numerous international agencies, including the United Nations and the Organization of American States, was only one of many similar meetings at which we have been host or a participant during the past several years.

In addition, our island's participation in the Dominican relief effort last year went well beyond the contribution of our Guardsmen. Several dozen personnel from our government-owned Electric Power Authority spent several months in the Dominican Republic after the storm, aiding in the restoration of that nation's power grid, and we have since arranged to lend the Dominicans a specialist to assist them in creating a long-range planning division within their national electric utility. In another area of common concern, we this year signed a joint agreement with the Dominican Republic to provide for technical cooperation and interchange in the energy field.

Although his Dominican Revolutionary Party has traditionally endorsed independence for Puerto Rico, President Antonio Guzmán of the Dominican Republic extended me an invitation to make a formal state visit to his nation last July, during which, in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Robert Yost, he publicly ex-

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pressed his people's gratitude for the timely and sincere friendship displayed by Puerto Rico on the occasion of the 1979 hurricane disaster. Moreover, the Dominican Foreign Minister, Emilio Ludovino-Fernández, told a Puerto Rican journalist in an on-the-record interview that "whatever status decision the Puerto Ricans should make, be it political integration with the United States or any other, it will meet with our total, absolute, and complete acceptance."

The successful initiatives we have been taking in the Caribbean in recent years are initiatives which we take as Puerto Ricans—as the neighbors and friends of the peoples who share this region with us. Because we ourselves feel no ambiguity about being both Puerto Ricans and Americans, our neighbors are beginning to regard the concept as not only acceptable, but perhaps even desirable. We benefit from the closer ties that result, and the United States benefits, too. With statehood, with two senators and seven congressmen, Puerto Rico will have the wherewithal, both political and economic, to do even more, and the benefit to the nation will increase commensurately.

VI

The mention of economics brings us to the only other major argument routinely raised in opposition to Puerto Rican statehood: that the island would be a costly and embarrassing burden on the American body politic, a "beggar state" wholly dependent on federal largesse. It is a fact that Puerto Rico is less developed than the mainland, that unemployment is high and per capita income comparatively low. But in reality, we need statehood precisely to become *less* dependent on federal transfer payments, not more so.

While certainly the most fundamental argument on behalf of statehood concerns the rights of citizenship in a democracy (and the fact that today we remain disenfranchised citizens of the greatest democracy of all), there remains no doubt that the economic aspects of the situation will be subjected to careful scrutiny. For the sake of argument, therefore, let us for the moment set aside the moral and ethical aspects of the Puerto Rico status question, and deal with it strictly in economic terms.

Suppose the Congress were to decide, as writers such as Alfred Stepan seem to prefer, that statehood was a bad bargain and that it preferred to have Puerto Rico become independent, despite the fact that well over 90 percent of the island's population has

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demonstrated repeatedly that it has no desire to relinquish its American citizenship.

This would leave two alternatives: to sever ties abruptly, leaving the island at the mercy of the other superpower, and sending immediate shudders of alarm through all of America's weaker allies; or to phase in independence, with a gradual elimination of existing federal aid, and then perhaps continued "foreign aid" to the new republic for an indefinite period of time thereafter.

Along the way, there would be strong and fully justified demands for some form of compensation to U.S. firms which had made major capital investments in Puerto Rico on the good faith assumption that the island's future status would be determined by the Puerto Ricans, not by Washington, and which might not wish to take their chances on continuing to operate there under an independence imposed against the will of the local population. Then too, there would be demands to pay similar compensation to the holders of billions of dollars in Puerto Rico government bonds. Payments would also have to be continued to Puerto Ricans who had earned social security and Medicare benefits during their working lives, as well as to veterans and retired federal employees.

In addition, the United States could hardly expect to maintain military bases in a Puerto Rico which had been arbitrarily expelled from the nation, so add in the cost of seeking out, acquiring, and equipping substitute bases elsewhere in the Caribbean, keeping in mind that this would probably require substantial long-term outlays to one or more foreign governments, while offering less long-term security than did the rent-free bases on U.S. soil in Puerto Rico.

Moreover, unless the United States decided it had no interest in maintaining good relations with the Republic of Puerto Rico in the increasingly volatile Caribbean region, it seems likely that any continuing foreign-aid payments to the new nation would have to be maintained at a very sizable level, which in turn would bring pressure on Washington to increase aid to other Caribbean countries beyond what might otherwise be deemed necessary.

Finally, there is the human factor: 3.5 million U.S. citizens, most of them with relatives among the 2 million Puerto Ricans living on the mainland. What would become of them? To deprive each and every Puerto Rican of his or her American citizenship without due process would be illegal. Yet no grounds for due process would exist.

Accordingly, we could anticipate a wave of immigration to the

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mainland, alongside which this year's influx from Cuba would seem hardly noticeable. It is not inconceivable that between one and two million Puerto Ricans would choose their American citizenship in preference to an uncertain political and economic future on the island. And remember that in this instance the immigrants would be U.S. citizens, against whom no quotas could be established nor any restrictions imposed. So add in the cost of contending with an overnight mass migration the likes of which even this nation of immigrants has never come close to experiencing before.

Still, there are those who have the audacity to argue in favor of independence for Puerto Rico on the grounds that it would be the least costly alternative for the American taxpayer!

The commonwealthers' ideal scenario for the future envisions a Puerto Rico wherein U.S. citizenship and its benefits (except perhaps for the right to vote in federal elections) would be preserved, but where the local government would hold veto power over federal legislative and executive branch decisions affecting the island—possibly including the mobilization of troops in time of war. They call this "autonomy," but what it really amounts to is the birth of a nation without severing the umbilical cord.

The economic argument of the commonwealthers is that statehood would cripple the island's development, and hence benefit neither Puerto Rico nor the United States. They allege that the federal income tax burden would crush individuals, while simultaneously depriving the island of its chief incentive for attracting outside investment in job-producing industry. They depict a Puerto Rico inundated with food stamps and almost totally lacking in productive economic activity.

Where, then, do the statehooders stand?

VII

Our position is that throughout this century, in war and peace alike, we Puerto Ricans have demonstrated our loyalty to the principles of American democracy and to the private enterprise system, and that it is now high time we were granted the equality that our loyalty has earned, and to which our citizenship entitles us. To suspect that we might be interested in setting ourselves up in a welfare state is an insult to our character; to suspect that we might actually believe that a welfare state would be a pleasant place to live is an insult to our intelligence.

If welfare in Puerto Rico poses a headache to Washington, what do you suppose it poses to Puerto Rico? President Carter worries

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about unemployment creeping up to eight or nine percent. I have to deal with 16.5 percent unemployment, and even that has been reduced from 22 percent when I came into office. The President is alarmed at the rise in the cost of living in the 50 states. The cost of living in Puerto Rico is consistently 15 percent higher than the national average, despite a per capita income less than half that of the poorest state.

Can anyone seriously believe that I would be advocating statehood if I thought it would increase Puerto Rico's unemployment and reduce its per capita income? Can anyone seriously believe that I would favor statehood for Puerto Rico if I thought it would increase the level of idleness among our people? I know as well as anyone that idle hands do the devil's work, and that pride in a productive job, at decent pay, is the surest guarantee that a citizen will be a stable and law-abiding member of the community.

We statehooders are therefore committed to forging a society in which, while remaining faithful to our linguistic and cultural traditions, we can make a full and meaningful contribution to building a better America, in exchange for full and meaningful participation in the process by which America is governed.

Yes, statehood will bring with it federal taxes and limitations or changes in the rebates we receive from customs duties and federal excise taxes collected on the island. But there is no reason why this need happen overnight. It could be phased in over an appropriate period of time.

Since the adoption of the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Puerto Rico will have been the first new state that was not already incorporated into the federal internal revenue system at the time of its admission. Provision will therefore logically have to be made for this changeover, and Congress is fully empowered to grant such provisions. Among the reasonable options in this regard will be a 20-year transition period, during which Puerto Rico income tax rates—which are presently higher in every income bracket than the corresponding federal rates—will be lowered, as federal income taxes are gradually phased in. Revenue lost from local taxes and federal rebates will be offset substantially by new resources resulting from the island's full participation in federal programs—such as aid to the elderly, handicapped, and families with dependent children—under which we currently do not enjoy parity. Moreover, I have been assured by both congressional leaders and U.S. Treasury Department officials that tax exemption grants already in force on the day Puerto Rico becomes a state could remain fully in force until their normal expiration

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dates. Such a "cushion" would both ease the transition process and no doubt also stimulate a substantial and very constructive investment upsurge during the immediate pre-statehood period, as corporations hasten to set up new operations ahead of the deadline.

In becoming a state, Puerto Rico will be obliged to assume its proportionate share of the national debt. In return, it would not seem unreasonable for the federal government to assume responsibility for debt accumulated by Puerto Rico. Clearing the slate in this manner would enable Puerto Rico to devote more of its local resources to satisfying the infrastructure requirements of its post-statehood economy.

Notwithstanding the above, however, there has long existed a tendency to overemphasize the potential investment disincentives of statehood, without taking into account the positive incentives which statehood will provide. It must not be overlooked that the very fact that Puerto Rico's future political status remains in doubt serves today as a significant disincentive to investment by many firms. A great many of them are disinclined to risk a $100 million outlay under such conditions; when they do come in, it is more often on a small scale—perhaps ten million dollars. With statehood, the risk obstacle would disappear, and this in itself would help to counterbalance the loss of corporate tax exemptions, because the more secure an investment is, the less return is demanded on it.

In addition, many firms—especially small but rapidly growing firms in the sunbelt—do not at present even consider Puerto Rico in contemplating sites for domestic expansion, because it never occurs to them in the first place that the island is a part of the United States. Prior to its admission as the 50th state, Hawaii experienced precisely this same hardship. Looking back over the first 20 years of Hawaii's statehood, Senior Vice President Thomas K. Hitch of the First Hawaiian Bank told *The New York Times* (August 17, 1979), "Statehood has made all the difference for business. It made people on the mainland aware of Hawaii. It made them willing to invest money here. Why, I can remember when I'd go to New York or Boston to give a speech and people in a sophisticated audience would ask if Hawaii was a foreign country."

Thus statehood will serve to increase dramatically corporate America's awareness of Puerto Rico, and of the fact that we offer an abundant supply of easily trained, highly productive workers, who exhibit a very low turnover rate and whose performance and

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productivity have won the praise of senior executives of the hundreds of prestigious firms already established there.

With increasing frequency, I am hearing from off-island industrialists that they prefer to use materials manufactured in Puerto Rico because their quality is superior to that of similar goods produced on the mainland. One such report came from the operators of an oil field in Oklahoma, who had been purchasing external casing packing valves from a firm in Texas; when the number of defective valves per shipment rose to 30 percent, they changed over to a supplier based in Puerto Rico, and the number of defective units dropped almost to zero.

Likewise, the sheer quantity of talented, dedicated workers in Puerto Rico is an asset of inestimable value. It explains why we have been so successful in recent years in attracting investments from some of the fastest growing sectors of American industry: electronics, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and precision instruments, among others. Locales with high concentrations of these advanced-technology enterprises, such as the Route 128 crescent around Boston and California's "Silicon Valley," have experienced extraordinary wage spirals as companies pirate employees from one another. In Puerto Rico, however, the labor supply is now, and will continue to be, not only abundant but stable and productive as well.

From another perspective, the state of Puerto Rico, with its ideal climate, central geographical location, bilingual personnel, and modern communication and transportation facilities, will serve as an ideal base of operations for firms of all kinds desiring to expand into rapidly growing markets throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. And here I am talking not just about manufacturing, but about a wide variety of service industries as well.

To argue that statehood will cripple investment in Puerto Rico is therefore like arguing that attending college deprives a person of four years of earning power in the job market: the benefits are almost certain to outweigh the disadvantages. Agriculture, for example, was sorely neglected during the rush to industrialize; in the future, however, access to the federal agricultural extension services provided to states will abet our drive to reduce Puerto Rico's dependence on food imports, while making it possible for us to export fruits and produce to the mainland profitably during the winter months.

Statehood will also bring a tremendous boom to Puerto Rican tourism. Like business executives, many tourists are leery about

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going somewhere that seems too "different." Tourism expanded spectacularly in Hawaii after the islands attained statehood, and Puerto Rico, with its modern facilities and distinctive landscape and culture, will surely reap a similar harvest.

Finally, we must not overlook the stimulative impact of federal investment. All of us are aware of the periodic reports which appear, recounting the disproportionately large share of federal office complexes, research facilities, and other activities which find their way into the home districts of senior members of Congress. Because we have no voting representation in Congress, Puerto Rico has perennially missed out on such opportunities. Under statehood this will change, as our large population will entitle us to as many as seven or even eight members of the House, in addition to two senators and nine or ten electoral votes for President; we shall rank 26th among the 51 states in congressional representation, and at last begin to receive our fair share of appropriations for special projects.

VIII

The preceding have been only a few examples of how statehood could directly benefit Puerto Rico economically, and thereby reduce the inflow of federal transfer payments. While some of the proposals may be without precedent, none of them falls outside the realm of the constitutional authority of Congress. Over the years, Congress has granted a wide range of special concessions to new states, from land grants in excess of 100 million acres (in the case of Alaska) to outright cash grants. Puerto Rico's situation will in many ways be unique, and will accordingly merit a unique approach.

A people's quest for dignity is nearing its goal. An island which two decades ago the U.S. Department of State took delight in heralding around the world as a "showcase of democracy" has now come of age. No longer willing to serve passively and decoratively as a "showcase," our people have gone relentlessly forward, emerging as a driving, dynamic, energetic community in the United States.

The goal of the Puerto Rican people is political equality within a framework which will permit our island and our nation to prosper together. It is a goal which can and will be achieved.

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Paul H. Nitze

STRATEGY IN THE DECADE OF THE 1980s

An important element in recent European criticism of U.S. foreign policy is the claim that neither the Administration nor its critics has presented a coherent strategy for the decade of the 1980s. Responsible Europeans suggest that American statements on foreign policy have stressed the value of good personal relations, the importance of goodwill, and the desirability of shared aims, but have offered little in the way of practical guidelines as to how we should deal with the growing power of the Soviet Union. These critics ascribe the erratic nature of U.S. policy to the lack of a sound strategic concept. They are not, however, much happier on this score with the Administration's domestic critics than with the Administration.

It is timely, therefore, to outline an approach to a more coherent Western strategy. By way of introduction, I offer some comments on basic concepts, on the evolution of the correlation of forces, and on Soviet strategy.

II

Clausewitz uses the word "strategy" to describe an approach to war which links the outcomes of a number of military engagements in space and in time. Its object is to achieve a favorable overall position in which your opponent has no remaining courses of action open to him reasonably likely to reverse the course of the war. He must, therefore, accommodate to your side's political will.

Since Clausewitz's time, much thought has gone into expanding his concept into something broader than military strategy, often called "grand strategy," in which all factors bearing on the evolving situation—including economic, political and psychological factors as well as military—are taken into account over long periods of time, including times both of peace and of war. The Soviet leaders are careful students of Clausewitz and his successors

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and pay much attention to questions of doctrine, policy, strategy and tactics. Doctrine includes principles that are virtually unchanging over time, such as the primacy of the Communist Party over the state, the high importance of maintaining the security of the Soviet Union as the base of the Soviet Communist Party's power, the historical inevitability of progress toward world communism, and the Party's duty to assist that progress by exploiting class tensions and the tensions resulting from colonialism.

Policy deals more specifically with what should be the general aims and lines of action in a given era and thus changes somewhat over time depending on basic changes in the world situation. The Soviets view strategy as being considerably more flexible and fluid, the better to capitalize on new opportunities for exploitation as they may arise.

One of the basic Soviet guidelines for action is that there must be a careful and continuously updated appraisal of what they call the correlation of forces. When the correlation of forces has evolved significantly in the Soviets' favor, their doctrine calls upon them to exploit that change to nail down permanent gains for their side. Having once achieved what they intend to be a permanent gain, the Brezhnev Doctrine, in effect, calls on them to defend the permanence of that gain with Soviet armed forces, if necessary. In the correlation of forces, they include the political, psychological and economic factors bearing on the situation, as well as the military factors, but the balance in military factors plays a particular and fundamental role in their appraisal. In assessing the military balance, they examine all its components concurrently—ground, air, and sea, nuclear and non-nuclear—in all potential theaters.

Nothing about the Soviet approach is particularly surprising. It is, however, different from the U.S. approach or that of any other non-Soviet regime. It is unique in its demand for ideological purity and discipline within the Party, the primacy of the Party over the state, in its opposition to all potential centers of power and influence the Soviets do not control, and the subordination of all other goals or principles to the security and expanding influence of the Soviets' own group and the groups which they do control.

III

How has the correlation of forces evolved since the period immediately following the end of World War II?

It was in the economic field that the United States' position,

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after World War II, was clearly dominant. We capitalized upon this economic strength by initiating the Marshall Plan and building a strong international economic structure which included the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and the technical assistance program known as Point Four. These helped in the building of a political structure strong enough to assure for many years the political containment of Soviet expansionism.

Even today, the strength of the economic position of the so-called Western nations represented in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (principally the United States, the nations of Western Europe, and Japan) is four times that of the U.S.S.R. and its associates, if measured in terms of the aggregate of their gross national products. In combination, their economies provide a strong and flexible structure, which has been able to cope with the enormous increase in payments to the Persian Gulf oil-producing nations over the last six years—but at the cost of serious inflation and growing imbalances in the flows of earnings, of payments, and of debts between member nations, and reduced growth with accompanying political strain. The temptation for individual nations to adopt selfish competitive policies is constantly growing.

Similarly, the economic progress of the developing countries, never adequate, has been retarded, and a special problem is now presented by the net borrowing requirements of the non-oil producing developing countries, which will amount to over $50 billion in 1980 and may exceed that amount in 1981. These deficiencies have been met to a major extent by the Western private banking system, but there is grave question as to how long individual banks will carry the increasing risks involved. The result is to increase the difficulties of the developing countries and their vulnerability to external threats.

The Soviet-controlled group of states, what the Soviets call the "camp of peace and freedom," also has serious problems, but their system is already tightly managed from the center. Their economies are less productive but may be better able to weather a storm.

A key to economics, however, is politics, both domestic and foreign. Politics are affected by many things, including swings in public attitudes and therefore by propaganda, by the spread or atrophy of ideologies, by changes in class structure, and by the impact of events reflecting changes in the world power structure.

In the world political arena the influence of the United States

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has diminished. All is not roses for the U.S.S.R., either. Fear of Soviet expansionism has been latent in the world ever since the Winter War against Finland in 1940. During the long period of the so-called cold war, from 1947 to 1970, Soviet expansionism was contained and the world breathed somewhat more easily. Many governments felt it was safe to make tactical gains through indiscriminate attacks on the United States. Over the last few years, many have begun to see again that the real danger to their security and integrity comes from the U.S.S.R. and that a weakened United States adds to their danger. Furthermore, the Soviet version of communist ideology appeals to far fewer, particularly among the young, than it once did.

What can be said about the evolution of the military strategic position of the United States? Ever since the end of World War II it has been U.S. policy to support the independence of Western Europe and Japan from Soviet control. It was also early recognized that the security of the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa could have a bearing on the security of Europe, of East Asia, and of the United States as well. This being the case, it was important to defend as close to the perimeter of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies as feasible.

At all times since World War II, the Soviet side has had potential superiority in the capability of the conventionally armed forces which could be brought to bear on that perimeter. The United States, however, had superior force projection capabilities supported by a superior navy and a worldwide base and logistics structure. This gave it the ability to reinforce at any point on the perimeter. We also had, for a time, a nuclear monopoly. The potential military effectiveness of nuclear weapons, which were for many years very few in number, may have been largely exaggerated in the public mind. Nevertheless, these weapons did contribute to the West's strategic posture.

Subsequently, when the Soviets had developed a nuclear capability of their own, they demonstrated by the surprise attack by North Korea against South Korea that they were prepared actually to use military power under their control in support of their political aims. As a result, it became necessary for the United States greatly to increase its military defense effort. We did so beginning in 1950, rapidly increasing our defense expenditures from $12.5 billion to $40 billion per year (in 1950 dollars). We and our allies strengthened our conventional forces, including the power of our naval forces, added a substantial number of theater nuclear systems, and completely rebuilt our intercontinental nu-

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clear forces. As a result, we were able to continue the containment of Soviet military expansionism for another two decades.

It was in 1968, 1969 and 1970, as a result of the setbacks and frustrations of the Vietnam War, that many came to the conclusion that such efforts at containment beyond NATO and Japan were not worth the cost and that we were perhaps carrying too great a share of the burden even with respect to Europe and Japan. The European members of NATO, and Japan, Korea and Taiwan, had prospered beyond all expectation. Could not they bear a greater share of the burden? Mainland China had broken with Moscow. Didn't that significantly alter the strategic balance in favor of the West? Wasn't there hope that détente with the Soviet Union would alleviate tensions worldwide and reduce the possibility of serious crises between the two countries?

The developments leading to and following the Middle East crisis of 1973 demonstrated that these hopes were not well founded. The Soviet Union had a major role in encouraging the surprise attack on Israel and the subsequent OPEC oil squeeze. Despite the European and Japanese economic strength they could bring little positive contribution to containing the crisis. The principal burden fell on the United States.

The subsequent events in Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen, and Zaïre, though not all to Soviet advantage, gave evidence of Soviet determination (with the aid of Cuban and other proxies) to expand the sway of Soviet influence across Africa and the routes of access to the Persian Gulf. The revolution in Iran, and later seizure of U.S. hostages, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated much more convincingly the depth and extent of the problem.

As the 1970s came to a close, there was wide recognition that the hopes of the early portion of the decade had been disappointed. Even though the West had rejected hostility to the Soviet Union, had reduced its military programs, and had sought to alleviate East-West issues while pursuing a constructive approach to North-South issues, Soviet expansionism continued, and Soviet leaders began to state with growing confidence that the correlation of forces had shifted in their favor. The question now to be answered is: How should we cope with the challenges of the coming decade? What are those challenges likely to be?

IV

Soviet strategic ideas are worked out in the Politburo and its subsidiary committees. No one in the West has access to those

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deliberations. The Soviet system lends itself to effective secrecy. But the Soviet system is not wholly silent. The word must be gotten down to the cadres and to the troops. There is a high degree of continuity and persistence in their strategic approach. It therefore is not a useless exercise to try to judge what the main elements of that approach may be.

Let me outline some of the main Soviet strategic objectives for the 1980s. I would put high on the list the political separation of NATO Europe from the United States. A second aim is to increase Soviet influence and control over the Persian Gulf. A third is the encirclement and neutralization of China. A fourth is to stimulate trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean. A fifth is the ability to deal successfully with the contingency of a direct Soviet military confrontation with Western military forces. A sixth is to build the image of the Soviet regime as a responsible, legitimate, peace-loving participant in the international community.

Each one of these aims warrants a separate Soviet strategy for its support. All six strategies are interrelated and mutually supportive.

Looking at the NATO European scene, I should think the Soviet side would judge West Germany, closely followed by France, to be the states on which to concentrate. They are the key states economically, militarily, and politically. Without them, NATO Europe is capable of nothing.

West Germany, in the Soviet view, could be particularly vulnerable to a carrot-and-stick approach. The Federal Republic's economy depends on exports, on raw material imports (particularly energy—oil and natural gas), and on its earnings from overseas investments. A significant portion of its exports go to the Warsaw Pact countries. Much of its natural gas comes from Russia, and most of its oil from the Middle East. West German banks have made extensive loans to the Warsaw Pact countries and to countries in the Middle East or immediately adjacent to it, such as Turkey. Much of the Warsaw Pact's military power is poised as a direct threat to NATO's central front in Germany.

Given these West German vulnerabilities, what carrots might the Kremlin hold out to Bonn? The Kremlin can offer to continue and to expand its deliveries of natural gas. The Warsaw Pact countries can continue to service their debt obligations. The German Democratic Republic can expand permitted contacts between its citizens and those of the Federal Republic. The Soviet Union can offer unilaterally to place limits on its and the Warsaw

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Pact's military buildup facing Germany.

Each of these factors has been evident for some time. What may be less recognized is the now-emerging possibility that the Soviet Union may offer to join West Germany and France in joint negotiations with Persian Gulf suppliers for long-term oil-purchase contracts in adequate volume and at stable prices. Already the Soviet Union and the East European countries can use Middle East oil, and most estimates conclude that this need is likely to increase. Thus, the Soviet Union can urge a common interest with West Germany and France in securing oil purchase contracts on favorable terms. Such contracts would tend to be at the expense of those countries not covered. Fear of Soviet pressure can already be seen in the actions of certain of the Persian Gulf countries. It might therefore not be unrealistic on the part of West Germany and France to see advantages in negotiating in partnership with the Soviet Union rather than as an opponent. Whether or not the Germans and the French agree to such a negotiation, the very suggestion thereof can cause misunderstanding between them and the United States and serve the purpose of weakening the links between them.

If the above are important carrots the Soviet Union can offer to the Germans and the French, the stick would be the implied or actual threat to do the reverse of all those things, and in particular to use its power in the Persian Gulf area in a manner inimical to West European interests.

The Russian ambition to have direct access to the Gulf goes back some 200 years. Stalin renewed that aim. Immediately after World War II the West's initial confrontation with the Soviet Union was over the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. For the last 20 years much of Soviet foreign policy has been devoted to increasing its influence in the area—acquiring access, overflight, base or treaty rights from African and Middle Eastern states whose geographic position bears upon Soviet or U.S. access to the Persian Gulf area by land, air or sea. The thrust into Afghanistan advances the Soviet base structure by 500 miles so as to outflank Iran and bear directly on the Arabian Sea. Soviet strategy exploits the fears caused by a realization of Soviet military preponderance in the area, political tensions between the Arab states and Israel and between feudal regimes or narrowly based successor regimes and other groups desiring themselves to monopolize power, and every possibility that presents itself for disliking the United States. The so-called militant students who seized the American hostages have acted in a manner which appears to be competently controlled and directed. The official and clandestine broadcasts from

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Soviet soil have encouraged and urged them on. From photographs it can be seen that some are beyond normal student age. It is said that some have been identified with the Moscow-oriented Tudeh Party. Regardless of the extent of Soviet control, their activities, and the U.S. reaction which they stimulate, serve to poison U.S.-Iranian relations.

Military or political domination of the Persian Gulf states would not only dramatically support the Kremlin's European strategy but also the Kremlin's third strategy, the encirclement of China. That strategy concerns Pakistan, India, Southeast Asia, Japan and Korea.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the movement of over a million Afghan refugees into Pakistan increase both the immediacy and power of the military threat to Pakistan and provide an opportunity and excuse to provoke and exploit tribal differences and incidents. It is quite evident that Pakistan's rulers have understood the message: they have transferred their most highly regarded ambassador from Washington to Moscow, and have rejected the U.S. offer of military assistance, at least in the absence of a firm U.S. security commitment. As the situation stands, Pakistan apparently is relying on its ties to Islamic and nonaligned nations to deter direct Soviet military pressure.

India many years ago adopted a position of neutrality. Mrs. Gandhi now appears to have moved closer to collaboration with the Soviet Union and away from the West. In any case, the relations between India and China have long been strained.

In Southeast Asia the military success of the North Vietnamese, with Soviet support, against South Vietnam, then against Cambodia and Laos, and finally in defending against the 1979 Chinese incursion, has given the Soviets a strong ally and a useful base structure in that part of the world. North Korea has long been a Soviet client. The key to Soviet encirclement of China is Japan, which is dependent upon the Middle East for almost 80 percent of its oil. The Soviet Union can hardly hope to enlist Japan as an ally against China. They could hope, if Middle East oil were to fall under their influence, that Japan would, in effect, be neutralized.

Soviet strategy in the Western Hemisphere has long been oriented toward the support of subversion and guerrilla groups. Its outstanding success, of course, has been in Cuba. Attempts to exploit that success fully were checked by the U.S. handling of the Cuban missile crisis and the frustration of Che Guevara's subsequent attempts to spread the movement in Colombia, Bolivia and other parts of Latin America.

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But 18 years later we see a renewal of the threat in a different form. There is acknowledged to be a Soviet training brigade in Cuba. Fifty thousand trained Cubans are now estimated to be in Africa, actively supporting Soviet strategy in that area. Another 50,000 are estimated to be trained and available for similar activity in the Western Hemisphere. Cuban influence is already strong in Nicaragua and Jamaica. With Cuba operating under effective Soviet control, there is the grave possibility of a whole series of disruptive developments. These could drain American attention and resources, even if they do not result in additional cases of direct Soviet military presence in this Hemisphere.

A central concern of the Kremlin, however, has been, and must continue to be in the 1980s, the fifth strategy—the Soviets' ability to deal with the contingency of a direct confrontation of Soviet military forces with Western military forces. The Kremlin leaders do not want war; they want the world. They believe it unlikely, however, that the West will let them have the world without a fight.

Accordingly, they wish to maximize the possibility that at no single point of progress toward the attainment of Soviet aims will the gain appear so great and the prospects of successful Western resistance so strong that the West will use military force to confront directly Soviet military forces. The Soviets have for some time had reason to believe that their conventional forces on the Soviet-Warsaw Pact perimeter are superior in capability to those that might oppose them. They are developing and deploying non-nuclear forces and theater nuclear forces which can be projected to considerable distances beyond that perimeter. These will expand the range of circumstances under which they could expect to achieve local military superiority. They believe such a capability minimizes the prospect of direct Western-Soviet military confrontation.

If there nevertheless is such a confrontation, they further believe that, the stakes being vital, rather than accept their loss the West may escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviets are driven to put themselves into the best position they can to achieve military victory in such a war while assuring the survival, endurance and recovery of the core of their party and as much as possible of their power base in the Soviet Union.[1]

[1] More detailed discussion of the Soviet view of the importance of strategic nuclear power in local confrontations will be found in Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 207-32, and "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976-77, pp. 195-210.

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It is for that reason that they have put such a large percentage of their military effort into their nuclear offensive and defensive weapons. Whereas the U.S. government estimates that, overall, the Soviet military budget exceeds that of the United States by some 50 percent, the cost of their strategic nuclear programs has, for some years, been triple ours.

The sixth Soviet strategy—building the image of their regime as responsible, legitimate and peace-loving—is of a different type from the other five but of almost equal importance. When the Soviets decide that their other strategies require a given action, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, considerations of the sixth strategy give way. But immediately thereafter the full panoply of propaganda, diplomatic and economic tools return to the effort to restore and advance the desired image.

Finally, as a tactic amounting almost to a seventh strategy, the Soviets use every variety of covert operation on a scale far greater than the West has ever done. Today this focuses on the training, organization, and support of terrorist activities designed to break down the confidence of groups not under their control. The evidence, although often difficult to come by, supports the view that the Soviet Union has been, and is, a principal supporter of terrorism, both with material aid and in its politics and propaganda. For example, it appears probable that the Red Brigades in Italy, the assault on the Mosque at Mecca, and the seizure of the American hostages in Iran were supported and perhaps instigated by agents of the Soviet bloc.[2]

V

What then is an appropriate strategy for the West? Immediately after the close of World War II, most Americans thought that the West's policy should be wholly positive and constructive; it was hoped that the wartime alliance with the U.S.S.R. could be continued indefinitely into the peace. By the spring of 1947 it was clear that this was a false hope, that in addition to building a constructive system of political and economic order in the world under the aegis of the United Nations structure, the West must be prepared to defend that order against the quite different ambitions of the Kremlin.

As one looks into the 1980s, it is clear that the Soviet threat has increased and that the adequacy of Western means to resist it has

[2] See, for example, the detailed evidence concerning Soviet complicity in the Tehran Embassy takeover and in the attack on the Mecca Mosque, presented by Robert Moss largely on the basis of Western intelligence sources. "What Russia Wants," *The New Republic*, January 19, 1980, pp. 23-25.

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become more uncertain. It is important to continue with the constructive task of adapting the system of political and economic world order to changed circumstances, but the reactive, defensive aspects of Western strategy must again play a more important role. The principal task of the early 1980s must be to check, blunt, and, as far as possible, frustrate the interrelated Soviet strategies while the energies of the many nations similarly threatened have an opportunity to become mobilized and linked so as to reverse the currently adverse trends in the correlation of forces. Until not only those trends have been reversed, but also the actual correlation of forces has become more favorable than it is today, the United States and the West must play for time in many threatened areas, employing their resources with prudence and fortitude, while making a major effort to build up their overall strength.

If this is a correct analysis of the present situation and of the multiple threats posed by Soviet strategy, there can be no doubt that the situation is the gravest that the United States and the West have faced at least since the Soviet threat to Berlin in 1958–62 and possibly at any time since the end of World War II. Both the executive branch of our government and those aspiring to the presidency in the current political campaign should be frank and explicit in explaining to the American people the seriousness of the threat and the need for effort, energy and sacrifice to turn the situation around. Providing for the common defense now requires the kind of priority that it had in 1950, and it is a disservice to the American people to pretend that this can be accomplished without a major adjustment of national priorities, in which, of course, an equitable sharing of the burdens must be a central feature.

We must rid our minds of the fallacy that the concepts of détente and deterrence absolve us from concern with the possibility of military confrontations and the probable outcomes of such confrontations. We should seek to end the alienation of the U.S. middle class from our military. We should lessen the degree to which we conduct our foreign and defense policies in response to the public mood created by yesterday's television programs and guided by today's public opinion polls. Instead, our leaders should adopt a strategic view of foreign and defense policy—one which, even when dealing with specific problems, takes into account the entire world chessboard and the correlation of forces five and ten years from now, not just today's hot issue.

Above all, we must submit to enough discipline to cope with our economic problems realistically, even as we undertake an enlarged defense effort. In the 1950s and in the period that

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extended to roughly 1971, energy was cheap and readily available, the productivity of our economy was high and inflation was minimal. Today we must undertake an increased defense effort at a time when our total economic output is far greater, but when we must cope with serious energy, productivity and inflation problems. Unless all four are tackled in tandem, the overall program will remain ineffective. Without seeking to spell out all the policies necessary, let me note some of the highlights.

In the case of energy, the short- and medium-range problem is to reduce our dependence on Middle Eastern oil—both to strengthen our hand in the Middle East and to reduce the serious frictions with our major allies that arise from what they rightly perceive as excessive American oil consumption and oil import requirements that contribute directly to their own economic and political problems. In the effort to reduce our oil dependence, increased efficiency and conservation, conversion to coal, synthetic fuel production, and resumption of the construction of fission nuclear power plants must all play their part. Conservation is painful. It must be stimulated by strong economic incentives including increases in the price of oil and gas. Substantial shifts in the patterns of urban and suburban living will be necessary. Choices must be made between degrees of economic growth and progress in environmental protection.

Moreover, we must never lose sight of the long-term problem of developing national policies for the use of energy and for the development of alternative sources that will put us eventually in a strong and largely self-sufficient position in the changing conditions that loom in the next century. Fusion energy deserves maximum support, along with the development of other widely available and renewable energy sources.

On the economic front, the control of inflation and the restoration of American productivity gains are at the core of our problem. Both trace in large part to excessive consumption and an inadequate rate of capital formation: at 4.5 percent of disposable personal income, the current American rate of saving is drastically lower than the 15 to 17 percent rates of our three largest NATO allies, Britain, France and West Germany, and even further below Japan's 20 percent rate.[3] Although our proportion of investment to GNP is somewhat better in relative terms, there is no escape from the conclusion that as a rough measure we need to reallocate some five to seven percent of our GNP to increasing our rate of savings—thus permitting those investments necessary

[3] U.S. Department of Commerce, *International Economic Indicators*, June 1980, Table 12.

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for improved productivity and job creation. The burden of such reallocation will be substantially relieved as productivity gains are realized. Many current inefficiencies and disincentives in and out of government must be reversed, tax policies must be revised to promote productive capital investments, and rates of wages and other financial rewards to individuals, instead of being fully indexed for inflation, must be adjusted downward to reflect the need to increase savings, productivity and defense.

All of these efforts are essential in any circumstances. But alongside them, to deal with the fifth Soviet strategy—that of the Soviets being prepared, if necessary, to use predominant military force in support of their expansionist objectives—it is necessary for the West, and the United States in particular, to reverse current adverse military trends. To do so we will need to increase somewhat the size of our current naval and other general purpose forces; we should not have to denude our forces in Europe and the Far East in order to deal with a crisis in the Middle East. However, it is even more important to restore the fighting quality of our forces. This will require an improvement in their operational readiness, the procurement of modern operational equipment, an immediate and substantial pay increase for military personnel to improve retention, and the prompt institution of a democratic and equitable Selective Service system.

During the 1970s, a major objective of U.S. policy and its principal hope in dealing with the strategic nuclear problem was to limit the threat through the negotiation, ratification and entry into force of an effective SALT II treaty. Whatever the merits of that treaty might have been—I came to the conclusion they were almost entirely illusory—there is virtually no possibility that it can be considered by the Senate until the summer of 1981. By that time the Protocol would have only a few months to run and the treaty would have only four years or so before it too expired. Four years is far too short a time for such a treaty to have any significant effect. Therefore, the sensible course would be to skip SALT II and prepare now for negotiation of SALT III, with an expiration date further in the future, say 1995 to 2000. The prospect of the Soviet Union agreeing to such a treaty in a form which would meet our needs and those of the West is, however, low unless we have earlier demonstrated that we are prepared and able to handle our strategic security without a SALT treaty.

We should always be prepared to negotiate, but we should also never forget that when we are negotiating with the Soviet Union we are negotiating with an adversary.

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Concurrently with building our conventional capabilities, the United States therefore should do what is necessary to deny the Soviet Union strategic nuclear superiority. This means curing the inadequate survivability of our land-based ballistic missiles and enhancing the power of those that can be expected to survive, proceeding with the modernization of the submarine-based component of our strategic deterrent, replacing our aging B-52s, rebasing our bombers at greater distances from our coasts, equipping them with high performance cruise and self-defense missiles, and assuring the survivability and endurance of our command, control, communication and wartime intelligence facilities.

In their entirety, these general purpose and nuclear programs would call for increased expenditures, after taking into account practicable increases in efficiency, of some $40 billion to $50 billion a year, in 1981 dollars.[4] This is approximately 1.5 to 2 percent of our GNP. How these costs will be met, in view of the budgetary, inflation and energy issues which must be dealt with concurrently, is not clear. There is, however, a change in public attitudes in the United States toward the need to restore its power, including its military power, as a necessary support toward a constructive foreign policy.

In terms of overall effort, the scale of defense spending now required would therefore amount to 6.5 to 7 percent of our GNP, as compared to the present level of 5 percent. This compares to a level of defense spending that stood at approximately 10 percent throughout the 1950s and at 5.9 percent in 1973, when our involvement in Vietnam ceased. To say that such an effort—in relation to the present basic strength and size of the American economy—cannot be undertaken seems to me nonsense. But, to repeat, it must be meshed with comprehensive and much more effective attacks on our energy, productivity, and inflation problems. I believe we can carry out this kind of increase on an equitable basis, in which the level of sacrifice that is required of every segment of our society is fairly distributed and proportioned to economic status. What is required, above all, is a sense of national discipline and resolve that flows from clear understanding of the gravity of the situation.

And here the heart of the matter is that both the government and candidates for office, during the current campaign and afterwards, must give full publicity to the facts as we know them and

[4] This estimate derives from the detailed proposals published by the Committee on the Present Danger, which call for added defense spending amounting to $260 billion over a six-year period. CPD, "Countering the Soviet Threat—A U.S. Defense Strategy in the 1980s," May 9, 1980.

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not obscure them for short-term political reasons. During the 1970s, a tendency developed to play down the facts concerning, and the significance of, a number of Soviet actions. In general, this was done on the theory that if one did not find an excuse for Soviet actions the hope for a reasonable accommodation with the Soviet Union would be endangered; more specifically, it was done to avoid harming the prospects of Senate ratification of the SALT agreements.

These problems are not unique to the United States; they affect other countries as well. It is not only in the United States that the growing penetration of Africa with support of Cuban military forces was given little significance. It is not only in the United States that developments in Afghanistan were underplayed prior to the Soviet invasion, and indeed now are still being underplayed. Furthermore, it is not surprising that the campaign to discredit the United States is given comprehensive support in many countries.

Despite its many and manifest shortcomings, the Soviet system does, in certain ways, "work." Most notably the Soviet system imaginatively designs, centrally coordinates, and widely disseminates a powerful and effective propaganda line. The targets of that propaganda line shift from time to time. At one time the Federal Republic of Germany was the principal target of scorn; at another time it was the leadership of communist China; today, it is the United States. In the internal politics of foreign countries the usual target is the party most closely following the social democratic line; it can switch, however, to the party following a conservative line, and communist parties are not exempt, if insufficiently subservient to Moscow. Often the central accusation is designed to shift attention from some comparable but more serious Soviet action. Coordination of a Western response is often difficult to reconcile with freedom of the press. The Soviet propagandists thus have extensive opportunities effectively to divide their opponents and cover their own actions in a fog of conflicting assertions. Nevertheless, a prime task of the Western strategy in the 1980s, and of U.S. strategy in particular, must be to assure that the facts get out and are understood despite the obfuscations of Soviet propaganda.

VI

Obviously, if the United States mounts an overall program such as that described above—as I believe it must—it will take time for its material effects to become real and usable. There are those who

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argue that if the Soviet Union sees the United States acting in such a way as to reverse what they see as a strong current trend in favor of the Soviets in the correlation of forces, the temptation will be all the greater for the U.S.S.R. to step up its efforts to stir up new opportunities and to consolidate tentative gains of recent years.

There are also those who, for one motive or another, would seek to depict the United States as starting up a new "arms race." In my judgment, the facts are exactly contrary to any such claim. It is the Soviet Union that failed to respond to the more relaxed policies pursued by the United States in the 1970s, but instead moved relentlessly forward, first to build up its military power and then to extend its whole pattern of expansionist activity culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan. What is needed now is a redressing of the balance, undertaken not for the sake of any expansion of American influence or power, but to prevent further Soviet assaults on the national independence of individual countries and on the security of key regions of the world. Seen in this light—as I believe it can and should be—the picture of the United States pulling itself together should be understood, and welcomed, by all threatened nations whether or not allied with the United States. The object of the effort—as must be made clear at every point—is to *reduce* the threats to peace in the world and to advance the universal cause of a world in which nations can develop as they see fit. That such a free and plural world is also the one most conducive to the national interests of the United States is simply a reflection of the profound difference between American and Soviet national objectives.

Yet the danger that the Soviets might seek to exploit their temporary advantages in terms of military power cannot be dismissed. Crises may indeed arise a little sooner than they would otherwise have done, just as an always latent Soviet threat to Berlin ripened into direct threats in 1958 when the Soviets (as it turned out, mistakenly) thought that they had achieved a superiority in ballistic missiles. But what is clear beyond doubt is that if the United States does *not* act along the lines proposed here, the kind of Soviet gains and threats to world peace that have arisen in the last five years will multiply inexorably and perhaps, in the end, irretrievably.

Let us look, then, at the first four objectives of Soviet strategy, outlined earlier. To prescribe detailed American and Western counter-strategies for each would require more than a single article. But a few key points can be noted.

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With respect to NATO Europe, the proposed program should, almost at once, help to restore a confidence that is now shaken concerning the defense of Western Europe itself. Existing plans for strengthening NATO, including the plans for deployment of theater nuclear weapons, should go forward—subject only to the unlikely prospect of reaching effective agreements for mutual reduction of forces. And our European allies, as well as Japan, can reasonably be asked to take on greater shares of the burden of their own defense.

Similarly, the picture of a United States getting its house in order on the energy and economic fronts can only have a heartening impact, and should specifically, and soon, help to reduce the frictions that have arisen in these areas. There, and in respect to the Middle East and Africa, the United States could adopt the general line that we are prepared to do as much as, and more than, our allies, but that we are not prepared to act alone or with only one or two of them. We are therefore not only prepared fully to consult but insist upon consultation and agreement as a precondition to U.S. action. With respect to the Germans and the French in particular, we ought to be quite frank with them as to Soviet strategy as we see it, but willing to modify our views on the basis of the additional evidence they can bring to bear on the question.

The situation in the Middle East is obviously dark. The key American interests there are, as always, the independence of individual nations, preserving access to oil on an equitable basis, and the special American commitment to the survival of a healthy Israel roughly within the pre-1967 boundaries. Iran presents special problems, including the threat of a Soviet-oriented leftist takeover, and for the time being there is little possibility of effective U.S. influence there. But those nations seeking to retain their independence should have our quiet support on all fronts, and the United States cannot avoid the responsibility for furthering any possibility of peace between the Arab states and Israel, and for balancing its relationships with Israel and with moderate Arab nations.

Meanwhile, the all too likely prospect that the Soviets will not withdraw from Afghanistan—where they are embarked on an apparent campaign of total destruction of villages—and the continuing Soviet threat to Pakistan may at any time present acute problems. I see no prospect, at least until there has been a substantial improvement in the military balance, for the successful use of U.S. military force in that area except in circumstances

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where a majority of Muslim states as well as Israel, our European allies, Japan and China join in resisting the expansionist pressure of the Soviet Union. The principal task, therefore, is to help foster the emergence of a consensus among them. I believe it more feasible for such a consensus to be found in support of the principles of nonaggression and collective defense of the United Nations Charter than merely in support of U.S. leadership.

The encirclement and eventual dismemberment of China appears to be a more formidable task for Soviet policy. There are, however, opportunities. The Soviets could, for instance, stimulate a Vietnamese attack on Thailand, thus raising the possibility of Chinese action against Vietnam, followed by Soviet pressure on the province of Xinjiang and eventually Tibet. I believe the United States is right to emphasize its existing commitment to Thailand as a deterrent to any such chain of events, and that the existing U.S. relationship with China is about right, stopping short in present circumstances of any direct military ties. But if such a sequence should come about, the United States and other major nations will be faced with an extremely grave threat to world peace, and the result could easily be a cementing of the very ties between China and the West that the Kremlin apparently fears.

The problems of the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere differ qualitatively from those of the Eurasian landmass and of Africa. The interests of our NATO European allies and Japan are less, our own more direct. Soviet conventional military power projection capabilities play a smaller role. But in Latin America the political disposition toward antagonism to a powerful neighbor is substantial. In the short run, the United States must seek to identify and support moderate elements wherever possible, and must expand its resources for economic aid and, in selected cases, military assistance. And, in the longer run, what is required is a long and patient effort at building a group of Americans interested, knowledgeable, and professionally competent in the fine structure of the myriad facets of a most difficult set of psychological, economic and political problems.

VII

Even if the United States were not only to adopt but fully to carry out a strategy for the 1980s of the type and magnitude here proposed, that would not in itself assure the containment of Soviet expansionism. Success in restraining the Soviet Union requires a significant degree of parallel action and cooperation by substan-

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tially all those threatened. Otherwise they can be isolated and picked off one by one. To call such cooperation a "coalition of the free" is an oversimplification. Not all countries threatened by the Soviet Union enjoy much internal freedom, but all are freer both from external influence and internally than are members of the communist "camp of peace and freedom." What they share above all is the glue that has bound all coalitions in the past: the realization of a common danger.

Given the unifying force of a common danger, there are still many centrifugal forces and many grounds for rationalizing individual rather than common approaches to the problem. In the United States there is a deep tendency toward isolation from the hard facts of international conflict and escape into easy moralism. In Europe the provisions of the NATO treaty limiting the commitment of the participants to common action only in the case of threats to the NATO area are rationalized as absolving all participants but the United States from responsibility for dealing with threats outside that area. In the case of Japan, the limitations of the Japanese Constitution are used as a rationale to justify defense expenditures no larger than one percent of the GNP. The Chinese government argues that it is an underdeveloped country and will require 20 years before it will be in a position to play a role in the common defense commensurate with its position in the world. The Federal Republic of Germany notes its unique position as a divided country between East and West.

In the face of these obvious difficulties, how does one go about fostering the parallel and coordinated action which is necessary? Again, there is no easy formula for success but certain guidelines do suggest themselves.

More than half the task will be accomplished when others in the world sense that the United States is pulling itself together internally, that it is achieving a degree of control over its energy and economic-fiscal problems, and has settled on a responsible and consistent general line for its foreign and defense policies. The task will be further eased if a high measure of bipartisan support for that policy in and out of the Congress can be developed.

Fostering the necessary parallel and coordinated actions will require a persistent and flexible U.S. effort in many forums and through many channels. The North Atlantic Council is an appropriate forum for the discussion even of issues arising outside the NATO area. The U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council are other necessary forums. But the real work must be done through bilateral channels. In the past it has been wise to give

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special consideration to bilateral coordination with the British, the Germans, the French, the Japanese and the Canadians. But, depending on the issue, a wide range of other countries must also be consulted. The volume of work required is so large that the President must divide the burden with his executive branch subordinates and his diplomatic officers. The necessary subdivision, articulation and delegation of the task can only be successfully accomplished if there is a common understanding of the main lines of a consistent strategic approach.

The United States no longer enjoys the unquestioned primacy in the non-Moscow-controlled world which it once enjoyed. We succeeded in the positive task of assisting many of today's developed and developing nations to achieve the positions of strength and influence they now enjoy. Today, they must be expected to decide for themselves those actions which they believe are necessary for their continued well-being and security. The principal hope for the success of a U.S. strategy for the 1980s lies in its being consistent with the long-range interests of our allies and potential allies and being so perceived by them.

In the short run we must expect that local, narrower, more petty interests will result in action by them which will appear to us in the United States not to be in the general interest. In the long run the essential soundness of our position and the deceptive techniques, the brutal means, and the hegemonic aims of the Soviet Union will tend to force them back to actions more in the general interest. To buy time and to use it well is therefore of the essence.

If any of us are to survive the decade of the 1980s we must keep our eyes on the essential decency and goodwill of our associates. It is always tempting to find fault with others. It is important to avoid mutual recrimination. The best antidote for recrimination about the past is to concentrate on doing what needs to be done now to assure the future.

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Barry M. Blechman

DO NEGOTIATED ARMS LIMITATIONS HAVE A FUTURE?

As we enter the fall of 1980, the future of efforts to limit armaments through international negotiations is very much in doubt. President Carter's decision in January to defer Senate debate on the SALT II treaty only recognized formally what had long been apparent: in many ways the troubled history of SALT II already had represented a significant, perhaps fatal, defeat for negotiated arms limitations—regardless of the specific fate of the treaty itself. Even before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, enthusiasm for arms limitations had become increasingly restrained within the Administration (to put it mildly) as the SALT agreement's political problems had become increasingly evident. Moreover, the national SALT debate and related developments had occasioned perceptions in the Congress and among the public at large of political and substantive liabilities of negotiated arms limitations that seemed likely to give pause to any President in 1981.

Few would have predicted such a state of affairs. Upon taking office, President Carter set ambitious objectives for, and assigned unprecedented priority to, arms limitations. The design of the MX missile system, for example, the most expensive weapons program backed by the Carter Administration, was strongly influenced by projected requirements for verifying future negotiated limitations on strategic weapons. Similarly, early in 1977 the President established tough unilateral policies aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and restraining sales of conventional weapons. Most important, in March 1977, U.S. objectives in the ongoing SALT negotiations were reevaluated and a more ambitious negotiating position adopted. At the same time, then, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposed the creation of new U.S.-Soviet arms

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limitation working groups. Eight such groups were agreed upon: antisatellite weapons, chemical weapons, civil defense, comprehensive nuclear test ban, conventional arms transfers, demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, prior notification of missile tests, and radiological weapons and new types of mass destruction weapons.

The results of this ambitious program have been modest. Indeed, in the closing months of the present Administration, efforts to place limitations on armaments have been at a standstill, their prognosis bleak.

Judged strictly on their own criteria, unilateral efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and to restrain arms sales may have made progress for a time, but seem to have accomplished little of permanence. During the second half of 1979, as concern about the substantive and political consequences of Soviet military assertiveness mounted within the Administration, the President reversed himself on a series of arms transfer decisions, authorizing sales of OV-10 aircraft to Morocco and of large quantities of munitions to Saudi Arabia, and making a crucial blanket exception to the arms transfer restraint policy by permitting development of a new aircraft whose only markets would be found overseas. Similarly, efforts to restrain nuclear proliferation were set back in 1979 by the ambiguous results of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study,[1] several international deals involving components of civilian nuclear power systems, an unexplained event near South Africa which could have been a nuclear explosion, and the Administration's reversal of prior decisions not to provide economic or military assistance to Pakistan because of that nation's program to develop a nuclear explosive capability. While these individual decisions may be understandable in the light of world events, and although the nonproliferation and arms transfer policies did score some important early successes, at the end of three years both policies clearly were taking second place to more traditional concerns.

Even greater disappointments occurred in the negotiations. The SALT II negotiations were concluded successfully, but the treaty's fate is at best uncertain. Of the U.S.-Soviet working groups, negotiations on civil defense and prior notification of missile tests were never held;[2] three negotiations which did begin have since

[1] This effort to develop an international consensus on ways to limit the dangers that civilian nuclear power programs pose for nuclear weapons proliferation resulted in a February 1980 report which temporized on the dangers of breeder reactors and fuel reprocessing.

[2] A requirement for prior notification of certain missile tests was included in the SALT II treaty.

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been terminated—in fact, if not formally;[3] and two negotiations—for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on chemical weapons—continue, but with no agreement in sight. Agreement also remains elusive in a negotiation already proceeding when President Carter took office: talks for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. Only one negotiation was concluded successfully: that on radiological weapons; elements of an agreement acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union have been presented to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament for consideration and possible inclusion in a multilateral treaty.

Why was it not possible to accomplish more? To be sure, these activities were pursued in a domestic environment that included the same social and political factors which in recent years have made virtually any national policy difficult to establish and even harder to sustain over the long term. The absence of a national consensus, the dispersion of power within the Congress, the continuing conflict between the executive and legislative branches over appropriate roles in foreign policy decision-making, the legacy of suspicion and distrust of the presidency inherited by Jimmy Carter, the erosion of the major political parties and the rise of single-issue interest groups—all contributed to the difficulties of U.S. foreign policy in general and U.S. arms limitation efforts in particular.

Moreover, the climate for arms limitations had been strongly and adversely affected by the continuing buildup of Soviet military power. Roughly 16 years in duration by 1980, the broad scope and relentless pace of the buildup has had dramatic effects on Western public and elite perceptions of the political and military implications of U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. Although these Soviet military efforts raise certain specific security concerns, their perhaps more important effects are diffuse and political in character. The Soviet Union's continued willingness to allocate a relatively large percentage of its relatively scarce resources to military forces which already—to a Western eye—appear excessive for defensive purposes, has raised the most serious questions about Soviet ambitions.

Continuing turbulence and frequent military conflicts in the Third World have seriously aggravated the situation. These conflicts, which more often than not have challenged a status quo favoring the West, pose problems enough. Direct or indirect Soviet

[3] The Indian Ocean negotiations were last convened in February 1978, the conventional arms transfer talks were last held in December 1978, and the antisatellite talks were last convened in June 1979. No future meetings have been scheduled for any of the three.

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involvement, when it occurs, adds another and more threatening dimension to Third World turmoil. To be sure, these Soviet military programs and activity in the Third World do not violate any arms control agreement.[4] Moreover, short of war, negotiating mutual limitations on armaments remains the only direct way to constrain Soviet armed forces. Yet the political logic of the situation even before the occupation of Afghanistan was such that Soviet military decisions clearly made efforts to form and sustain the constituencies necessary to ensure the success of arms limitation initiatives far more difficult.

The U.S. Senate's SALT deliberations are instructive. At the end of the first round of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in August 1979, prospects for the treaty seemed bright. Criticisms of the specific terms of the treaty aired during the extensive sessions of the committee had been fully discussed and largely discredited. Remaining concerns focused mainly on what commitments to military spending the Carter Administration would be willing to make to offset charges that SALT could induce a certain euphoria in the U.S. government and among the public which would lead to neglect of the defense budget. Although passage was far from certain, betting in Washington was that approval by the full Senate would be in hand by Thanksgiving. The subsequent travails of the treaty are traceable not to the surfacing of any new arguments about the agreement itself, nor to new information about the balance of strategic weapons, but to other types of events. The revelation in September that there was a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and the subsequent pseudo-crisis delayed the committee markup. Once sufficient time had passed for the hoopla to die down, the committee reviewed the treaty line by line, again demonstrating the weaknesses of substantive criticisms of the agreement itself. The treaty was passed by the full committee in November without amendments significant enough to require renegotiation. Then, however, came the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which delayed the opening of floor debate, and, finally, the *coup de grace* administered by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

What now? Obviously, not much will happen in the near term—at least through the U.S. election. But what of the period after 1980? Should there be continued efforts to limit arms through negotiations? What objectives, if any, are realistic? Much will

[4] Recent evidence that the Soviets may have been storing (or producing) biological warfare agents in Sverdlovsk stands as a possible exception to this statement.

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depend upon the resolution of two fundamental issues: the continuing debate about the desired character of U.S.-Soviet relations, and a largely unstated argument about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy.

II

Surveying the connection between U.S.-Soviet relations and the progress of arms negotiation over the past ten years, it is worth recalling the words of Vladimir S. Semyonov, who began the Soviet presentation at the first session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1969:

> The government of the U.S.S.R. attaches great importance to the negotiations on curbing the strategic arms race. *Their positive results should undoubtedly contribute both to improvement in Soviet-American relations and in the consolidation of universal peace.*[5]

Thus, at the very outset of the talks, the concept which eventually was to break the back of the SALT process was recognized formally: linkage, the idea that progress toward arms limitation would lead to progress in other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations and, conversely, its corollary, that cooperation (or lack of cooperation) in other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations would facilitate (or hamper) movement in arms negotiations. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been ambivalent about "linkage." Each has stressed or de-emphasized "linkage" when it was in its own interest to do so. In the end, however, the concept took firm root in the American political system and, as a result, imposed a heavier burden on the talks than they could possibly bear; indeed, the notion implied a model of U.S.-Soviet relations which was strongly opposed by a variety of groups with powerful voices in national security decision-making.

Given their ideological origins, it would be surprising if Soviet commentators did not stress interrelationships between negotiated arms limitations and broader accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. From a Marxist theoretical perspective, the source of all conflict is economic and by extension political, stemming fundamentally from the existence of historically antagonistic social systems. To a Marxist theorist, the basic premise of arms control—that weapons in themselves contribute to the risk of war—is sophistry. Conflict results from the necessary

[5] *The New York Times*, November 18, 1969, p. A16 (italics added).

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clash of opposing social forces. The alleviation of conflict, therefore, can only result from broad political accommodation. By making preexisting settlements specific and legally binding, arms limitation agreements can strengthen political accommodations but they can never force new arrangements; they are the "practical embodiment" of détente, not its cause.

At times, the Soviets have been willing to demonstrate the practical consequences of this relationship. Perhaps the best example occurred in December 1978. At that time, Secretary Vance met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva in what was widely viewed as likely to be the final round of substantive SALT II negotiations. Indeed, the White House had begun media preparations to announce completion of the agreement. Just prior to the round, however, the United States declared its intention to normalize relations with China, a process to be marked by the visit of Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping to Washington the following month. In response, the Soviets demonstrated their belief that political conditions were not yet right for U.S.-Soviet arms limitations by elevating to new prominence at the final session what previously had been perceived as relatively minor issues, thus delaying the U.S.-Soviet summit expected to cap the negotiations.

For the most part, however, the close linkage between movement in broader political relations and progress in arms limitations which would seem to be dictated by Soviet theory has not proved to be important in practice. Most notably, in 1972 the Soviets completed SALT I as scheduled, despite the United States' mining of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports on the eve of the summit (an act which trapped or damaged a number of Soviet-flag merchant ships). More recently, the Soviets have vigorously protested U.S. attempts to link progress in arms negotiation to the curtailment of Soviet military activities in Africa, Cuba and South Asia.

To be sure, Soviet forebearance did not result either from devotion to the cause of arms limitation or from a rejection of their Marxist heritage in favor of historic American pragmatism. What did happen was that the stream of world events and the dictates of Soviet internal politics were such that the Brezhnev regime found pursuit of SALT very much in its interest, despite continued erosion of the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations. In fact, as U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Soviets pressed harder across the range of negotiations, adopting increasingly conciliatory positions and raising expectations in several. It is as

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if they saw in arms limitation negotiations the only remaining evidence of the possibility of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and clung to them in desperation as Brezhnev's policy of détente otherwise was torn asunder.

In the United States, the experience has been just the opposite. The American theory of arms control would isolate such negotiations from politics. In theoretical terms, arms limitation talks should be viewed as technical exercises, directed at constraining the risks which weapons themselves add to existing political conflicts. As those espousing arms control made no pretense of solving political conflicts through the negotiations they proposed, they saw no relationship (other than that artificially instilled by politicians) between progress or lack of progress in settling underlying sources of conflict and progress or lack of progress in arms negotiations. Indeed, they accepted international tensions as inevitable and saw arms limitation talks simply as one way to manage their more dangerous consequences.

In practice, however, the United States has closely linked movement in arms control with broader political accommodation with the Soviet Union. Specifically, successive U.S. Administrations, perhaps reluctantly, have frequently concluded that there could not be movement in arms talks unless or until the Soviet Union modified its international behavior so as not to pose military challenges to Western interests. Examples are legion. The start of the talks, for example, planned for 1968, was delayed by the occupation of Czechoslovakia. In 1976, completion of the Vladivostok accord was deferred because of Soviet military involvement in Angola. And, despite its public protestations to the contrary, as early as 1978 the Carter Administration's positions in SALT and other arms negotiations were strongly influenced by the deterioration of U.S.–Soviet relations, punctuated by such events as the Soviet military involvement in the Horn of Africa and the East German and Cuban roles in the Shaba incident in Zaïre.

This sensitivity on the part of American policymakers should be expected in a democratic political system. Policies—especially innovative policies that run counter to traditional ways of doing business[6]—cannot be sustained without substantial political constituencies. SALT suffered more from rising uneasiness among the American populace about Soviet military power and Soviet assertiveness than from any deficiencies of its own. Never mind that

[6] One is reminded here of former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Paul Warnke's characterization of arms control as "an unnatural act."

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SALT was the one policy instrument that conceivably could place limits on Soviet forces. The concept that prevailed in the public's mind extended the basic premise of linkage (i.e., that progress in arms control could facilitate progress in broader relations) to an assertion that if arms control was worth pursuing, it would result in broader accommodation. Since there was no evidence of such a broad accommodation, the argument ran, then obviously arms control was at least not serving its purposes and probably, in some mysterious way, was itself contributing to the problem. As this concept took root, first among conservative Republicans and later in a broader segment of the public, both the Ford and Carter Administrations felt compelled to behave as though they accepted it as well.

In effect, the SALT talks became a weathervane of U.S.–Soviet relations, the centerpiece and primary symbol of a certain model of that relationship. As such, the talks were criticized by, indeed contributed to, the creation of a coalition of dedicated opponents who fought both the treaties and the process which led to them, as much for what they implied for U.S.-Soviet relations as for whatever specific limitations they did or did not impose on American and Soviet nuclear weapons.

The 1972 treaty which placed severe limitations on antiballistic missile (ABM) systems is the key factor here. By agreeing not to deploy weapons that could create the illusion of a capability to defend against a major nuclear attack, the two nations formally recognized the probability that each would suffer unprecedented destruction in the event of a major nuclear exchange. Thus, they accepted the necessity for a certain degree of cooperation in their relations and implicitly set limits on their competition. This is not to say that they agreed to get along with one another, to end the rivalry, or anything like that; far from it. Still, they did establish a formally recognized mutual need to stop the competition from getting out of hand, to avoid confrontations that could contain a real danger of nuclear war.

The ABM treaty is thus a central element in the quest for cooperative U.S.-Soviet relations. The continuing SALT process supported the viability of the ABM treaty; limits on defensive weapons probably cannot be sustained in the presence of a wide-open offensive weapons race. SALT thus came to symbolize America's acceptance of the need to get along with the Soviet Union. Additionally, by linking the United States and the U.S.S.R. in a cooperative venture reserved for them and no other nations, SALT

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set the two superpowers apart from all other states—even America's allies.

To many Americans these postures are wrong, both morally and in terms of U.S. security interests. They believe that the United States must seek to change Soviet society and, that to do so, it must remain in a state of tension with the Soviet government. They argue that if it is isolated, the Soviet state eventually will crack of its own internal contradictions—nationalities problems, economic failures, corruption, the natural yearnings of individuals for freedom, and so forth. This means that the United States should seek to construct a wall of implacable hostility around the U.S.S.R., a political-cum-military alliance among the nations of Western Europe, Japan, China and others in the Third World. Only America can galvanize such an alliance, it is argued, and to do so the United States must avoid bilateral agreements or even bilateral negotiations, as these imply permanent acceptance of the Soviet regime and accord legitimacy to it. The ABM treaty, the SALT II treaty, and the SALT process itself—to say nothing of other arms negotiations—are thus seen to undermine the long-run objective of causing fundamental change in Soviet society.

Obviously, opponents of arms limitations typically find it in their interest not to articulate this line of reasoning; they prefer to debate technical points in the treaty itself, arguing that they support arms control in the abstract, but that a better deal should have been made. The reasons for this stance are clear: the specter of unfettered and open-ended competition with the Soviet Union, including a relatively high risk of confrontation and nuclear war, is not one likely to find substantial political support over the long term. The fact that the congressional SALT debate concentrated on technical questions, rather than basic issues like the implications of the SALT process for U.S.-Soviet relations, testifies to the political skills of the treaty's opponents. The importance of their ability to dictate the terms of the debate is magnified when the second unstated burden of SALT is considered.

It is widely believed in the United States that nuclear weapons can play only a small and tightly circumscribed role in foreign policy. Because of the tremendous risks they imply, the standard argument proceeds, nuclear weapons (meaning nuclear threats) can be utilized only for narrow and quite specific purposes. First and foremost, they serve to deter nuclear attacks on, or coercion of, the United States itself. Additionally, it is believed, the U.S. nuclear umbrella can be extended to a few other nations—primarily the industrialized democracies. And that, more or less, is

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that. It is true that beginning in the early 1970s some officials began to speak of additional purposes for nuclear weapons, as when discussing limited nuclear options, but this was strictly in a reactive context, to offset the presumed political consequences of growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities.

Some argue, however, that the *threat* of nuclear war should be integrated more centrally into U.S. foreign policy; nuclear strength could be translated into political clout in a positive and assertive way. Indeed, some would maintain that this has already occurred, and continues to occur, regardless of our declaratory stance. Ever since World War II, they argue, nuclear weapons in fact have provided the one trump card in the U.S. hand. From the two bombs dropped on Japan, to nuclear threats, implicit or explicit, during the Berlin blockade, Korean War, Quemoy crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and 1973 Middle East war, as well as other more uncertain occasions, the United States turned to the threat of its nuclear arsenal, when push came to shove, to protect its own security and the security of its friends and allies.

Faced with the impossibility, in a democracy, of sustaining over the long haul conventional forces large enough to match those of the Soviet Union—this reasoning continues—the United States will likely confront this necessity again. NATO doctrine itself ensures such a probability with its explicit reliance on the threat of first use of nuclear weapons in the event that conventional conflict goes badly. Moreover, the balance of conventional military power is turning so adversely against the United States that this reliance is more and more likely. Witness the recent tentative turn to nuclear threats to back up President Carter's commitment that the United States would defend the Persian Gulf from Soviet aggression.[7]

To the extent that the United States must rely on nuclear weapons, it is argued, agreements which seek to enshrine strategic nuclear parity as a permanent condition of U.S.-Soviet relations are misguided; rather, the United States must turn its resources and technology to the quest for strategic superiority. Not that success in this goal is seriously contemplated; none but the most naïve believe that such an end is attainable. Nonetheless, the argument runs, by placing itself formally in a posture of seeking nuclear superiority the United States would be demonstrating a

[7] Within ten days of the President's statement, U.S. defense officials made clear nuclear threats on three separate occasions. Although officials subsequently backtracked, coincidental flights of B-52 bombers directed against Soviet naval vessels in the Arabian Sea reinforced the message.

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willingness to manipulate the risk of nuclear war for political objectives, thus lending credibility to the nuclear threats implicit in its foreign policy. In short, only in an environment of wide-open U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition can the United States' *necessary reliance* on nuclear weapons to underpin its foreign policy be supported successfully.

An element uniting these two underlying strands of argumentation against SALT—implications for U.S.-Soviet relations and for the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy—is that those adhering to these viewpoints cannot be satisfied by any changes in the specific content of agreements. From their perspectives, the adverse implications of SALT can be erased only when the very process of seeking arms limitation comes to an end, and its meager products are dismantled.

III

Obviously, those who oppose SALT for these reasons can never be counted among the potential supporters of future arms control initiatives. But what of others? Can a new coalition be created with sufficient political power to rejuvenate arms negotiations?

Rebuilding such a constituency would necessarily be complicated by the ambivalence which characterizes American attitudes toward the talks. Even among supporters, the purposes and potential benefits of arms negotiations have reflected sharply divergent perspectives. This is symbolized by the very title of the agency created in 1961 to plan and carry out these negotiations—the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a title which emerged only after long debate, in a typical congressional compromise that appeared to give each side what it wanted but in fact gave neither the benefits of victory. For "arms control" and "disarmament" represent quite different approaches to arms limitations, with very different policy implications. Although obfuscation of the differences between them did help to secure a prominent position for arms limitations on the nation's agenda for a while, in the end it contributed to the failure of efforts to negotiate limits on armaments.

The theory of "arms control" is based on the rather modest notion that decisions to acquire certain types or quantities of weapons can aggravate political conflicts and thereby *in themselves contribute to the risk of war*. This is not to say that weapons decisions are a primary or even secondary cause of conflict; only that such decisions are one factor which influences the relative probabilities that political conflicts are resolved peacefully, remain unsettled,

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or result in war. It is assumed that one nation's weapons decisions are perceived and interpreted by other states, and that these judgments influence the latters' assessments of the potential military threat to their security, the likelihood that their adversaries intend to make use of that potential, and what weapons or military actions in response are necessary on their own part. Thus the initial decision and the decisions which follow affect both the "stability" (a key word) of the military balance and of broader political relations among nations, as well as the risk of war. Conversely, the theory continues, these adverse effects can be reduced, or at least contained, both through unilateral decisions to avoid deployments of "destabilizing" weapons and, more important, through international negotiations on agreements to mutually avoid deploying certain types of weapons or to place other types of agreed mutual limitations on weaponry.

Thus, at its root, "arms control" offers a technically oriented approach to arms limitations with a modest set of objectives. It accepts conflict among nations as an inevitable part of contemporary international politics and views military force as a necessary (and legitimate) instrument of national policy. It views negotiated limitations on armaments solely as a means of containing the risks and costs of political conflict. "Arms control" and military programs are seen as two sides of the same coin, both being means of enhancing the nation's security.

The limited objectives of arms control flow from its recognition of the fundamental political basis of international conflict, and its acceptance that essentially technical discussions about weapons can only reflect, not initiate, political accommodation. In the usual formulation, three goals are mentioned: (a) to reduce the risk of war; (b) to reduce the cost of preparing for war; and (c) to reduce the cost of war should it occur. In all three, however, success can come only at the margin. The purpose is not to abolish war, but to diminish the risk that war would occur. The objective is not to turn all swords into plowshares, but to create conditions wherein some resources which otherwise might be used to prepare for war can instead be utilized for peaceful purposes.

As this modest theoretical construct (of interest chiefly to a handful of defense intellectuals and military specialists) was transformed into a national political issue, however, these objectives and even the ultimate promise of arms control were sharply revised. Essentially, the nation's political leaders found in arms control a convenient means of satisfying popular demands resulting both from international circumstances and certain fundamen-

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tal strands of opinion long present in the nation's psyche. These latter—*inter alia*, anti-militarism, with its concomitant desire to minimize defense spending, and an aversion to power politics, especially a fear of foreign entanglements—had dominated the nation's foreign policies (except for a few short-lived periods) until the Second World War. They remain important determinants of certain basic American perspectives on world affairs, and can become more or less so depending on events. For convenience, I will refer to those whose attitudes on world affairs are dominated by these sorts of concerns as the "disarmament constituency." Readers should be clear, however, that this shorthand refers to a far larger group than that small minority which actively supports true disarmament.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, concerns of the "disarmament constituency" concentrated largely on nuclear weapons. After all, at that time, the tensions of cold war confrontation in Berlin and elsewhere were very real. The dangers of nuclear holocaust, still at the forefront of concern for the postwar generation which dominated political life, were manifest through such phenomena as civil defense drills and atmospheric nuclear tests, to say nothing of the surviving victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Ten years later, in the late 1960s, the concerns of the disarmament constituency were far broader, its demands more strident, and its political clout far more impressive. Twenty years later, in the late 1970s, as memories of Vietnam faded, as increasing Soviet assertiveness revitalized old fears of Russian imperialism, and as events in Africa and Southwest Asia demonstrated anew the potential utility of military power, attitudes which motivate the disarmament constituency have again been subsumed by other concerns.

For those 20 years, however, American political leaders found in arms control a pragmatic means of satisfying the demands of this constituency—at least for a while. Thus, for example, as his Administration came increasingly under fire because of the slow pace of disengagement from Southeast Asia, President Nixon found it increasingly in his interest to emphasize SALT. In effect, the Nixon Administration said, "Yes, we know you are dissatisfied with what is happening in Southeast Asia and we are doing our best, under difficult circumstances, to speed things up. But, anyway, look over here. We have managed to isolate Vietnam from U.S.-Soviet relations and are making important progress. We are building a 'structure of peace' with the Russians, a structure whose centerpiece is SALT—the control of nuclear weapons. This will be of lasting benefit for your concerns."

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This is not to imply that the Nixon Administration's SALT policies were cynically motivated or driven solely by a desire to ease the pressures stemming essentially from the war; simply that, because of the war, the separate effort to control nuclear weapons gained new political significance and therefore greater emphasis. Nor is it being suggested that only the Nixon Administration acted from this complex of motives. At times Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Ford and Carter all found political benefits in their support for arms control, and saw in their advocacy of arms control a means of satisfying political demands. Indeed, if anything, Democratic Presidents are more susceptible to the pressures of the disarmament constituency. For example, although his personal commitment to arms limitation is beyond question, President Carter obviously saw the benefit of a strong pro-arms control stance when competing for the support of the then-Mc Govern wing of the party during the early stages of his presidential campaign.

Regardless of who was President, however, these political ends necessitated the transformation of the limited objectives of arms control into *first steps*. The implicit promise was that the arms control process would continue, and that each stage would have more ambitious goals. In this way, the disarmament constituency could accept tentative and modest early measures; political support was exchanged for the promise of more ambitious undertakings in the future.

It is surprising that this deal survived as long as it did. The premises upon which it was based simply could not be fulfilled, and evidence to that effect soon became apparent. After all, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty did not soon result in a comprehensive end to nuclear testing. Treaties in the 1960s to demilitarize the Antarctic, outer space, and the seabed were not soon followed by progress toward demilitarization of regions in which the threat of military conflict was more pertinent. And, most important, the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons did not quickly lead to more significant constraints on nuclear weapons as had been promised.

It took the SALT II Treaty, however, for the bargain finally to come unstuck. SALT II would place many important restraints on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, restraints which could significantly stabilize the nuclear competition and the balance of strategic forces, thereby contributing to a lower risk of nuclear war. Its features in this regard—limits on the number of warheads on strategic missiles, limits on the introduction of new types of land-

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based missiles, a special sub-ceiling on the number of land-based missiles with multiple warheads, and others—were readily recognizable to the specialist in arms control. However, the importance of these things was not nearly so apparent to the general public, nor to most politicians. What the latter looked for were the obvious—the signs of progress toward disarmament, toward fulfillment of the promise attributed to arms control 20 years before. And these did not exist. The treaty would cause only slight reductions in Soviet nuclear forces, and, in fact, would ratify an increase in U.S. forces. The treaty would not end weapons modernization, and thereby permit budget reductions—far from it. It would allow an acceleration of U.S. strategic programs and thereby larger expenditures on strategic forces. For all these reasons, the treaty disappointed the disarmament constituency.

The effect of this was not so much to lose specific senatorial votes for ratification as to make it impossible to organize a political constituency behind the treaty. For the most part, the Carter Administration's efforts to gain support for the treaty were ignored—not so much because of anything deleterious in the treaty itself, as because of its lack of evident positive attributes. Its importance was simply not credible (and certainly not obvious) to a significant political audience. As a result, mass support could not be enlisted and senators, for the most part, had little if any reason to get out in front of the ratification process. What could they cite in their home states as reason for their advocacy? That the treaty would result in "only" 2,250 central strategic nuclear delivery systems on each side? That, like SALT I, the new treaty was important not for itself, but because it would make possible future negotiations? After ten years of SALT, the promise of significant future gains would no longer wash.

Moreover, inflated expectations of the ultimate promise of negotiated arms limitations had the contradictory effect of stiffening the opposition. As the objectives of arms control were transformed from the modest goal of regulating the nuclear competition into "the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth," as President Carter put it in his inaugural address, the coalition of groups opposing SALT grew and hardened. Apart from the opposition already identified, others opposed SALT because its transfigured objectives directly challenged their personal and institutional interests. Obviously, individuals whose entire professional lives have been devoted to the development or operation of nuclear forces are likely to view these weapons in a rather more favorable light than was indicated by the Administration's policy.

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Still others grew disenchanted as they saw a certain naïveté in the inflated rhetoric. While both these groups may support negotiations which seek to regulate the nuclear competition, they are unlikely to believe that a process that aims ultimately to abolish nuclear weapons is either realistic or beneficial.

As the post-Vietnam retrenchment in U.S. military power continued through the 1970s, SALT increasingly lost the support it previously enjoyed from the armed services, from the aerospace industry and the labor unions which serve it, from the scientific and research community associated with the Defense Department, and from their political representatives. This was a crucial defeat for arms control; without the support of these groups and in the absence of prospective treaties dramatic enough to stimulate decisive political support from the disarmament constituency, arms limitations can never succeed in a democratic political system.

The regulation of international trade provides an analogy of some relevance.[8] The strongest supporters of international trade agreements typically are those firms and labor organizations that are most dependent upon imports and exports for their livelihoods. Besides their obvious interest in liberalized trade policy, they see in regulation the benefits of stability, which permit effective long-range planning, as well as the avoidance of risks and costs of unfettered competition. Theoretically at least, those most directly concerned with the strategic competition could see similar benefits in arms control. Yet, since 1972, this has not proven to be the case, largely, in my view, because of exaggeration of the original goals of arms control and obfuscation of the differences between arms control and disarmament.

If efforts to negotiate limits on arms are to succeed in the future, policymakers will have to choose between two alternatives. They can define, structure and pursue these efforts along the lines of the original concept of arms control, seeking modest objectives, and enlisting the support of those elements of the government, industry, labor, and the scientific community which are most personally and directly concerned with nuclear weapons; or they can continue to blur the distinction between arms control and disarmament, seeking to reinvigorate that wider political constituency whose roots lie in considerations of religion, morality and the fundamental American antipathy to military power. The

[8] See I.M. Destler, "Trade Consensus, SALT Stalemate: Congress and Foreign Policy in the Seventies," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress*, American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

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latter approach can succeed, however, only if the products of negotiations are more dramatic than those recently delivered. If this wider constituency is to be rebuilt, the benefits of agreements will have to be apparent, on their merits, to a large popular audience. As there is little basis in either the history of arms negotiations or in more recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations to believe that such dramatic results are at all feasible, a return to the original concept of arms control is clearly warranted.

IV

Ironically, the failure of the Carter Administration's arms control policy, and particularly the failure of SALT II in the 96th Congress, could provide an opportunity to modify and then revitalize the public's appreciation of arms control. This would not be easy; it would take considerable time. It would require the leadership of the Administration that takes office in 1981 and the support of those in the Congress who have developed a reputation for expertise on the subject.

Essentially, these political leaders would have to make clear to the public that no matter what happens in arms negotiations, for the foreseeable future the United States will have to take decisive and costly actions to rebuild its military forces sufficiently to offset the growth in Soviet military power over the past 16 years. Given that such a defense buildup is vigorously pursued, however, the extent of the effort required and the dangers implicit in the continuing competition may be moderated through agreements placing mutual restraints on specific types of weapons. If other nations agree to place specific limits on the size of their forces, for example, the United States may be in a position to accept comparable restrictions on its own forces. If other nations agree to retard certain weapons modernization programs, the United States may be able to slow down some of its programs to a comparable degree. If other nations agree to restrict the operational flexibility of their forces in a certain region in order to avoid suspicions about the possible outbreak of war, then the United States may find that it too has an interest in limiting the flexibility of its forces in comparable ways.

In short, if arms control is to be revived, policymakers and political opinion leaders should be forthright about the modest potential of even successful negotiations. Arms talks can reduce the risk of war, but not abolish war. Arms talks can reduce the cost of preparing for war, but the burden of military preparations will remain high as long as the international political system

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remains in its present form. Agreements that result from arms negotiations are not stepping stones to peace; at best, they can accomplish specific things in the context of continuing international political conflict.

In concrete terms, this means that the first step must be to rewrite and substantially narrow the arms control agenda. What is needed most is a clear set of priorities: a firm sense of what is important and what is trivial. Even in its early days, the experience of the Carter Administration demonstrated conclusively that neither the American political system nor the contemporary condition of relations among nations is capable of sustaining arms negotiations on a broad front. Some of the Carter Administration initiatives conflicted with one another substantively. All competed with one another both for the attention of high-level decision-makers and for the political capital necessary to move them through a resistant bureaucracy and equally difficult international system.

The next Administration, Republican or Democratic, must decide what is important and what is feasible and pursue limitations only in those few areas. Policymakers must be ruthless in this regard. There is a tendency to accept new objectives even when their prospects are perceived to be hopeless, as a means of pleasing constituents with actions that are considered harmless. In fact, however, the larding of the arms control agenda with foolish initiatives demeans those items which are significant, wasting time and influence, and casting a naïve pall over the entire policy, regardless of the intrinsic merits of specific items.

For convenience, the prospective arms control agenda can be divided into three main areas: arms control in Europe, U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear weapons, and multilateral arms control.

Arms Control in Europe. The politico-military situation in Europe comes closest to the conditions necessary for the success of arms negotiations. East-West political and economic relations in Europe are relatively cooperative, and have been that way for more than ten years. With a few obvious exceptions, political systems on both sides of the demarcation line are stable; most economies are doing reasonably well. Ties between the two halves of Europe continue to deepen and to expand in scope. The fact that, so far at least, détente in Europe has survived the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations demonstrates the stability of the situation.

European political leaders in both East and West have considerable incentive to ensure that things do not change. Détente has a tangible economic meaning in Europe which it never gained in

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the United States. Détente also has a very human dimension for Europeans, as it facilitates exchanges, such as family visits, across the boundary between East and West. For East Europeans, détente has meant a relaxation of political and economic restrictions. The threat of war, which would rise quickly if Europe returned to more tense East-West relations, also has a more pointed historic meaning for Europeans than for most Americans. And, not insignificantly, West European nations—for the most part—are ruled by individuals who partly have built their careers on rapprochement, and by political parties whose ideologies stress the need for international cooperation.

Despite all this, the East-West military competition in Europe continues to escalate. Both sides are now substantially expanding their military capabilities on the continent. The Warsaw Pact, particularly in its Soviet component, grew somewhat in size and began to accelerate its equipment modernization more than ten years ago. NATO responded slowly, but is now taking important steps to expand its combat capabilities, by raising force levels slightly and sharply accelerating its modernization programs, as well as taking other steps to improve the efficiency with which the alliance as a whole makes use of its members' contributions. The nations of NATO now seem resolved to increase their military spending beyond the amount necessary to offset inflation each year. Over time, given NATO's far greater resource base, this would reverse the past trend in relative capabilities between East and West.

These continuing military buildups have an adverse effect on the political situation in Europe. At a minimum, they delay and make more difficult the strengthening of détente. More likely, over time—by contributing to a diffuse sense of unease and apprehension—they can actually erode the progress made in the past, thus contributing to new tensions and a greater risk of war. At times, specific decisions can have more pointed and immediate political effects, as in the case of the Soviet deployment of SS-20 mobile intermediate-range missiles and the resultant NATO decision to deploy both a new-model ballistic missile and ground-launched cruise missiles capable of striking Soviet territory. Should certain contingencies occur, whether civil strife in Yugoslavia, turmoil in Poland, or anarchy in Italy, the suspicions and concerns resulting from the continuing momentum of the military competition can make the avoidance of military conflict more difficult. Overall, it seems doubtful that political stability and détente can survive indefinitely in the face of unbridled military competition.

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This is an excellent opportunity for arms control. Theoretically at least, given the relatively benign political situation, it should be possible to negotiate mutual limitations on the military forces of the two sides which can dampen these adverse consequences of continuing military deployments. Such negotiations would not erase the remaining differences between East and West but, potentially, they could confine the degree to which the military competition independently aggravates the political situation. They would not end the need for NATO to respond to the Soviet military buildup but, by confining growth in Soviet capabilities, they could moderate the burden of defense in the West.

There are three potential forums for such negotiations: the now seven-year-old NATO-Warsaw Pact talks in Vienna for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in central Europe; the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which previously negotiated and incorporated in the Helsinki Final Act certain measures to increase the confidence with which each side was able to view the other's military activities, and for which a review conference is scheduled to begin in Madrid in November of 1980; and the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which has received some support from both the Warsaw Pact and the West Germans.

If these putative negotiations are each pursued separately, they are all virtually guaranteed either to fail or to produce insignificant results. Progress toward arms control in Europe requires a unified approach with the support of all members of both blocs, as well as the neutral and nonaligned states. Seemingly most promising would be a strategy that sought to terminate the MBFR talks with completion of the proposal now on the table—calling chiefly for modest asymmetrical reductions in military personnel—and then moved to assimilate the French CDE proposal within the CSCE context.

MBFR is badly flawed by its limited geographic scope, its too-long history, its endless debates over data, the refusal of the French to participate, and, most important, its emphasis on bloc-to-bloc confrontation. The talks have served some useful purposes—mainly, perhaps, in terms of their effects on intra-NATO consultations and procedures—but have outlived their usefulness. They require some sort of modest agreement to permit a graceful exit for all parties. The proposal put on the table by the West in December would provide an equitable, if essentially symbolic, agreement, and a convenient way to end the talks. It is now up to the U.S.S.R. to respond so as to complete the negotiation.

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In the meantime, the preliminary steps necessary to fuse the CSCE and CDE concepts and inaugurate the new negotiating forum could be taken at the CSCE Review Conference. It may be possible at Madrid, in fact, to make more stringent the confidence-building measures already included in the Helsinki Final Act. More important, however, would be the creation of a CSCE working group on European security issues. Such a group could incorporate the essence of the French CDE proposal—addressing the broad definition of Europe (from the Urals to the Atlantic) and shifting from bloc-to-bloc to true multinational negotiations; the group might even meet in Paris. At the outset it might take up a number of additional confidence-building measures. If these negotiations proved successful, the talks could shift to the tougher issues of quantitative limitations on conventional forces.

U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Strategic Weapons. The SALT II treaty obviously is gravely wounded. It has had such a difficult history, it is associated in a large part of the public's mind with such negative events, its politics are so bad—that any new Administration, including a second Carter Administration, would be reluctant to enter yet again into the maelstrom of congressional debate on the treaty. Yet the treaty will not disappear; some action will have to be taken, and the character of that action will have an important impact on U.S.-Soviet relations. The test will come early in 1981. The U.S. elections will be past; presumably, U.S.-Soviet relations will have stabilized, even if, as is likely, they entail a high level of tension and open political conflict.

Under such conditions, there would be important reasons to seek to preserve the terms of SALT II. It is precisely at the times when U.S.-Soviet confrontation is most acute that the benefits of SALT are most significant. Confrontational politics seem likely to be the watchword for at least the next several years. Reducing the nuclear component of the risks associated with such a situation could be a crucial plus.

Besides, the treaty places significant limitations on Soviet strategic forces. It restricts the number of warheads on Soviet missiles and the number of such missiles themselves. It retards modernization of Soviet land-based missiles. The pace and status of Soviet strategic programs is such that these provisions could be violated rapidly once the Kremlin decided that SALT was either dead or undesirable. Most Americans now agree that the United States must take major steps to improve its own strategic capabilities. These steps will take time, however. The treaty confines Soviet options at precisely the time when the United States would be

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most disadvantaged, the period between now and 1985. In the absence of SALT II's constraints on Soviet programs, the United States may be playing catch-up for far longer than is now contemplated, regardless of the size of the step-up in our own efforts.

Whether these considerations will be persuasive remains to be seen. The immediate need is for both sides to avoid steps that violate the terms of the treaty. If such a tacit agreement can be maintained until 1981, it may be possible to consider resubmitting the treaty to the Congress. Conceivably, the two sides might find it in their mutual interest to make some minor changes to the treaty, changes sufficient to take the political curse off the present document. Alternatively, it could be possible to devise some procedural arrangement to maintain tacit observance of the treaty while negotiations are reopened on a new agreement. There will always be a temptation in the United States, particularly if a new Administration takes office, to throw away SALT II and begin again. That temptation should be avoided. In one sense, SALT's current problems stem from this Administration's initial decision to discard the Vladivostok accord in favor of something better.

Beyond SALT II, questions about the future of the ABM treaty will recur. The key date is 1982—the year of the next scheduled review conference. Unquestionably, pressure will mount to scrap or at least to amend the treaty significantly. These pressures will be greater if SALT II is not preserved, but they will exist regardless, in view of new developments in relevant technologies, the ostensible potential of ABMS to facilitate the deployment of survivable land-based offensive missile systems, and the blood already drawn by some opponents of SALT—whose real target has always been the ABM treaty and its implications for U.S.-Soviet relations. Determining one's position on the question of whether the ABM treaty should or should not be amended requires evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of the new technologies, a comparable survey of alternative methods of accomplishing similar ends, and a political assessment of the consequences of seeking to revise one of the few major accomplishments of arms negotiations.

If SALT II continues to be observed, formally or informally, and if the ABM treaty is preserved, even if modified to permit defense of additional ICBM sites, consideration of the style and substance of new negotiations on offensive weapons may again become relevant. Too much must occur between now and then, however, and too much ink has already been futilely spilled on the subject of SALT III, to warrant such speculation at present.

In the interim, the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, a confidential body established by the ABM treaty, could

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provide a useful forum for continued discussions of the modalities of U.S. and Soviet behavior that could best preserve what progress has been made in the past, as well as options for the future if political relations thaw. These talks could touch on what is necessary to preserve the "objectives and purposes" of SALT II, the beginnings of a dialogue on the question of whether to revise the ABM treaty, and, conceivably, the types of national behavior that could most support chances for a future agreement to prevent the escalation of U.S.-Soviet military competition in space.

Multilateral Arms Control. There clearly must be a shift in emphasis from bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations to multilateral forums. There has been a tendency to seek U.S.-Soviet agreement as a first step, believing that once that nut had been cracked, wider agreement would follow. This has not only placed undue burdens on U.S.-Soviet relations, but has nurtured the fears of those who see arms control as an expression of U.S.-Soviet condominium, thereby aggravating the political problems already surrounding the negotiations.

Problems more appropriately tackled in multilateral, rather than bilateral, forums include those of nuclear tests, chemical weapons, and arms sales. These phenomena pose dangers to the security of all, not just the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no reason why the United States should place itself in the position of *demandeur* on these matters, as is implied when it takes initiatives for U.S.-Soviet agreements preliminary to multilateral solutions. Indeed, unnecessary problems are often created when it appears that the superpowers are dictating the terms of agreement to less powerful nations, a problem faced, for example, in the recent talks to restrain arms sales.

The multilateral forum most appropriate for these discussions is the U.N.'s Committee on Disarmament. Recently reorganized, the Committee now includes all the nuclear powers, as China took its seat during the spring 1980 session. The United States can and should play a constructive role within the Committee, but its posture should be relatively low key. Separate U.S.-Soviet discussions might take place, at times, as on the details of additional protocols to aid verification arrangements, but these talks should be viewed as complementary, not as substitutes for discussions in the Committee or any working groups that it establishes. Moreover, such separate talks need not take place until it is clear that multilateral agreement is feasible. Some will argue that this proposal condemns these negotiations to failure. But the substantive problems that make multilateral negotiations difficult—for example, the reluctance of some nuclear powers to end nuclear

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testing—would not disappear even if the United States and the U.S.S.R. could reach agreement. Moreover, the faltering bilateral talks further impede other forms of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

Others will fear that greater emphasis on the Committee on Disarmament would put pressure on the United States to subscribe to agreements that it would otherwise prefer to avoid. That argument too is spurious. There is no substantive reason why the United States, like France, could not persist in defense of its own perception of proper approaches to, and necessary conditions for, arms control, including—wherever appropriate—a firm insistence that any agreements include adequate attention to verification.

V

Judged by the standards of the recent past, this agenda is modest in the extreme. Yet what is needed now—and badly—are tangible accomplishments. After 20 years of grandiose declarations, absolute objectives, ambitious agendas and inspiring speeches, we need results—pragmatic steps toward the limitation of arms.

If negotiated arms limitations are to have a future, they need to return to the more limited concept which originally characterized arms control. In this heterogeneous world of sovereign nations, there are real conflicts—over land, over economic rights, over religious and political values. And there are real villains in this world as well—individuals dedicated to the aggrandizement of themselves, their friends, their nations, even at the expense of others, and even at grave risk of war. Weapons are not the cause of these conflicts, they are their reflection. Discussions about weapons cannot solve these conflicts; they can—and even then only at certain times—contain their effects.

In another sense, given the rhetoric of confrontation which now characterizes U.S.-Soviet exchanges, even this modest agenda may appear naïve. An acceptance of a return to more tense U.S.-Soviet relations, however, need not include the abandonment of efforts to contain the military competition at its most dangerous points. Given the extraordinary uncertainties of nuclear war and the unprecedented potential of nuclear weapons for destruction, containing the effects of political conflict, reducing the risk of war—even if only modestly—could be a crucial accomplishment. The effort deserves our attention, and it also requires our support.

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Lloyd N. Cutler

TO FORM A GOVERNMENT

> [On May 10, 1940, Winston Churchill was summoned to Buckingham Palace.] His Majesty received me most graciously and bade me sit down. He looked at me searchingly and quizzically for some moments, and then said: "I suppose you don't know why I have sent for you?" Adopting his mood, I replied: "Sir, I simply couldn't imagine why." He laughed and said: "I want to ask you to form a Government." I said I would certainly do so.
>
> —Winston S. Churchill
> *The Gathering Storm* (1948)

Our society was one of the first to write a Constitution. This reflected the confident conviction of the Enlightenment that explicit written arrangements could be devised to structure a government that would be neither tyrannical nor impotent in its time, and to allow for future amendment as experience and change might require.

We are all children of this faith in a rational written arrangement for governing. Our faith should encourage us to consider changes in our Constitution—for which the framers explicitly allowed—that would assist us in adjusting to the changes in the world in which the Constitution must function. Yet we tend to resist suggestions that amendments to our existing constitutional framework are needed to govern our portion of the interdependent world society we have become, and to cope with the resulting problems that all contemporary governments must resolve.

A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural

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inability of our government to propose, legislate and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms, one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a Government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. As we wonder why we are having such a difficult time making decisions we all know must be made, and projecting our power and leadership, we should reflect on whether this is one big reason.

We elect one presidential candidate over another on the basis of our judgment of the overall program he presents, his ability to carry it out, and his capacity to adapt his program to new developments as they arise. We elected President Carter, whose program included, as one of its most important elements, the successful completion of the SALT II negotiations that his two predecessors had been conducting since 1972. President Carter did complete and sign a SALT II Treaty, in June 1979, which he and his Cabinet regarded as very much in the national security interests of the United States. Notwithstanding recent events, the President and his Cabinet still hold that view—indeed they believe the mounting intensity of our confrontation with the Soviet Union makes it even more important for the two superpowers to adopt and abide by explicit rules as to the size and quality of each side's strategic nuclear arsenal, and as to how each side can verify what the other side is doing.

But because we do not "form a Government," it has not been possible for President Carter to carry out this major part of his program.

Of course the constitutional requirement of Senate advice and consent to treaties presents a special situation. The case for the two-thirds rule was much stronger in 1793, when events abroad rarely affected this isolated continent, and when "entangling foreign alliances" were viewed with a skeptical eye. Whether it should be maintained in an age when most treaties deal with such subjects as taxation and trade is open to question. No parliamentary regime anywhere in the world has a similar provision. But in the American case—at least for major issues like SALT—there is merit to the view that treaties should indeed require the careful bipartisan consultation essential to win a two-thirds majority. This is the principle that Woodrow Wilson fatally neglected in 1919. But it has been carefully observed by recent Presidents, including President Carter for the Panama Canal Treaties and the SALT II Treaty. In each of these cases there was a clear prior

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record of support by previous Republican Administrations, and there would surely have been enough votes for fairly rapid ratification if the President could have counted on the total or near-total support of his own party—if, in short, he had truly formed a Government, with a legislative majority which takes the responsibility for governing.

Treaties may indeed present special cases, and I do not argue here for any change in the historic two-thirds requirement. But our inability to "form a Government" able to ratify SALT II is replicated regularly over the whole range of legislation required to carry out any President's overall program, foreign and domestic. Although the enactment of legislation takes only a simple majority of both Houses, that majority is very difficult to achieve. Any part of the President's legislative program may be defeated, or amended into an entirely different measure, so that the legislative record of any presidency may bear little resemblance to the overall program the President wanted to carry out. Energy and the budget provide two current and critical examples. Indeed, SALT II itself could have been presented for approval by a simple majority of each House under existing arms control legislation, but the Administration deemed this task even more difficult than achieving a two-thirds vote in the Senate. And this difficulty is of course compounded when the President's party does not even hold the majority of the seats in both Houses, as was the case from 1946 to 1948, from 1954 to 1960 and from 1968 to 1976—or almost half the duration of the last seven Administrations.

The Constitution does not require or even permit in such a case the holding of a new election, in which those who oppose the President can seek office to carry out their own overall program. Indeed, the opponents of each element of the President's overall program usually have a different makeup from one element to another. They would probably be unable to get together on any overall program of their own, or to obtain the congressional votes to carry it out. As a result the stalemate continues, and because we do not form a Government, we have no overall program at all. We cannot fairly hold the President accountable for the success or failure of his overall program, because he lacks the constitutional power to put that program into effect.

Compare this with the structure of parliamentary governments. A parliamentary government may have no written constitution, as in the United Kingdom. Or it may have a written constitution, as in West Germany, Japan and Ireland, that in other respects—such as an independent judiciary and an entrenched Bill of

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Rights—closely resembles our own. But while there may be a ceremonial President or, as in Japan, an Emperor, the executive consists of those members of the legislature chosen by the elected legislative majority. The majority elects a Premier or Prime Minister from among its number, and he selects other leading members of the majority as the members of his Cabinet. The majority as a whole is responsible for forming and conducting the "government." If any key part of its overall program is rejected by the legislature, or if a vote of "no confidence" is carried, the "Government" must resign and either a new "Government" must be formed out of the existing legislature or a new legislative election must be held. If the program *is* legislated, the public can judge the results, and can decide at the next regular election whether to reelect the majority or turn it out. At all times the voting public knows who is in charge, and whom to hold accountable for success or failure.

Operating under a parliamentary system, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt formed the present West German Government with a majority of only four, but he has succeeded in carrying out his overall program these past five years. Last year Mrs. Thatcher won a majority of some 30 to 40 in the British Parliament. She has a very radical program, one that can make fundamental changes in the economy, social fabric and foreign policy of the United Kingdom. There is room for legitimate doubt as to whether her overall program will achieve its objectives and, even if it does, whether it will prove popular enough to reelect her Government at the next election. But there is not the slightest doubt that she will be able to legislate her entire program, including any modifications she makes to meet new problems. In a parliamentary system, it is the duty of each majority member of the legislature to vote for each element of the Government's program, and the Government possesses the means to punish members if they do not. In a very real sense, each member's political and electoral future is tied to the fate of the Government his majority has formed. Politically speaking, he lives or dies by whether that Government lives or dies.

President Carter's party has a much larger majority percentage in both Houses of Congress than Chancellor Schmidt or Mrs. Thatcher. But this comfortable majority does not even begin to assure that President Carter or any other President can rely on that majority to vote for each element of his program. No member of that majority has the constitutional duty or the practical political need to vote for each element of the President's program.

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Neither the President nor the leaders of the legislative majority have the means to punish him if he does not. In the famous phrase of Joe Jacobs, the fight manager, "it's every man for theirself."

Let me cite one example. In the British House of Commons, just as in our own House, some of the majority leaders are called the Whips. In the Commons, the Whips do just what their title implies. If the Government cares about the pending vote, they "whip" the fellow members of the majority into compliance, under pain of party discipline if a member disobeys. On the most important votes, the leaders invoke what is called a three-line whip, which must be obeyed on pain of resignation or expulsion from the party.

In our House, the Majority Whip, who happens to be one of our very best Democratic legislators, can himself feel free to leave his Democratic President and the rest of the House Democratic leadership on a crucial vote, if he believes it important to his constituency and his conscience to vote the other way. When he does so, he is not expected or required to resign his leadership post; indeed he is back a few hours later "whipping" his fellow members of the majority to vote with the President and the leadership on some other issue. But all other members are equally free to vote against the President and the leadership when they feel it important to do so. The President and the leaders have a few sticks and carrots they can use to punish or reward, but nothing even approaching the power that Mrs. Thatcher's Government or Chancellor Schmidt's Government can wield against any errant member of the majority.

I am hardly the first to notice this fault. As Judge Carl McGowan has reminded us, that "young and rising academic star in the field of political science, Woodrow Wilson—happily unaware of what the future held for him in terms of successive domination of, and defeat by, the Congress—despaired in the late 19th century of the weakness of the Executive Branch vis-à-vis the Legislative, so much so that he concluded that a coalescence of the two in the style of English parliamentary government was the only hope."[1]

As Wilson put it, "power and strict accountability for its use are the essential constituents of good Government."[2] Our separation of executive and legislative power fractions power and prevents accountability.

[1] Carl McGowan, "Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power," *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 77, No. 8 (1977) pp. 1119–20.

[2] *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics*, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1913, p. 284.

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In drawing this comparison, I am not blind to the proven weaknesses of parliamentary government, or to the virtues which our forefathers saw in separating the executive from the legislature. In particular, the parliamentary system lacks the ability of a separate and vigilant legislature to investigate and curb the abuse of power by an arbitrary or corrupt executive. Our own recent history has underscored this virtue of separating these two branches.

Moreover, our division of executive from legislative responsibility also means that a great many more voters are represented in positions of power, rather than as mere members of a "loyal opposition." If I am a Democrat in a Republican district, my vote in the presidential election may still give me a proportional impact. And if my party elects a President, I do not feel—as almost half the voters in a parliamentary constituency like Oxford must feel—wholly unrepresented. One result of this division is a sort of a permanent centrism. While this means that no extreme or Thatcher-like program can be legislated, it means also that there are fewer wild swings in statutory policy.

This is also a virtue of the constitutional division of responsibility. It is perhaps what John Adams had in mind when, at the end of his life, he wrote to his old friend and adversary, Thomas Jefferson, that "checks and ballances, Jefferson, . . . are our only Security, for the progress of Mind, as well as the Security of Body."[3]

But these virtues of separation are not without their costs. I believe these costs have been mounting in the last half-century, and that it is time to examine whether we can reduce the costs of separation without losing its virtues.

During this century, other nations have adopted written constitutions, sometimes with our help, that blend the virtues of our system with those of the parliamentary system. The Irish Constitution contains a replica of our Bill of Rights, an independent Supreme Court that can declare acts of the government unconstitutional, a figurehead president, and a parliamentary system. The postwar German and Japanese Constitutions, which we helped to draft, are essentially the same. While the Gaullist French Constitution contains a Bill of Rights somewhat weaker than ours, it provides for a strong President who can dismiss the legislature and call for new elections. But it also retains the parliamentary system and its blend of executive and legislative power achieved by

[3] *The Adams-Jefferson Letters*, Vol. II, (Lester J. Cappon, ed.), Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959, p. 134.

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forming a Government out of the elected legislative majority. The President, however, appoints the Premier or First Minister.

II

We are not about to revise our own Constitution so as to incorporate a true parliamentary system. But we do need to find a way of coming closer to the parliamentary concept of "forming a Government," under which the elected majority is able to carry out an overall program, and is held accountable for its success or failure.

There are several reasons why it is far more important in 1980 than it was in 1940, 1900 or 1800 for our government to have the capability to formulate and carry out an overall program.

1) The first reason is that government is now constantly required to make a different kind of choice than usually in the past, a kind for which it is difficult to obtain a broad consensus. That kind of choice, which one may call "allocative," has become the fundamental challenge to government today. As a recent newspaper article put it:

> The domestic programs of the last two decades are no longer seen as broad campaigns to curb pollution or end poverty or improve health care. As these programs have filtered down through an expanding network of regulation, they single out winners and losers. The losers may be workers who blame a lost promotion on equal employment programs; a chemical plant fighting a tough pollution control order; a contractor who bids unsuccessfully for a government contract, or a gas station owner who wants a larger fuel allotment.[4]

This is a way of recognizing that, in giving government great responsibilities, we have forced a series of choices among these responsibilities.

During the second half of this century, our government has adopted a wide variety of national goals. Many of these goals—checking inflation, spurring economic growth, reducing unemployment, protecting our national security, assuring equal opportunity, increasing social security, cleaning up the environment, improving energy efficiency—conflict with one another, and all of them compete for the same resources. There may have been a time when we could simultaneously pursue all of these goals to the utmost. But even in a country as rich as this one, that time is

[4] Quoted from Carl P. Leubsdorf, "Contemporary Problems Leave U.S. Political System Straining to Cope," reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, October 31, 1979, pp. S15593-94.

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now past. One of the central tasks of modern government is to make wise balancing choices among courses of action that pursue one or more of our many conflicting and competing objectives.

Furthermore, as new economic or social problems are recognized, a responsible government must *adjust* these priorities. In the case of energy policy, the need to accept realistic oil prices has had to be balanced against the immediate impact of drastic price increases on consumers and affected industries, and on the overall rate of inflation. And to cope with the energy crisis, earlier objectives of policy have had to be accommodated along the way. Reconciling one goal with another is a continuous process. A critical regulatory goal of 1965 (auto safety) had to be reconciled with an equally critical regulatory goal of 1970 (clean air) long before the auto safety goal had been achieved, just as both these critical goals had to be reconciled with 1975's key goal (closing the energy gap) long before either auto safety or clean air had lost their importance. Reconciliation was needed because many auto safety regulations had the effect of increasing vehicle size and weight and therefore increasing gasoline consumption and undesirable emissions, and also because auto emission control devices tend to increase gasoline consumption. Moreover, throughout this 15-year period, we have had to reconcile all three of these goals with another critical national objective—wage and price stability—when in pursuit of these other goals we make vehicles more costly to purchase and operate.

And now, in 1980, we find our auto industry at a serious competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Japanese and European imports, making it necessary to limit those regulatory burdens which aggravate the extent of the disadvantage. A responsible government must be able to adapt its programs to achieve the best balance among its conflicting goals as each new development arises.

For balancing choices like these, a kind of political triage, it is almost impossible to achieve a broad consensus. Every group will be against some part of the balance. If the "losers" on each item are given a veto on that part of the balance, a sensible balance cannot be struck.

2) The second reason is that we live in an increasingly interdependent world. What happens in distant places is now just as consequential for our security and our economy as what happens in Seattle or Miami. No one today would use the term "Afghanistanism," as the Opposition benches did in the British Parliament a century ago, to deride the Government's preoccupation with a war in that distant land. No one would say today, as President

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Wilson said in 1914, that general European war could not affect us and is no concern of ours. We are now an integral part of a closely interconnected world economic and political system. We have to respond as quickly and decisively to what happens abroad as to what happens within the portion of this world system that is governed under our Constitution.

New problems requiring new adjustments come up even more frequently over the foreign horizon than the domestic one. Consider the rapid succession of events and crises since President Carter took up the relay baton for his leg of the SALT II negotiations back in 1977: the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty over Soviet and Arab opposition, the Soviet-Cuban assistance to guerrilla forces in Africa and the Arabian peninsula, the recognition of the People's Republic of China, the final agreement on the SALT II terms and the signing of the Treaty in Vienna, the revolution in Iran and the later seizure of our hostages, the military coup in Korea, the Soviet-supported Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, our growing dependence on foreign oil from politically undependable sources, the affair of the Soviet brigade in Cuba, the polarization of rightist and leftist elements in Central America, and finally (that is, until the next crisis a month or two from now) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the added threat it poses to the states of Southwest Asia and to the vital oil supplies of Europe, Japan and the United States.

Each of these portentous events required a prompt reaction and response from our Government, including in many cases a decision as to how it would affect our position on the SALT II Treaty. The government has to be able to adapt its overall program to deal with each such event as it arises, and it has to be able to execute the adapted program with reasonable dispatch. Many of these adaptations—such as changes in the levels and direction of military and economic assistance—require joint action by the President and the Congress, something that is far from automatic under our system. And when Congress does act, it is prone to impose statutory conditions or prohibitions that fetter the President's policy discretion to negotiate an appropriate assistance package or to adapt it to fit even later developments. The congressional bans on military assistance to Turkey, any form of assistance to the contending forces in Angola, and any aid to Argentina if it did not meet our human rights criteria by a deadline now past, are typical examples.

Indeed, the doubt that Congress will approve a presidential foreign policy initiative has seriously compromised our ability to

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make binding agreements with nations that "form a Government." Given the fate of SALT II and lesser treaties, and the frequent Congressional vetoes of other foreign policy actions, other nations now realize that our executive branch commitments are not as binding as theirs, that Congress may block any agreement at all, and that at the very least they must hold something back for a subsequent round of bargaining with the Congress.

3) The third reason is the change in Congress and its relationship to the Executive. When the Federalist and Democratic Republican parties held power, a Hamilton or a Gallatin would serve in the Cabinet, but they continued to lead rather than report to their party colleagues in the Houses of Congress. Even when the locus of congressional leadership shifted from the Cabinet to the leaders of Congress itself, in the early nineteenth century, it was a congressional leadership capable of collaboration with the Executive. This was true until very recently. The Johnson-Rayburn collaboration with Eisenhower a generation ago is an instructive example. But now Congress itself has changed.

There have been the well-intended democratic reforms of Congress, and the enormous growth of the professional legislative staff. The former ability of the President to sit down with ten or fifteen leaders in each House, and to agree on a program which those leaders could carry through Congress, has virtually disappeared. The committee chairmen and the leaders no longer have the instruments of power that once enabled them to lead. A Lyndon Johnson would have a much harder time getting his way as Majority Leader today than when he did hold and pull these strings of power in the 1950s. When Senator Mansfield became Majority Leader in 1961, he changed the practice of awarding committee chairmanships on the basis of seniority. He declared that all Senators are created equal. He gave every Democratic Senator a major committee assignment and then a subcommittee chairmanship, adding to the sharing of power by reducing the leadership's control.

In the House the seniority system was scrapped. Now the House Majority Caucus—not the leadership—picks the committee chairmen and the subcommittee chairmen as well. The House Parliamentarian has lost the critical power to refer bills to a single committee selected by the Speaker. Now bills like the energy bills go to several committees which then report conflicting versions back to the floor. Now mark-up sessions take place in public; indeed, even the House-Senate joint conference committees, at which differing versions of the same measure are reconciled, must

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meet and barter in public.

The recent conference committees on the Synthetic Fuels Corporation and the Energy Mobilization Board, for example, were so big and their procedures so cumbersome that they took six months to reach agreement, and then the agreement on the Board was rejected by the House. All this means that there are no longer a few leaders with power who *can* collaborate with the President. Power is further diffused by the growth of legislative staffs, sometimes making it difficult for the members even to collaborate with each other. In the past five years, the Senate alone has hired 700 additional staff members, an average of seven per member.

There is also the decline of party discipline and the decline of the political party itself. Presidential candidates are no longer selected, as Adlai Stevenson was selected, by the leaders or bosses of their party. Who are the party leaders today? There are no such people. The party is no longer the instrument that selects the candidate. Indeed, the party today, as a practical matter, is no more than a neutral open forum that holds the primary or caucus in which candidates for President and for Congress may compete for favor and be elected. The party does not dispense most of the money needed for campaigning, the way the European and Japanese parties do. The candidates raise most of their own money. To the extent that money influences legislative votes, it comes not from a party with a balanced program, but from a variety of single-interest groups.

We now have a great many diverse and highly organized interest groups—not just broad-based agriculture, labor, business and ethnic groups interested in a wide variety of issues affecting their members. We now have single-issue groups—environmental, consumer, abortion, right to life, pro- and anti-SALT, pro- and anti-nuclear, that stand ready to lobby for their single issue and to reward or punish legislators, both in cash and at the ballot box, according to how they respond on the single issue that is the group's raison d'être. And on many specific foreign policy issues involving particular countries, there are exceptionally strong voting blocs in this wonderful melting pot of a nation that exert a great deal of influence on individual Senators and Congressmen.

III

It is useful to compare this modern failure of our governmental structure with its earlier classic successes. There can be no structural fault, it might be said, so long as an FDR could put through an entire anti-depression program in 100 days, or an LBJ could enact a broad program for social justice three decades later. These

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infrequent exceptions, however, confirm the general rule of stalemate.

If we look closely we will find that in this century the system has succeeded only on the rare occasions when there is an unusual event that brings us together, and creates substantial consensus throughout the country on the need for a whole new program. FDR had such a consensus in the early days of the New Deal, and from Pearl Harbor to the end of World War II. But we tend to forget that in 1937 his court-packing plan was justifiably rejected by Congress—a good point for those who favor complete separation of the executive from the legislature[5]—and that as late as August 1941, when President Roosevelt called on Congress to pass a renewal of the Selective Service Act, passage was gained by a single vote in the House. Lyndon Johnson had such a consensus for both his domestic and his Vietnam initiatives during the first three years after the shock of John Kennedy's assassination brought us together. But it was gone by 1968. Jimmy Carter has had it this past winter and spring for his responses to the events in Iran and Afghanistan and to the belated realization of our need for greater energy self-sufficiency, but he may not hold it for long. Yet the consensus on Afghanistan was marred by the long congressional delay in appropriating the small amounts needed to register 19- and 20-year-olds under the Selective Service Act—a delay that at least blurred the intended impact of this signal to the world of our determination to oppose further Soviet aggression.[6]

When the great crisis and the resulting large consensus are not there—when the country is divided somewhere between 55–45 and 45–55 on each of a wide set of issues, and when the makeup of the majority is different on every issue—it has not been possible for any modern President to "form a Government" that could legislate and carry out his overall program.

Yet modern government has to respond promptly to a wide range of new challenges. Its responses cannot be limited to those for which there is a large consensus induced by some great crisis. Modern government also has to work in every presidency, not just

[5] The mention of this historic example may strike some readers as sharply impairing the general thesis of this article in favor of disciplined party voting in the Congress. But one can readily envisage a category of issues—analogous to mutual defense treaties—where an Administration would not be entitled to apply party discipline. (In Britain, for example, votes on such issues as capital punishment have traditionally not been subject to the party whip.) Any measure amending the Constitution or affecting the separation of powers (as the 1937 Court Plan did) should probably be exempted, as well as any issue of religious conscience, such as legislation bearing on abortion.

[6] Similarly, the belated consensus on energy self-sufficiency did not restrain the Congress from overriding, by one of the largest margins in history, the President's unpopular but necessary oil import fee order.

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in one presidency out of four, when a Wilson, an FDR or an LBJ comes along. It also has to work for the President's full time in office, as it did not even for Wilson and LBJ. When they needed congressional support for the most important issue of their presidencies, they could not get it.

When the President gets only "half a loaf" of his overall program, this half a loaf is not necessarily better than none, because it may lack the essential quality of balance. And half a loaf leaves both the President and the public in the worst of all possible worlds. The public—and the press—still expect the President to govern. But the President cannot achieve his overall program, and the public cannot fairly blame the President because he does not have the power to legislate and execute his program. Nor can the public fairly blame the individual members of Congress, because the Constitution allows them to disclaim any responsibility for forming a Government and hence any accountability for its failures.

Of course the presidency always has been and will continue to be what Theodore Roosevelt called "a bully pulpit"—not a place from which to "bully" in the sense of intimidating the Congress and the public, but in the idiom of TR's day a marvelous place from which to exhort and lift up Congress and the public. All Presidents have used the bully pulpit in this way, and this is one reason why the American people continue to revere the office and almost always revere its incumbent. Television has probably amplified the power of the bully pulpit, but it has also shortened the time span of power; few television performers can hold their audiences for four consecutive years. In any event, a bully pulpit, while a glorious thing to have and to employ, is not a Government, and it has not been enough to enable any postwar President to "form a Government" for his entire term.

Finally, the myth persists that the existing system can be made to work satisfactorily if only the President will take the trouble to consult closely with the Congress. If one looks back at the period between 1947 and 1965 there were indeed remarkable cases, at least in the field of foreign policy, where such consultation worked to great effect, even across party lines. The relationships between Senator Vandenberg and Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, and between Senator George and Secretary Dulles, come readily to mind. But these examples were in an era of strong leadership within the Congress, and of unusual national consensus on the overall objectives of foreign policy and the measures needed to carry it out.

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Even when these elements have not been present, every President has indeed tried to work with the majority in Congress, and the majority in every Congress has tried to work with the President. Within this past year, when there has been a large consensus in response to the crises in Afghanistan and Iran, a notable achievement has been a daily private briefing of congressional leaders by the Secretary of State, and weekly private briefings with all Senate and House members who want to attend—a step that has helped to keep that consensus in being. Another achievement of recent times is the development of the congressional budget process, exemplified by the cooperation between the congressional leadership and the President in framing the 1981 budget.

But even on Iran, Afghanistan and the budget, the jury is still out on how long the large consensus will hold. And except on the rare issues where there is such a consensus, the structural problems usually prove too difficult to overcome. In each Administration, it becomes progressively more difficult to make the present system work effectively on the range of issues, both domestic and foreign, that the United States must now manage even though there is no large consensus.

IV

If we decide we want the capability of forming a Government, the only way to do so is to amend the Constitution. Amending the Constitution, of course, is extremely difficult. Since 1793, when the Bill of Rights was added, we have amended the Constitution only 16 times. Some of these amendments were structural, such as the direct election of Senators, votes for women and 18 years olds, the two-term limit for Presidents, and the selection of a successor Vice President. But none has touched the basic separation of executive and legislative powers.

The most one can hope for is a set of modest changes that would make our structure work somewhat more in the manner of a parliamentary system, with somewhat less separation between the executive and the legislature than now exists.

There are several candidate proposals. Here are some of the more interesting ideas:

1) We now vote for a presidential candidate and a vice-presidential candidate as an inseparable team. We could provide that in presidential election years, voters in each congressional district would be required to vote for a trio of candidates, as a team, for President, Vice President and the House of Representatives. This

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would tie the political fortunes of the party's presidential and congressional candidates to one another, and provide some incentive for sticking together after they are elected. Such a proposal could be combined with a four-year term for members of the House of Representatives. This would tie the presidential and congressional candidates even more closely, and has the added virtue of providing members with greater protection against the pressures of single-issue political groups. This combination is the brainchild of Congressman Jonathan Bingham of New York, and is now pending before the Congress.

In our bicameral legislature, the logic of the Bingham proposal would suggest that the inseparable trio of candidates for President, Vice President and Member of Congress be expanded to a quintet including the two Senators, who would also have the same four-year term. But no one has challenged the gods of the Olympian Senate by advancing such a proposal.

2) Another idea is to permit or require the President to select 50 percent of his Cabinet from among the members of his party in the Senate and House, who would retain their seats while serving in the Cabinet. This would be only a minor infringement on the constitutional principle of separation of powers, but it would require a change in Article I, Section 6, which provides that "no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office." It would tend to increase the intimacy between the executive and the legislature, and add to their sense of collective responsibility. The 50-percent test would leave the President adequate room to bring other qualified persons into his Cabinet, even though they do not hold elective office.

3) A third intriguing suggestion is to provide the President with the power, to be exercised not more than once in his term, to dissolve Congress and call for new congressional elections. This is the power now vested in the President under the French Constitution. It would provide the opportunity that does not now exist to break an executive-legislative impasse, and to let the public decide whether it wishes to elect Senators and Congressmen who *will* legislate the President's overall program.

For obvious reasons, the President would invoke such a power only as a last resort, but his potential ability to do so could have a powerful influence on congressional responses to his initiatives. This would of course be a radical and highly controversial proposal, and it involves a number of technical difficulties relating to the timing and conduct of the new election, the staggering of

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senatorial terms and similar matters. But it would significantly enhance the President's power to form a Government.

On the other hand, the experience of Presidents—one recalls Nixon in 1970—who sought to use the mid-term election as a referendum on their programs suggests that any such dissolution and new election would be equally as likely to continue the impasse as to break it. Perhaps any exercise of the power to dissolve Congress should automatically require a new presidential election as well. But even then, the American public might be perverse enough to reelect all the incumbents to office.

4) Another variant on the same idea is that in addition to empowering the President to call for new congressional elections, we might empower a majority or two-thirds of both Houses to call for new presidential elections. This variant has been scathingly attacked in a series of conversations between Professor Charles Black of the Yale Law School and Congressman Bob Eckhardt of Texas, published in 1975, because they think that such a measure would vitally diminish the President's capacity to lead.[7]

5) There are other proposals that deserve consideration. There could be a single six-year presidential term, an idea with many supporters, among them Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson and Carter, to say nothing of a great many political scientists. (The French Constitution provides a seven-year term for the President, but permits reelection.) Of course Presidents would like to be elected and then forget about politics and get to the high ground of saving the world. But if first-term Presidents did not have the leverage of reelection, we might institutionalize for every presidency the lame duck impotence we now see when a President is not running for reelection.

6) It may be that one combination involving elements of the third, fourth and fifth proposals would be worthy of further study. It would be roughly as follows:

A. The President, Vice President, Senators and Congressmen would all be elected for simultaneous six-year terms.

B. On one occasion each term, the President could dissolve Congress and call for new congressional elections for the remainder of the term. If he did so, Congress, by majority vote of both Houses within 30 days of the President's action, could call for simultaneous new elections for President and Vice President for the remainder of the term.

C. All state primaries and state conventions for any required

[7] Bob Eckhardt and Charles L. Black, Jr., *The Tides of Power: Conversations on the American Constitution*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.

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mid-term elections would be held 60 days after the first call for new elections. Any required national presidential nominating conventions would be held 30 days later. The national elections would be held 60 days after the state primary elections and state conventions. The entire cycle would take 120 days. The dissolved Congress would be free to remain in session for part or all of this period.

D. Presidents would be allowed to serve only one full six-year term. If a mid-term presidential election is called, the incumbent would be eligible to run and, if reelected, to serve the balance of his six-year term.

Limiting each President to one six-year term would enhance the objectivity and public acceptance of the measures he urges in the national interest. He would not be regarded as a lame duck because of his continuing power to dissolve Congress. Our capacity to "form a Government" would be enhanced if the President could break an impasse by calling for a new congressional election and by the power of Congress to respond by calling for a new presidential election.

Six-year terms for Senators and Congressmen would diminish the power of single-interest groups to veto balanced programs for governing. Because any mid-term elections would have to be held promptly, a single national primary, a shorter campaign cycle and public financing of congressional campaigns—three reforms with independent virtues of their own—would become a necessity for the mid-term election. Once tried in a mid-term election, they might well be adopted for regular elections as well.

7) One final proposal may be mentioned. It would be possible, through constitutional amendment, to revise the legislative process in the following way. Congress would enact broad mandates first, declaring general policies and directions, leaving the precise allocative choices, within a congressionally approved budget, to the President. All agencies would be responsible to the President. By dividing up tasks among them, and making the difficult choices of fulfilling some congressional directions at the expense of others, the President would fill in the exact choices, the allocative decisions. Then any presidential action would be returned to Congress where it would await a two-house legislative veto. If not so vetoed within a specified period, the action would become law.

If the legislative veto could be overturned by a presidential veto—subject in turn to a two-thirds override—then this proposal would go a long way to enhance the President's ability to "form a Government." In any event, it should enable the elected Presi-

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dent to carry out the program he ran on, subject to congressional oversight, and end the stalemate over whether to legislate the President's program in the first instance. It would let Congress and the President each do what they have shown they now do best.

Such a resequencing, of course, would turn the present process on its head. But it would bring much closer to reality the persisting myth that it is up to the President to govern—something he now lacks the constitutional power to do.

V

How can these proposals be evaluated? How can better proposals be devised? Above all, how can the public be educated to understand the costs of the present separation between our executive and legislative branches, to weigh these costs against the benefits, and to decide whether a change is needed?

One obvious possibility is the widely feared constitutional convention—something for which the Constitution itself provides—to be called by Congress itself or two-thirds of the states. Jefferson expected one to occur every generation. Conventions are commonplace to revise state constitutions. But Congress has never even legislated the applicable rules for electing and conducting a national constitutional convention, even though more than 30 states have now called for one to adopt an amendment limiting federal taxes and expenditures. Because of the concern generated by this proposal, any idea of a national constitutional convention on the separation of powers is probably a non-starter.

A more practicable first step would be the appointment of a bipartisan presidential commission—perhaps an offshoot of President Carter's first-class Commission on the Eighties—to analyze the issues, compare how other constitutions work, hold public hearings, and make a full report. The presidential commission could include ranking members of the House and Senate, or perhaps Congress could establish a parallel joint commission of its own.

The point of this article is not to persuade the reader of the virtue of any particular amendment. I am far from persuaded myself. But I am convinced of these propositions:

We need to do better than we have in "forming a Government" for this country, and this need is becoming more acute.

The structure of our Constitution prevents us from doing significantly better.

It is time to start thinking and debating about whether and how to correct this structural fault.

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Robert L. Paarlberg

LESSONS OF THE GRAIN EMBARGO

The urge to teach someone a lesson seldom inspires sound policy. The lessons learned are too often one's own. So it is with President Carter's 1980 grain embargo. Soviet food supplies have been little affected. U.S. illusions about its own "food power" have been properly dispelled.

The idea of U.S. food power over the Soviet Union was an inevitable diplomatic by-product of U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, which had grown very large over the past decade, seemingly in proportion to large and growing Soviet needs. The President finally decided to use this putative power on January 4 of this year, when he suspended delivery of all U.S. grain sales to the U.S.S.R. in excess of the eight million tons guaranteed under the terms of a 1975 bilateral agreement. His announced purpose was to punish the Soviet Union for its military occupation of Afghanistan, begun in late December 1979. Never before had U.S. food exports to the U.S.S.R. been suspended in pursuit of a noncommercial, foreign policy objective. Now, at last, the "food weapon" had been taken from the shelf. For all who cared to watch, a definitive test of its effectiveness was at hand.

In most respects, circumstances in January 1980 seemed tailor-made for a high measure of success. Because of very dry weather early in 1979, that year's Soviet grain harvest had fallen 48 million tons (21 percent) short of production targets. To prevent a severe reduction in the size of its livestock herds, the Soviet Union had made plans, in October, to import an all-time record quantity of grain, 35 million tons in the next 12 months. By far the largest share of these anticipated grain imports (about 25 million tons, or nearly three-quarters of the total) were to be supplied by the United States, which had just completed a bountiful harvest. Meanwhile, owing to record demand, a poor harvest, and transport bottlenecks throughout much of the rest of the world's grain trading system, major suppliers other than the United States were

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less prepared than usual to assist in meeting Soviet import needs. If the Soviet Union would ever be vulnerable to U.S. food power, this seemed the time.

Yet, a closer look at the situation—and at history—might have suggested that, whenever food exports are manipulated in pursuit of noncommercial objectives, the odds are stacked heavily against success. This is because any effective exercise of food power requires an unbroken chain of favorable developments, in three distinct arenas, all at the same time.

First, *within the political system of the nation seeking to exercise food power* (in this case, the United States), foreign policy officials must be able to maintain control over the volume and over the direction of their own food exports. This is no simple task in the United States, which has no government grain marketing board, and where powerful producer and trade groups have traditionally resisted government restrictions on overseas sales.

Second, *within the bounds of the international food trading system*, other countries and transnational corporations must be prevented from "leaking" embargoed U.S. grain into the target nation, through transshipment or deception. Other food exporting countries must also be dissuaded from expanding or redirecting their own food exports to replace embargoed U.S. food sales to the target country.

Third, *within the political and economic system of the target nation* (in this case, the Soviet Union), the intended reduction in food imports must be adequate and appropriate to produce the desired effect.

Like a three-linked chain, the President's 1980 grain embargo had to hold at each of these points, if it was to hold overall. An embargo that fails at any one of the three will fail altogether.

As might have been expected, the President's embargo has failed to meet this strict requirement for success. The embargo did enjoy some initial success at Point One, when for several months it received broad-based political support within the United States. But this temporary success was possible only at a growing cost to taxpayers, and also, in part, because the embargo was simultaneously breaking down at Point Two, within the international grain trading system. There the embargo has triggered a significant expansion of Soviet grain imports from nations other than the United States. Speculating a bit, even if the embargo had somehow managed to succeed at both Points One and Two, it would probably have failed at Point Three, within the Soviet Union.

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II

Before its domestic audience, the grain embargo was a surprising short-run political success. Widely anticipated farm state opposition to the embargo did not materialize for several months. Scarcely two weeks after the President announced that 17 million tons of U.S. grain ($2.6 billion worth of farm products in all) would not be sold to the Soviet Union in 1980, he confounded and silenced most of his critics by winning a two-to-one margin of victory in the Iowa Democratic Party caucuses. Farm lobby groups, mindful of a rising patriotic tide in support of the President, gave their tentative endorsement.

Many of these groups had assumed that President Carter would never dare to interrupt U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, at least not in an election year, and certainly not on the eve of the Iowa caucuses. After all, it was candidate Carter who had pledged to those same Iowa farmers, prior to the 1976 party caucuses, that under his Administration there would be "no more embargoes." Producers and exporters seemed well positioned to hold him to this promise. When President Ford, late in 1975, had tried to place a temporary curb on grain sales to Russia (initially to limit food price inflation in the United States), he immediately encountered an angry and well-organized farm state protest. Perceiving damage to his own 1976 election prospects, Ford had hastened to lift that embargo after only two months' time. U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union were resumed—and a five-year bilateral purchase and supply agreement was reached—without Ford's gaining any of the concessions on low-cost Soviet oil exports to the United States that he had stipulated, at one point, as a necessary condition for lifting the embargo.

The only initial resistance to President Carter's embargo came not from farm groups, but from the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), which immediately announced that it would block *all* further grain exports to Russia, including an undelivered 2.5-million-ton portion of the promised 8 million tons that the President had felt obliged, under the terms of the 1975 bilateral agreement, to make available. It was not until early March that the ILA could be persuaded, through private arbitration, to resume loading these committed grain cargoes on ships bound for the Soviet Union. However embarrassing this first domestic challenge to the President's action, its short-run effect was to strengthen, not weaken, the initial impact of the grain embargo on the Soviet Union.

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The President's embargo policy achieved its early political success at home as a result of several factors not present when his predecessor suspended grain sales to the U.S.S.R. in 1975: the clear authority which was given to the President under the 1979 Export Administration Act, to deny validated export licenses for reasons of national security; a momentary fever of patriotism and a renewed deference to presidential leadership (which resulted from the hostage crisis in Iran, as much as from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan); and not least of all, the lavish compensation which was immediately extended to U.S. grain producers and exporters affected by the embargo.

To hold the support of farmers and grain exporters, a variety of compensatory measures were taken. First, to protect exporting firms that had already purchased large quantities of grain earmarked for delivery to the Soviet Union, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced that the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) would step in to assume the contractual obligations of exporters for undelivered embargoed grain. This unusual improvisation, arranged in haste over a weekend following the President's televised announcement, did avert a panic sale of grain futures contracts, which would have meant catastrophic losses for export firms, and a subsequent collapse of farm prices. The CCC eventually took ownership of 4.2 million tons of wheat and 9 million tons of corn, at a short-run cost to the government of about two billion dollars, and then temporarily isolated this embargoed grain from the market, as best it could, through a technique of "rolling forward" contracted port delivery dates. Plans were made to hold some of this grain—the 4.2 million tons of wheat—in an emergency food reserve. But by midsummer, the CCC had managed to "retender" most of its embargoed grain back into market channels.

Producers were concerned, during this retendering process, that the government, having bailed out the big export firms, was now acting to depress their farm prices. But USDA had earlier taken care to provide a variety of direct benefits to producers. At an immediate cost to taxpayers of several hundreds of millions of dollars, government "loan prices" for wheat and corn were increased, to guarantee producers more for the grain which they can pawn to the government. The President raised these loan prices still higher in July. "Release" prices were also raised, to allow market prices to go a bit higher before surplus grain could come out of reserve. Compensation for grain storage on farms was

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increased, the heavily subsidized "farmer-owned reserve" was substantially enlarged, and interest costs on grain entering that reserve were waived.

Despite these market-tightening measures, 1980 farm prices did not keep up with fast-rising production costs, and farm support for the embargo eventually began to falter. The American Farm Bureau withdrew its support for the embargo in April, charging that the Administration had failed in its promise to protect farmers from adverse price effects. Congressional concern was aroused in June, following a USDA forecast that net farm income could decline by as much as 40 percent in 1980. Legislation to end the embargo was introduced in both Houses, under wide and growing bipartisan sponsorship. On the eve of receiving his party's nomination, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan then promised, when elected, to "terminate" the embargo, which he now called a "financially painful burden on the farmer," that had also entailed, by his estimate, a one-billion-dollar net loss to U.S. taxpayers.

In truth, the Carter Adminstration had done its best to hold down taxpayer costs in its management of the embargo. The President's budget-cutters insisted, despite the embargo, that there be no paid "acreage diversion" program for either wheat or corn in 1980. Such a program might have cost an additional billion dollars, but it would have offered some safeguard against record plantings this year, and downward pressure on prices. These pressures emerged when an all-time record U.S. winter wheat harvest was completed under ideal conditions, before the summer heat wave struck. Without acreage diversions, expanded 1980 plantings of spring wheat and corn then tended to offset the very bad summer weather, containing prices just enough to stimulate new demands for federal help, and fueling discontent with the embargo.

By July, Administration officials were clearly on the defensive, facing down congressional critics, and denying frequent rumors that the embargo was about to be lifted. Just how to lift the embargo might itself someday become a problem. Unlike the Olympic boycott, which could die a natural death as the summer games came to an end, the grain embargo would require an awkward act of termination, awkward as long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. An added difficulty will be the obligation, which the Administration has promised to honor, to permit a limited renewal of U.S. grain deliveries to Russia in any case. Beginning October 1, the Soviets are to be permitted to take up

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to eight million additional tons, during the fifth and final year of President Ford's 1975 U.S.-Soviet bilateral grain trade agreement. The President will be hard pressed, when these scheduled deliveries begin, to persuade his political audience that he has not suddenly reversed his grain sale policy once again.

Larger federal subsidies for farm prices, and deeper federal involvement in the farm sector, are legacies of the embargo that will linger on even if it is eventually lifted. Domestic grain producers view the embargo as more than just a temporary loss of export opportunities. They doubt that the Soviet Union will ever again, any time soon, make plans to buy so much U.S. grain, even if given official permission to do so. They expect to be compensated by the taxpayer not just this year, but also into the future, for continuing damage they claim to have sustained.

In fact, U.S. grain producers tend to exaggerate the damage done to their export opportunities by the embargo. Direct sales to the Soviet Union may have been constrained in 1980, but a surge in exports to other customers has largely offset this loss. The volume, the value, and also the market share of U.S. exports of wheat and corn all grew in 1980, and the U.S. agricultural trade surplus continued to widen, despite the embargo. In the first seven months of fiscal 1980, U.S. agricultural exports were 34 percent, by value, above the level of a year earlier. By volume, wheat exports were up by 26 percent, corn by 37 percent. A sharp drop in net farm income in 1980 had been forecast long before the embargo, and can be blamed more on fuel costs and interest rates than on the loss of the Soviet market. Farmers have sought to use the embargo as added justification for gaining federal assistance that many would have sought in any case.

If the 1980 embargo had in fact sharply constrained U.S. grain export opportunities, farm state resistance would have come sooner, and would have been much sharper. To understand why U.S. grain exports have continued to grow, despite the embargo, we must turn to the behavior of other actors in the world grain trading system.

III

The international grain trading system was the second point at which the President's embargo had to succeed, and it is the point at which the embargo has proved itself most prone to failure. Within the world market, a unilateral food power exercise must survive several kinds of difficulties. First, an effective unilateral embargo must not leak. U.S. grain must not be transshipped to

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the U.S.S.R. (reexported through third countries, or through multinational trading firms). At the same time, competing suppliers must not redirect or otherwise expand their own grain sales to the Soviet Union. All the while, the diplomatic cost to the United States of preventing or limiting trade shifts or leakage must not outweigh the benefit.

Transshipment of U.S. grain was the first and most obvious threat to the embargo within the international arena. Nearly 100 million tons of U.S. grain entered world commerce in the past year, bound initially for destinations other than the U.S.S.R. Some portion of this total, once it left U.S. shores, was bound to find its way, by an indirect route, to the Soviet Union.

One broad avenue of transshipment was through Eastern Europe. Warsaw Pact countries were planning, prior to the U.S. embargo, to import about 16 million tons of grain in 1980, mostly from the United States. In the months following the embargo, that import total grew to more than 18 million tons, despite this year's vastly improved East European harvest prospects. Roughly two-thirds of these total imports were feed grains, precisely what the Soviets desired the most. The only sure way to prevent the leakage of embargoed U.S. grain through Eastern Europe would have been to do what President Ford was forced to do in 1975: enlarge the scope of the embargo to include one or more Warsaw Pact countries. Ford had decided to include Poland in the 1975 embargo. To repeat such a step this year would have entailed an added diplomatic cost, as it would have broken the spirit of a bilateral grain sale agreement which was reached with Poland, a large and important U.S. grain customer, following the unpleasant 1975 embargo experience. Expanded sales of U.S. grain to Eastern Europe were thus permitted to continue, inviting leakage and irritating competing suppliers in Canada and Western Europe, who had been asked to exercise export restraint. "You'd have to be pretty naïve to believe that increased exports to that area would not find their way to Russia," complained the president of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, as Canadian support for the embargo began to weaken last spring.

Another sort of transshipment has also threatened the embargo. The five largest private grain trading firms (which handle 85 percent of U.S. grain exports) are genuinely multinational in structure and in character. Even those firms which are headquartered in the United States do much of their business through overseas affiliates. Cargill, for example, uses a Geneva-based affiliate, Tradax, to make many of its sales. Secretive and competitive

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as they are, these multinational firms have a well deserved reputation for discretion and ingenuity when it comes to servicing the needs of their largest and wealthiest customers, most notably the Soviet Union, which can readily pay for its grain imports this year by selling gold at 1980 prices. To deter export firms from making secret sales of U.S. grain to the U.S.S.R., a so-called sting operation was talked about last February, within USDA. The Agriculture Department, which has long seen its mission as the promotion of U.S. food exports, seemed an unlikely enforcement agency for the embargo. All the same, export firms claim to have abided by the terms of the embargo, even to the point of joining an "informal agreement" with USDA to restrict overseas sales of non-U.S. grain to the Soviet Union, an agreement which lapsed in June. It is the nature of secret sales that they can often remain a secret, so trade publications could only guess, early in the year, that five million tons of U.S. grain would sooner or later leak through to the Soviet Union in 1980, transshipped via East and West European channels. These first leakage estimates were probably high. As it turned out, the Soviets did not have to use large transshipments of U.S. grain to evade the embargo.

Far more damage was done to Carter's embargo in 1980 by expanded and redirected exports of non-U.S. grain to the U.S.S.R. The United States does supply more than half of all grain entering world markets every year, including nearly three-quarters of the world's feed grain exports, corn primarily, which is what the Soviet livestock industry needs the most. The other grain-exporting nations, such as Canada, Australia, France, Argentina, South Africa and Thailand, have for some time been supplying a declining share of total grain exports, and they supply much less altogether than the United States alone. These nations did not have the short-run capacity, merely by expanding production, to replace fully the 17 million tons of U.S. grain which the President had hoped to deny to the Soviet Union in 1980. They could, however, enlarge their exports temporarily, by drawing down surplus stocks. They could also redirect their grain exports, away from traditional customers, and toward the Soviet Union. By offering premium prices, the Soviet Union has made it worth their while to do both.

To dissuade other suppliers from expanding or redirecting their grain exports to the U.S.S.R., the United States hastily organized a conference of grain-exporting nations in Washington, during the week following the President's January embargo announcement. At that conference, Canada, Australia and the European Com-

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munity (EC) made a public pledge to hold their 1980 grain sales to the Soviet Union down to "normal" levels. Unfortunately for the United States, grain exports to the U.S.S.R. from these three sources have varied so much in the past that considerable growth can occur in any one year, and can be defended as "normal." Even so, the growth in exports which did occur was so great as to constitute a clear hedge on earlier promises, and a major setback for the embargo. Measured against average volume over the previous seven years, 1980 grain exports to the Soviet Union from these three suppliers, during the trade year which ended in June, more than doubled, increasing by about five million tons.

The Australian government has most conspicuously exceeded its past levels of grain sales to the U.S.S.R., selling more this year than in the previous four years combined. Having yielded to intense pressure from its own grain producers and exporting organizations, Australian officials now plan to continue these expanded grain sales to the U.S.S.R., at the newly established "normal" level of nearly four million tons a year. Depending upon how this year's weather has affected crops in Canada, Australia could use these expanded sales to the Soviet Union to move into a position as the second-largest wheat exporting nation in the world, after the United States.

Canada's grain production and export organizations, long troubled by transport, labor and logistical problems, have been openly resentful of this year's embargo restrictions upon larger sales to the Soviet Union. By observing some export restraint, they claim to have sustained income losses of up to 57 cents a bushel. All the same, Canada allowed its sales to the Soviets to increase by about 50 percent in 1980, and has hinted at a further increase in the coming year.

The EC, which began the year with seven to eight million tons of exportable wheat and cereals on hand, has also faced a strong temptation to hedge on its promise to support the embargo. Finding overseas buyers for surplus grain has long been a headache for the Community, one that frequently requires the application of expensive export subsidies. Expanded sales to Russia by French grain cooperatives began within a month of the President's embargo announcement.

Real damage was done by these expanded exports from nations which had endorsed the embargo. Still, the greatest damage was done by one nation which had not—Argentina. Argentina is the world's second-largest feed grain exporter, after the United States, and in recent years has been a regular supplier of modest quan-

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tities of wheat, corn and grain sorghum to the Soviet Union. The 1980 Argentine corn and sorghum harvest, which began in March, was a major disappointment, the poorest in four years, due to drought conditions earlier in the season. But this poor harvest did not prevent Argentina from expanding its grain exports to the Soviet Union, openly profiteering at the expense of the U.S. embargo. By redirecting its normal pattern of trade—reducing customary exports to Italy, Spain, Japan, Chile and Peru—Argentina was able to offer nearly all of its exportable corn and grain sorghum surplus this year, about 4.5 million tons, to the Soviet Union. The incentive to do so was an attractive price, as much as 25 percent above the American selling price, paid willingly by eager Soviet purchasing agents.

The United States made several futile attempts to dissuade Argentina from redirecting its 1980 grain exports toward the Soviet Union. Argentine officials were invited to the Washington exporters' conference in January, but they refused at that meeting to promise any restraint, complaining that they could not be expected to join an embargo initiative which had been taken unilaterally by the United States, without prior consultation. Argentina held firmly to this position, despite the pleadings of a special U.S. emissary, General Andrew Goodpaster, sent to speak with President Videla in Buenos Aires. During these talks, leaders in the Argentine junta are said to have asked when the United States would stop denouncing human rights violations in their country and resume military sales, which had been cut off by Congress over that issue.

Soon thereafter, the Soviet Union sent its own emissary to Buenos Aires, Viktor Pershin, Director of the Soviet grain purchasing agency, Exportkhleb. Immediate sales for 1980 were arranged, and negotiations were subsequently completed on an agreement whereby Argentina would supply the Soviet Union, over the next five years, with at least 20 million tons of corn and grain sorghum, and with 2.5 million tons of soybeans. These vastly expanded grain and feed sales are to become the centerpiece of what is suddenly a booming Soviet-Argentine commercial relationship. The Soviet Vice Minister for Foreign Trade visited Argentina in April, and predicted a tripling of total trade volume between the two countries, to include increased cooperation in the nuclear energy field.

If the embargo continues, it could soon be further weakened by sales from several other Southern Hemisphere food exporters, including South Africa (corn), Thailand (corn, rice and tapioca),

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and Brazil (corn and soybeans). Brazil has an exportable surplus of corn for the first time in two years, and its 1980 soybean harvest was half again as large as last year's crop. It would be something of an irony if Brazilian soybeans were to further weaken the U.S. food embargo. Brazil only recently became a major soybean exporter, largely as a result of an earlier U.S. food embargo, the momentary soybean embargo of 1973 (designed to check food price inflation in the United States). This embargo "shocked" the Japanese into making much larger investments in the now flourishing Brazilian soybean industry.

It is of interest that even India has provided Russia with grain this year. India was able to export to the Soviet Union about two million tons of its "surplus" wheat, partially in repayment for an earlier Soviet wheat loan, and partially in barter for Soviet oil.

These shifts which have occurred in grain trading patterns since the embargo are not all bad for U.S. exporters, and are not all bad for the world's food system as a whole. Markets abandoned by competitors, in their haste to sell to the U.S.S.R., have in part been filled by the United States. Hence the surprising volume of U.S. exports this year, despite the embargo. While losing a big part of the large but unpredictable Soviet market, U.S. exporters may be gaining some smaller but more steady customers. Of course, these new customers must first be persuaded that the United States is a reliable supplier, and that they are not to be the next target of a U.S. food-power exercise. Also, because the embargo has produced some diversification of Soviet grain imports, the market disruptions so often associated with those imports may now be reduced; Soviet purchasing agents buying grain from a larger number of suppliers, and in smaller quantities, will find it more difficult to surprise the market than in the past. As one final benefit, the hasty buy-up of embargoed grain did stimulate the United States to establish a much needed four-million-ton food reserve, to meet emergency needs in poor countries. Unfortunately, the embargo has also made far less likely the participation of the Soviet Union in a truly multilateral food reserve system. Prior to the embargo, Soviet officials had been playing a far more positive role than ever before in the on-and-off negotiations to establish such a system.

Assessing the situation now, it is better to continue searching for redeeming side effects than to redouble diplomatic efforts to plug leaks in the embargo. Those leaks, together with shifts in trade, have practically eliminated the value of the embargo as an instrument of denial. By USDA estimates, the Soviet Union was

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able to import, from all sources, a total of 31 million tons of grain during the trade year that ended in June—more than in any previous year in its history, and only 2.5 million tons less than it had planned to import prior to the embargo announcement.[1] If this embargo must continue, then its many leaks should probably be allowed to continue as well. The diplomatic cost to the United States of seeking to make the embargo more effective would surely outweigh the benefits.

Added to these diplomatic costs is another concern, a concern that this embargo, even if made effective in the world market, might not yield its intended effect at the third point in the food power process. Even if the 1980 grain embargo had somehow managed to hold within the United States, and within the world's grain trading system, it might yet have failed to produce the desired result within the target nation, the Soviet Union.

IV

What would constitute success for the embargo within the Soviet Union? Accepting the President's language, the embargo had a highly limited but clearly stated purpose. The announced objective was not to force the Soviet Union to remove any or all of its occupying troops from Afghanistan. The objective was not to deter a further act of Soviet aggression. If it had been, it would have made greater sense to continue grain exports on a conditional basis. Nor was the announced purpose of the embargo to force the Soviet Union to spend more on agriculture, and therefore less on arms, though this might have been an unannounced purpose. The purpose of the grain embargo, as stated by the President, was simply to punish the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. The President used the diplomatic double negative, explaining that the Soviets should not be permitted to commit such an act "with impunity." Accepting this announced objective at face value, the embargo would have been a success if it had managed to inflict a significant dose of pain upon the Soviet Union, by damaging the Soviet livestock industry.

Because of the seasonal import needs of the Soviet livestock industry, it is best to provide a three-part estimate—short, middle

[1] In April, amid publicity over embargo leakage, USDA suddenly raised its estimate of Soviet pre-embargo July–June grain import intentions, from 34 million tons, up to a previously unheard of level of 37.5 million tons. By doing so, it was able to claim a somewhat larger "denial" effect for the President's embargo. This upward revision was accompanied by an admission of "numerous uncertainties" when judging Soviet import intentions. The earlier, and less suspect, 34-million-ton estimate is used here.

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and long run—of the damage that might have been done by a well-disciplined U.S. grain embargo.

In the very short run (during the six months before grain from the 1980 Soviet harvest began to become available for feed use, in late July), if denied access to imported feed supplies, the Soviet Union might have been required to conduct what is known as a "distress slaughter" of livestock. Such an action increases the quantity of meat available for consumption in the very short run, but makes vastly more difficult any sustained increase in meat production in the long run. The Soviets last conducted such a distress slaughter following a weather-related crop disaster in 1975. Even with the benefit of record grain imports at that time, it then required about three years to rebuild livestock numbers back up to pre-1975 levels. In the meantime, per capita meat production stopped growing. The punitive design of the 1980 U.S. grain embargo was to trigger another such disruptive cutback in Soviet livestock numbers.

The embargo has failed in this short-run objective. The Soviet Union was able to feed 126 million tons of grain to livestock during the year which ended in June, which is one million tons more than last year, and only two million tons below the quantity that had been forecast before the embargo. This two-million-ton difference translates into a three percent short-term feeding cutback attributable to the embargo, since it was compressed into the six month January-June period. From a Soviet perspective, this three percent embargo-related feeding cutback does not begin to approach setbacks of the recent past, such as the 20 percent feeding cutback from the trend of that period which followed the 1975 Soviet harvest failure. For that matter, it is also much less dramatic than a feeding cutback experienced not too long ago by the U.S. livestock industry. Because of a very bad corn crop and high feed grain prices in 1974, U.S. livestock producers reduced grain feeding by almost 30 percent.

To explain the short-run survival of Soviet livestock herds, we must look beyond leaks in the embargo. Equally important, this past spring, was the decision of the Soviet Union to draw a very large quantity of grain—estimated at 17 million tons—out of its own food reserves. This decision was not without precedent. Soviet stocks had been drawn down by about 16 million tons following the poor harvest of 1977. Although the total size of Soviet grain reserves is a well-guarded state secret, outsiders could scarcely doubt the availability of these extra supplies on this occasion. Assisted by a heavy volume of imports, the Soviets had been able

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to build their stocks by adding an estimated 19 million tons following their very successful 1978 grain harvest (which came in at a record 237 million tons). Even if the 1980 embargo had not leaked, the Soviets might have been able to meet much of their short-run need, by removing even larger quantities of grain from their own reserves.

Saved by its own grain reserves in the short run, the Soviet livestock industry has now been saved by good weather in the middle run. The 1980 Soviet grain harvest looks to be a well-timed success. That harvest has been estimated at 210 million tons, 15 million tons above the average over the past five years, and more than 30 million tons above the 1979 harvest. Had this year's harvest failed, the Soviet livestock industry, having struggled to survive the spring and summer by drawing down reserves, would almost certainly have been forced into substantial herd reductions. It might then have appeared that the President's embargo was working.

In fact, with bad weather and a poor harvest in 1980, Soviet livestock herds would have been sharply reduced even without a U.S. grain embargo. In the middle run, Soviet weather fluctuations are of much greater significance than the deprivation that could result from any imagined U.S. embargo. Year-to-year variations in Soviet grain production can be as great as 84 million tons (as in 1976, relative to 1975). This huge potential variation in production is always the dominant middle-run concern for Soviet livestock managers, much more than the 17-million-ton difference that might have been made by a well-disciplined embargo.

In the longer run, over more than the next year or two, a well-disciplined grain embargo could do very serious and lasting damage to the Soviet livestock industry. Drawing down stocks can save the Soviets in the short run. Unusually good weather can even get them through the middle run. But in the long run, very bad weather will sooner or later strike when stocks are low. Under these circumstances, without a very large volume of grain imports, the Soviet Union would not be able to continue to expand its livestock herds at the desired rate. If a tight U.S. grain embargo could be maintained over the long run, the Soviet Union might be forced to abandon its present plans for a dramatic increase in the meat component of the Soviet diet.

Not that this long-run prospect should inspire efforts to keep the embargo in place. The longer any U.S. embargo continues, the more likely it becomes that new sources of supply will emerge.

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Argentina is the obvious candidate to take over, permanently, a sizable share of the Soviet market. If Argentine farmers begin to use high-yielding varieties of grain, and if they bring more land under cultivation, their annual harvest could very well double in the coming years, from 25 million tons up to 50 million tons.

The long-term promise of an embargo would also be clouded by a second and more speculative judgment. If a U.S. grain embargo were to accomplish its announced long-run purpose, if it were to force Soviet leaders to abandon their present hopes for a rapid increase in per capita meat consumption in the U.S.S.R., then it might be doing those leaders a curious favor. What better excuse than a foreign policy crisis—a grain embargo—to rethink the grandiose agricultural objectives of the Brezhnev era? For the past dozen years, the Soviet leadership has deceived itself in pursuing a costly plan to upgrade rapidly the Soviet diet. Neither Soviet agriculture nor the rest of the Soviet economy can yet provide an adequate base to support diets rich in meat. Even with the unprecedented grain imports of the past decade, plans for a rapid increase in meat production were not being fulfilled.

The Soviet Academy, some time ago, established a "scientific" meat consumption norm of 82 kilograms per capita, or about three-quarters of the U.S. level. Even before the embargo, the Soviets were making little or no progress toward this presumed goal. After reaching a high of 57 kilograms in 1975, per capita meat consumption had stopped growing. In 1978, the planned rate of growth in per capita meat consumption for the upcoming 1981–85 plan period had been set at only 1.5 percent, which was well below the unfulfilled goal of the present plan period. Soviet meat production in 1979, before the embargo, had actually fallen below the quantity produced in 1978. Soviet leaders were forced to revise their 1980 meat production goals further downward. At the time Carter announced the embargo, Brezhnev's meat production program was already going nowhere.

Is it good policy for the United States to seek to inflict a small bit of added pain upon an already failing Soviet meat production program? Does the United States wish to be seen as responsible for a major Soviet food policy failure, a failure that would have become increasingly obvious even without an embargo? If the U.S. embargo had continued without leaks, it might have provided a unique opportunity for Soviet leaders, most logically Brezhnev's successors, to abandon their costly meat consumption program without having to admit to their own people the failures of state farming. These failures could have been obscured, if

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necessary, behind calls for sacrifice and retrenchment, to blunt the hostile designs of enemies of socialism abroad. Soon after the embargo was announced, the Soviet press rallied the people to resist—as they had during the siege of Leningrad in World War II—this new attempt on the part of a foreign enemy to "create famine" in the Soviet Union.

Nor would a tight embargo force the Soviets, necessarily, to spend more on agriculture and less on arms. The effect might be the opposite. Soviet leaders have not been using their grain imports as a "low cost alternative" to larger investments in their own agricultural sector. Those imports, over the past decade, have been just one part of an extremely lavish and increasingly expensive agricultural program. Agricultural investments have been steadily expanded, under Brezhnev, from 20 percent up to 27 percent of total annual capital investment. The Soviet government has been throwing an estimated $50 billion every year into investments in agriculture, a staggering amount, roughly five times as much as the United States. The Soviet farm price subsidy program, though it offers little as a production incentive, has been running out of control. Outlays were increased by 15 percent in 1978 alone, and these subsidies are now the most expensive of their kind anywhere in the world.

It is difficult to imagine the Soviet Union spending much more on agriculture than it is already. In response to a well-disciplined U.S. grain embargo, Brezhnev or his successors might instead be prompted to reassess the costs of pursuing an unrealistic meat consumption objective. Should that objective then be set aside, or the timetable for its attainment stretched out, less money might be spent on Soviet agriculture, and given Soviet fears of Sino-American encirclement, more might be spent on arms.

It is said that the Soviet consumer would not tolerate his government abandoning the well-publicized meat consumption objectives of the Brezhnev era. True, perhaps, in an atmosphere of détente. With a return to confrontation, under conditions of a continuing grain embargo, austerity might well be accepted as a patriotic duty. Care should be taken not to offer to the Soviet leadership this avenue of escape from its own food policy failures.

V

With such little chance of success, and with clear costs attached to failure, why did the President select a grain embargo as part of his response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? By doing so, he went against his own better judgment, and against his own

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campaign promise, that U.S. food exports should not be used as a "weapon."

Perhaps the embargo decision was taken as a gamble on the weather. If this year's Soviet grain harvest had failed badly (the odds were at least one in five), the President's embargo would have seemed, to those with little information, a principal cause of the resulting damage. A claim could have been made that punishment had been inflicted. At the same time, on the chance that bad weather might hurt the U.S. grain harvest this year, a restriction on large sales to Russia might have seemed a prudent step to help steady food prices at home. But the odds, last January, were very long against winning both ends of this gamble. If hot and dry summer weather had done any less damage to this year's U.S. corn crop, the President might actually have found himself losing this gamble both ways.

In fact, the haste with which the President's decision was taken suggests a more immediate and less calculated set of concerns. However slim its chance of success, the grain embargo must have appeared, last January, as more attractive than the alternative. The alternative was to continue with plans, which had been made the previous October, to sell in 1980 an all-time record 25 million tons of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union. For reasons unrelated to domestic food prices, these sales would have proved at least as embarrassing to the President, this year, as his ineffectual embargo. Without an embargo of some kind, the President would have found himself presiding over the largest "Russian grain deal" on record, much larger than Richard Nixon's still remembered sale to the Russians in 1972, the so-called Great Grain Robbery. To important allies abroad, this would have been an inappropriate token of the Administration's new policy toward the Soviet Union, so soon after Afghanistan. Likewise, to his political audience at home, these sales would have raised large doubts, at the time, about the President's capacity to make hard decisions. Politically, the only thing worse than announcing a grain embargo two weeks before the Iowa caucuses would have been *not* to announce such an embargo. The President's entire foreign policy would have appeared hostage, in a moment of crisis, to a few Iowa corn growers.

More than this, if the President had not announced his grain embargo on January 4, we can guess that within a week the International Longshoremen's Association would have proceeded on its own to block grain shipments to Russia, as it has on several occasions in the past. Should the President then acquiesce in such

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an action, following meekly behind renegade labor leaders, thereby getting all of the pain but none of the credit for an embargo policy? Or should he send his lawyers to plead the U.S.S.R.'s case in court, and be seen begging the ILA to allow U.S. grain to reach the Soviet transgressors? When viewed against these alternatives, and when supplemented with more substantial measures to improve the security of U.S. interests in Southwest Asia, the grain embargo was not so much a serious mistake as an unhappy necessity.

VI

A similar logic of political necessity may eventually require a lifting of the embargo. Producers and exporters hope to be able to force a policy reversal, with or without a change of Presidents in January. But such an end to the embargo would not restore the status quo ante. Nor should it. No future President should wish to find himself uncomfortably positioned, as was President Carter earlier this year, with his most visible trade and security policies toward the Soviet Union moving in opposite directions. Nor should any future President wish to expose his domestic food and farm policies, as much as in the past, to the disruptive consequences of large and largely unregulated grain sales to the U.S.S.R.

Perhaps an error was made in 1972, when then Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz promised Leonid Brezhnev that the Soviet Union would be "absolutely safe" in building up its livestock herds with grain from the United States. Given the dominance of strategic concerns between rival superpowers, given the volatility of the U.S. political system, and given the obsessive secrecy of the Soviet system, no such assurance could or should have been given. The recent intensification of superpower rivalry is only one part of the grain sale problem. Even in the early honeymoon of détente, large and unpredictable U. S. grain sales to the Soviet Union proved more trouble than they were worth, at times, for both parties. The United States suffered from exposing its food and farm economy to the disruptions caused by "hit and run" Soviet purchasing tactics. It could never be known far enough in advance just how much U.S. grain the U.S.S.R. would buy. The Soviets suffered, in turn, whenever U.S. fears of an untimely sale led to surprise export interruptions, as in 1974 and 1975.

The 1975 bilateral agreement took some of this fear out of the market, but the agreement remains an imperfect means to control commercial disruption. Under its terms, the United States promised to make eight million tons of grain available to the Soviets

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every year. Larger sales would require official approval, year by year. But constant pressure from U.S. producers and exporters led to much larger offers, every year, of sales double or triple this minimum amount. The Soviets, meanwhile, refused ever to give assurance in advance that they would buy more than the rather low six-million-ton minimum purchase requirement specified in the agreement. Even with the grain agreement, U.S. farmers, traders and policy officials went into every season with few clues of what to expect from the Soviet market.

The continuing invasion of Afghanistan has now overshadowed these commercial difficulties. Still, one possible occasion for ending the embargo might be a renegotiation looking to an extension of the bilateral grain agreement, which is due to expire October 1, 1981. As a part of this renegotiation, the minimum Soviet purchase requirement ought to be raised. Alternatively, the Soviets might at least be required, on a year-by-year basis, to match any temporary increase in U.S. offers to sell with an increase in their own commitments to buy. More likely, of course, the Soviet Union will shun a renegotiation of the grain agreement, as long as the embargo remains in place, to avoid any appearance of dealing with the United States from a position of weakness. If their hope is to resume importing large quantities of U.S. grain, they might simply take their chances on a new President, or on political pressures in the United States for a timely policy reversal without a new agreement.

Then again, a different kind of Soviet action may eventually ease the grain embargo dilemma. If the Soviets, in response to the 1980 embargo, should decide to slow the growth of their own grain imports, or to persevere in a further diversification of those imports, then the troublesome question of mammoth U.S. sales to the Soviet Union, in future years, might not arise. If U.S. grain exports can then continue to grow, free from their previous degree of dependence upon these mammoth sales, something useful will have been salvaged from the embargo experience by both superpowers.

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By Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

WALTER LIPPMANN'S AMERICAN CENTURY

WALTER LIPPMANN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY. By Ronald Steel. Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown, 1980, 640 pp. $19.95.

To James Thurber, in a 1943 *New Yorker* cartoon, Walter Lippmann was the object of respectful humor: a wife looks up from a newspaper and tells her husband, "Lippmann scares me this morning." To Judge Learned Hand, Colonel House, and five hundred guests at a testimonial dinner in 1931, he was, in the words of *Time* magazine, "their Moses, their prophet of Liberalism." To Dean Acheson, writing his memoirs, he was "that ambivalent Jeremiah." To Woodrow Wilson, for whom Lippmann prepared several of the famous Fourteen Points, his judgment was "most unsound"; to Lyndon Johnson, it was ultimately far worse than that. The one inescapable conclusion to be drawn from his six decades as a public correspondent is that Lippmann was America's, and perhaps the world's, most influential journalist.

That this should be so, when he changed his views so radically and so often, and indeed when he was so often wrong, is at first puzzling. But there were good reasons for it. His style, for one thing. From his Harvard days, the student and protégé of William James, George Santayana, and Charles Copeland commanded a forceful rhetoric that at best was both simple and magisterial. His concerns were elevated above political gossip; his focus was long and clear in almost everything he wrote, from his muckracking days as a young *New Republic* editor to his profoundly conservative middle years. Though he often came about 180 degrees within a few months, he was seldom ambivalent at any moment, and his limpid, reasonable prose gave his readers an impression of assurance and profundity.

He was influential as well because he developed with the nation's politicians a symbiotic relationship that enabled him to write about their policies with a degree of prescience, since in some instances he helped form them. Ronald Steel, in his insightful and stylish biography, credits Lippmann with a seminal role in shaping American war aims in 1917; in helping Senator Borah defeat the Versailles Treaty; in settling an angry dispute with Mexico in the late 1920s; in developing the concepts of the 1940 destroyer-bases deal and of Lend-Lease; and even in responding to Soviet threats after the war. According to Steel:

> The Soviets—citing an agreement reached at Yalta and Potsdam—put pressure on Turkey for a naval base in the Dardanelles and joint control over the straits. In

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> late February 1946, Lippmann talked the matter over with Navy Secretary Forrestal, with whom he had grown quite friendly, and together they decided that the United States should make a show of force in the Mediterranean to indicate its interest in Turkey. Forrestal came up with the idea of sending the battleship *Missouri* to return the body of the Turkish ambassador, who had just died in Washington. Lippmann hailed the plan in his column. (p. 427)

Steel may exaggerate Lippmann's contribution to making this decision and others cited in *Walter Lippmann and the American Century.* Public men have been known to induce powerful opinion-makers to believe that they have played a key part in forming policies, in order to give them a stake in celebrating those policies. And though Lippmann in later life warned his fellow journalists to beware of growing too close to politicians, he was himself not only susceptible to the attractions of power and ambitious to share in its use, but rightly considered himself one of the elite. For historical purposes, it is a pity that Steel's many accounts of Lippmann's participation in making American policy could not be posed to Wilson, House, Dwight Morrow, Forrestal, and the others with whom he is said to have shared their creation.

Still, it is undeniable that many public figures sought Lippmann's advice, and, like millions of their fellow Americans, were persuaded by his books and columns. Style alone could not have made this so, nor long-term consistency of opinion, since this was lacking. What most attracted his readers and won him their trust over more than half a century was, I believe, his constant effort to be fair; his essential conservatism; and his willingness to traverse, in his own mind, almost the entire range of political opinion. He was, in his youth, a socialist. Later, he found in scientific "disinterestedness" the key to sound government. Having once apotheosized the masses, he came to believe that democratic man was totally incapable of understanding the complex world about him, and should, for his own good, give over to experts the management of public affairs. At last, in his sulfurous tirades against American involvement in Vietnam, he denounced the experts who had planned it. In this life-long saga what mattered most was not the wide variety of his opinions, but his honesty in embracing, if only for a time, the many conflicting truths that make up truth.

On occasion, his fairness led him into dark corners. Immediately following the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti, Lippmann, then editorial page director of the New York *World*, composed a piece that praised both the Lowell Committee for its "bravery" in confirming the jury's guilty verdict, and Felix Frankfurter and the defense for upholding the "rights of the humblest and most despised." Amos Pinchot replied that "the important thing is that the contending factions should be united by a common appreciation of Walter Lippmann's fairness."

Later, in 1933, Lippmann sought to be fair to Nazi Germany. Following a seemingly conciliatory speech by Hitler, he wrote: "We have heard once more, through the fog and the din, the hysteria and the animal passions of a great revolution, the authentic voice of a genuinely civilized people." Ronald Steel writes:

> By this he meant that the Germans should not be judged simply by Nazi rantings or treated as permanent outcasts. . . . People were capable of both good and evil. Would it be fair, he asked, to judge the French by the Terror, Protestantism by the

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> Ku Klux Klan, the Catholic Church by the Inquisition? Or for that matter, "the Jews by their parvenus"? (p. 331)

That Lippmann could compare the flashiness of Jewish parvenus with terrorism and brutality is, as Steel writes, deeply shocking and offensive. In part, it must have emerged from his subliminal disdain for his own Jewishness, in part from a kind of cultural squeamishness that made order and tranquillity for him the chief constituents of a good society.

II

He was, both in his active social life and in his politics, a conservative—inclined, for the most part, to adopt the views and endorse the policies of those in power, at least at the beginning of their terms; then, as their inevitable failures or excesses carried them and the nation into stormy waters, to chide them and at last to demand their removal—in order that "safer" men, such as Landon, Willkie, Dewey, Eisenhower, and Nixon in 1968, might guide us to harbor. This progress was doubtless consonant with that of many readers, whose more visceral feelings were confirmed by Lippmann's Olympian prose.

Conservative in general, but various in particulars:

> During the 1920's, and much of the 1930's as well [Steel writes], Lippmann was neither consistent nor persuasive in his prescriptions for preventing war. Simultaneously espousing disarmament and American naval strength, international cooperation and an Anglo-American domination of the seas, American freedom of action and a "political equivalent of war," he reflected the confusions of the age. Like the broad-minded financiers who were his friends, he wanted stability within the framework of an international system that, far more than he realized, was already breaking down. (pp. 255–6)

If his proposals were contradictory, his fundamental preference for caution was clear. He was, throughout the period, pessimistic about the usefulness of American intervention. In 1935 he wrote:

> A cold appraisal of the American interest which is, I take it, to protect our own development as a free nation, seems to me to lead to the conclusion that we can contribute nothing substantially to the pacification of Europe today, that vague commitments would only mislead Europe and mask the realities. For the time being, therefore, our best course is to stand apart from European policies. (p. 334)

If this was true of Europe, it was even more true of Asia. When Japan seized Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, Lippmann wrote, "In the whole great region in which Japan claims predominance we have no particular political interest of our own to protect. If there is to be any concerted action, let the policy emanate from the governments which have a definite stake in the area"—Russia, China, the European powers. This was "a policy of realism."

The same realism caused him to think Chamberlain wise in 1938, because he was "expedient" in the face of superior force:

> In dealing with these warrior statesmen, the democracies must not delude themselves with the idea that there is any bloodless, inexpensive substitute for the willingness to go to war. Collective security, economic sanctions, moral pressure,

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> can be made effective only by nations known to be willing to go to war if necessary. If that willingness to fight does not exist, then Mr. Chamberlain is right when he concludes that he must try to make tolerable terms with the dictators. (p. 370)

This is Realpolitik at its purest. It offers a specific application of Lippmann's famous dictum that a workable foreign policy "consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power." Where power (which includes national will) is limited, so should be commitments. That it would have been better for Britain, the United States and France to have expressed a common determination to resist German aggression in the mid-1930s—despite the reluctance of their people to risk the renewal of war—seems almost a wistful judgment today, compared to Lippmann's astringent realism at the time. No one knows where such an allied policy, which would have created political storms in each country, might have gotten us. We all know, of course, where Munich led.

What runs through Lippmann's commentaries from the 1930s forward is a plea for the recognition of limits. Acknowledge the limits of your power, and of your essential interests. Acknowledge that equivalent powers also have essential interests, which you must respect in order to avoid war—to maintain tranquillity. This was not a counsel of appeasement: Lippmann was not pleased that behind Chamberlain were few Britons besides Winston Churchill who were willing to beard the Nazis. It was, in his mind, a counsel of realism.

It led him to propose, toward the end of World War II, that the West acknowledge and respect Russia's dominant influence in Eastern Europe, a region it considered vital to its security. This was, he argued, hardly heretical; the United States, after all, had a "privileged zone" in Latin America and the Pacific. Great powers required such friendly buffer zones. Thus the "right-wing" Poles—the anti-communist ones—should be ignored if they sought to create a hostile coalition against the Soviet Union. Lippmann did not argue, as some American liberals did in the aftermath of the war, that the Soviets would bring a more liberal and beneficent rule to areas long dominated by monarchies and privileged classes. He saw it purely in terms of territorial interests, the mutual recognition of which, he believed, would insure the peace.

He was appalled by Averell Harriman's comment at the San Francisco United Nations conference, that "our objectives and the Kremlin's objectives are irreconcilable." Lippmann denounced those "who, to say it flatly, are thinking of the international organization as a means of policing the Soviet Union." Had he foreseen what the United Nations would become, he might have been less exercised, at least in this regard.

The line drawn between the Soviets and Americans, he wrote Secretary-designate James Byrnes, was "not inherent in the nature of things," but rather due to "inexperience and emotional instability in our own delegation." The British, he thought, were principally responsible for stimulating trouble with the Russians. They were colonialists, hostile to any form of radicalism. And, he wrote later, "I do not believe that the pre-war rightist elements can continue to govern in Europe. I do not think it is ideology, but realism, to argue that the support of governments somewhat left of center has the greatest promise. . . ."—namely, the promise of assuaging Soviet fears of neighboring hostility. "[O]ur interest in free elections in Poland appears [in Moscow's view] as a British-American protection and encouragement of those East

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European and Balkan factions which are hostile to the Soviet Union." The Russians had reason to question, he said, "whether our political interest in that orbit is what it professes to be, or is the cover for an intervention designed to push them back to where they were in 1939." Of course they did; but, as in 1939, the Western nations were unable to contain the aggrandizement of the region's principal power.

His position at this critical moment of the "American century" was a subtle one. In the wake of Churchill's famous Fulton, Missouri speech, he wrote that America should make loans to Britain and France, enact universal military training, rebuild the Mediterranean and European fleets, and launch an economic development project for the Middle East. "But if we do any of these necessary, desirable, and inherently constructive things inside an alliance which is avowedly anti-Soviet, they will surely accentuate the antagonism of Moscow far more than they reinforce our own influence for a peaceable settlement." He was depressed by the Western effort, inspired, he believed, by the British, to create a strong West German state as a bulwark against the Soviets. He preferred a weak Bonn, with strong constituent *Landesstaaten* that would pose no threat to the supersensitive East.

III

Reading his views today, in the sympathetic hands of Ronald Steel, Lippmann emerges an early revisionist. If the Russians were difficult, it was because they perceived the West as aggressively hostile to them, determined to deny them the buffer zone of hegemony that history had shown they needed. Granting them their sphere of influence would, he thought, reduce their anxiety and make peace possible. The problem was not inherent Soviet adventurism, but responsive Soviet fear.

He was particularly affronted by the "globalism" that emerged in Truman's speeches and Acheson's policies. If Russia embraced the West directly, she should be resisted. But it was dangerous to confront her with "dispersed American power in the service of a heterogeneous collection of unstable governments and of contending parties and factions which happen to be opposed to the Soviet Union." Steel sums it up: "Intervention in the name of balance of power was justified and necessary; indiscriminate intervention in support of far-flung and unstable client regimes was wasteful and dangerous." One can hear in this either the voice of realism, particularly in the wake of Vietnam; or the voice of Neville Chamberlain, speaking of that faraway land, Czechoslovakia.

Europe, in any case, was not far away, and Lippmann early endorsed the Marshall Plan. Indeed, Steel's account of Lippmann's discussions with Acheson, Forrestal and Clayton suggests that the European recovery program might better have been called the Lippmann Plan. At the very least, his columns helped generate enough public support to make the plan politically possible. Europe counted for Lippmann. If it was made strong, and if that strength, together with a recognition of Russia's legitimate concern for protecting her borders with client states, led to a genuine balance of power in the region, and if the West avoided overcommitment to unstable regimes elsewhere, then peace was possible. He wrote to a friend: "I am convinced that the question of war or peace hangs upon the Soviet willingness to engage in a general war, and not on the strength of the local defenses in any part of the

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world. For this reason I have never believed in the policy of containment as preached by the State Department."

Lippmann in 1949 was eager to respond to a Soviet proposal that Germany be neutralized, and foreign troops withdrawn. If accepted, he argued, German nationalists might be held in check—instead of flirting with Moscow to recapture lost territories—and the need for NATO obviated. The Administration thought otherwise. "It dismissed the Soviet proposal as merely a device to block the formation of NATO," writes Steel. "This was indeed true. But the more important question was whether NATO was in fact necessary—particularly since it prevented the Soviet withdrawal from central Europe that was presumably a major objective of American diplomacy." The implied question—"What if?"—recurs throughout Steel's account of the postwar period. It is the revisionists' litany, in that it suggests that an alternative to the kind of Western alliance that was missing in the late 1930s might have produced better results than its absence produced then.

For one so convinced of the unique importance of Europe, Lippmann was curiously belligerent when North Korea launched its attack on the South in June 1950. He warned of international anarchy "if a wretched little satellite government in northern Korea can thumb its nose at the United Nations." He supported the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits; but as Truman committed troops to Korea, Lippmann began looking for the guilty parties who had produced such a mess. He found them, as Republican campaigners did in 1952, in the White House and State Department, for "not having clarified the question of our obligation in Korea," and then for fighting there. (Whether Lippmann would have endorsed a specific commitment to Syngman Rhee's regime prior to June 25 is not made clear.) He told Joseph Alsop, "I am rather gloomy about the quality of the men in charge of our destiny." This solemn indictment, poured out to a fellow pessimist, must have hung in the air like an organ chord in St. Paul's.

Steel suggests—and it is worth citing here not as Lippmann's view, but as background music for Steel's biography—that the Korean invasion

> might have been prompted by the American decision to sign a peace treaty with Japan—a treaty the Soviets had not been allowed to join, and one that turned Japan into an advance base of American power. [Or] the Soviet-backed invasion might have been designed to challenge China rather than the United States. For [Truman and Acheson] it was a test of American fortitude. To have backed away might have been, as Acheson later said, "highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States." (p. 471)

Once again, the Soviet Union reacted to an unfriendly American action; or it acted in a way that, fairly seen, did not jeopardize American interests, but, in this case, those of China. The difficulty with such revisionism is not only its unanswerable "what if?," but its inutility as a guide to action. Neither Truman nor Acheson nor Lippmann could have known, in late June 1950, whether the Soviets were seeking to intimidate Japan or China. What they appeared to be doing, in the world's eyes, was sponsoring an invasion that, if successful, would have upset the Asian balance of power and would have seriously diminished—can one say it?—the credibility of the American deterrent.

Steel is not, as this review suggests, uniformly admiring of Lippmann's view. He admires his adherence to Realpolitik, the fact that he spoke the

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language of military strength, spheres of influence, an Atlantic alliance—which "made it difficult to dismiss his attacks on a diplomacy that had seemingly lost all sight of rational objectives in an obsessive search for an ever-elusive feeling of 'security'." But this very severity of approach had its limitations. Steel writes:

> While penetrating in his critique of certain American policies— . . .containment, German rearmament, support for Chiang—he was always so within the self-imposed limitations of political "realism" . . . . Having no firm guidepost other than pragmatism, lacking a philosophical approach or ideological commitment, reluctant to accept the part that economic demands or *imperial ambitions* might play in explaining American foreign policy, Lippmann was unable to take a consistent approach to the issues he wrote about. (emphasis added) (p. 486)

He was not, in other words, in the camp of those who saw America's purposes and actions as central to the problem of world disorder. The implication is that had he been of that number, he would have denounced American "economic demands [and] imperial ambitions," and so used his influential voice to force a retrenchment. He is, Steel believes, to be praised for going as far as he did in resisting globalism; but "he nonetheless supported such American intervention where Western control was challenged by indigenous [sic] communists. Thus, he favored aid to the Greek monarchy, air and naval intervention in Korea (though not troops), and even support for the French in Indochina." In short, he "ended up by accepting the logic of containment in cases where the balance of power seemed to be involved." So, one might have thought, would Steel; but he is more consistent than his subject. A communist advance—not the theoretical threat of one—caused Lippmann to support containment in those instances. Steel would differ if the area involved was far distant from America's territorial interests. The fact that a remote transgression was communist-led did not, in Steel's view, convert it into a threat to the balance of power.

Lippmann in 1952 concluded that it would be a "catastrophe of enormous proportions . . . if Southeast Asia were to fall within the communist orbit." But by 1963, when President Kennedy expressed the same view, Lippmann—though a profound admirer of Kennedy, and an "insider" in his Administration—had grown wary. Though he did not favor American withdrawal, he thought "[t]he price of a military victory in the Vietnamese war is higher than American vital interests can justify." He shared the Administration's belief that China would inherit the spoils after a communist victory there, but he thought the best way to prevent that eventuality was to work for a "reunited, independent and neutral Vietnam." This was General de Gaulle's proposal, and since World War II days Lippmann had considered Charles de Gaulle the paragon of world statesmen. Following his lead, Lippmann urged limited support for Saigon, while the Administration pressed Hanoi and Peking for neutralization. Kennedy rejected the notion, and was concerned that the Diem family would attempt a settlement with the North that provided for it. Later, President Johnson asked Lippmann how neutralization could prevent Indochina from falling to the communists. There was no assurance that it would, Lippmann answered; but there was no realistic alternative.

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IV

By 1965, Walter Lippmann—75 years old, veteran of half a century's involvement with men of power, author of millions of wise, and more than a few pompous and fatuous words, still his country's most respected journalist—had embarked upon the last great campaign of his life. "He did not argue the morality of America's involvement in Vietnam because, with rare exceptions, he did not view foreign policy as a moral issue. For him it was a question of geopolitics and a cold calculation of national interest," Steel writes. The same calculation led Lippmann to support American intervention in the Dominican Republic that year, not because of the need to "stop communism everywhere," but because the Dominican Republic is in our back yard. Vietnam was obviously not. "Russia had no business mucking around in the Dominican Republic—but neither did the United States in Vietnam," Steel sums it up.

As the American involvement deepened, so did Lippmann's passionate conviction that it was a desperate mistake. The bombing campaign against the North, he thought, was futile; for the Vietnamese "do not value their material possessions, which are few, nor even their lives, which are short and unhappy, as do the people of a country who have much to lose and much to live for." Hardly the sentiments of the anti-war movement as a whole, for whom American bombing was an act of immoral hostility; but their conclusions were similar. Lippmann became a hero to the movement, even as he became a pariah to the Johnson whom he had courted with praise—just as Johnson wooed him with attention—in the early years of the Administration. The network of personal, political and journalistic relationships that is peculiar to Washington, and, within which, for pleasure and professional contacts Lippmann was a central player for several decades, was savaged by the emotions generated by the war. Still he persisted—the guns of his prose more powerful than the invective Johnson poured upon his name in the Oval Office.

His opposition to the war led him, in 1968, to support the election of Richard Nixon. Hubert Humphrey was, he wrote, "Lyndon Johnson's creature," who could neither break with Johnson on the war nor carry with him the Republican support needed to resolve it. Nixon, on the other hand, would have to seek a cease-fire and a "self-respecting withdrawal of our land forces." Further, Nixon, unlike Humphrey, could take those stern measures necessary to restore domestic tranquillity to a "violently disordered" United States.

Once more, then, Lippmann endorsed the challenger to an incumbent Party. He had, in his long career, backed Smith and then FDR against Hoover; Landon and Willkie against Roosevelt; Dewey against Truman; Eisenhower against Stevenson, and then in 1956, Stevenson against Eisenhower; Kennedy against Nixon; and at last, Nixon against Humphrey. In most of these cases he chose the opposition in order to right what he perceived to be an imbalance in public affairs, brought on or perpetuated by the inadequacy of the man in office. Every President who won his praise, even those, like Wilson, Hoover, FDR, Kennedy, and Johnson, with whom he shared confidences and to whom he rendered private and public counsel, ultimately felt the lash of his displeasure. Only one among the politicians of his day, he told a friend, did he ever love: Theodore Roosevelt. But that affection was born before he became distressed by the "globalism" of American aims abroad.

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The current President, no less than the Congress and the public, seems quite uncertain about the proper reach of American interests. One faction would aggressively confront the Soviet, and other totalitarian, regimes, over their abuse of human rights. This would have seemed nonsense to Lippmann; he seldom displayed outrage about internal repression in other nations, since what counted was achieving a balance of power among states that would preserve international peace. He would have been distressed by the present shakiness in U.S.-European relations. His column, "Today and Tomorrow," would now be filled with expressions of European dismay over the shortcomings of American statemanship.

Today, he would doubtless counsel restraint in responding to far-away hostilities and upheavals. But unlike some who, in the aftermath of Vietnam, embraced him as the angry critic of American "imperialism," he believed that the United States had a vital and constructive role in preserving peace, and that its instincts and purposes were not inherently corrupt. By and large his countrymen profited from his conservative, fair-minded advice, and could read it with advantage now. Ronald Steel is to be commended for an immense work of scholarship that vividly recalls Walter Lippmann's, and America's, century.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NONPROLIFERATION

To the Editor:

I am in complete agreement and natural sympathy with your statement of editorial policy of presenting a divergency of ideas without necessarily accepting responsibility for the views expressed. However, I would suggest that your responsibility to your readership should extend to a concern for the analytic quality of the articles published within your pages. These thoughts occur while reading the article by Amory Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, and Leonard Ross, "Nuclear Power and Nuclear Bombs" (Summer 1980). Though few would dispute the breadth and even accuracy of their research, their presentation is grossly one-sided. More tellingly, the evidence is not as conclusive as the authors' presentation would indicate.

Let me offer three specific examples from their article. First, they explicitly link civilian nuclear power reactors to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although it is true that the six members of the nuclear weapons club do have civilian reactor systems, the authors make little attempt to point out that in at least five of those six cases, nuclear weapons preceded civilian power reactor systems. More to the point, there are numerous nations with extensive nuclear power reactor systems that have no intention of using them to obtain or manufacture nuclear weapons. Technically, the Lovinses and Ross are correct in that power reactors make the acquisition of nuclear weapons easier, but they completely ignore the issue of intention. There are, in short, multiple and pressing reasons for nations *not* to obtain nuclear weapons (arguments certainly familiar to this journal's careful readership) which Lovins *et al.* studiously fail to present.

Second, Lovins and his coauthors consistently employ extreme examples to buttress their arguments. For example, they cite a *draft* report from the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI) as an *official* estimate of U.S. energy consumption by the year 2000 rather than offer a range of best (or even mean) projections. Two recent SERI reports estimate that solar industrial process heat systems would not be cost competitive with present-day, oil-based systems until the price of petroleum reached $460 per barrel, and that solar-enhanced oil recovery systems could not be price or environmentally competitive with current fossil-fired systems for at least ten years *assuming* the necessary technological breakthroughs are realized. A third SERI report demonstrated how a domestic photovoltaic industry could only survive in an artificial market subsidized and guaranteed by government support, and even then its survivability was problematic. Yet one sees no mention of these discrepancies in the authors' solar success scenarios.

Last, if the nuclear industry is as moribund as the authors propose—and there surely is evidence to that end—then one wonders why they elaborately pummel this particular dead horse. The market system they celebrate should extinguish the residuals of the nuclear industry and, at the same time, advance the favored soft energy technologies. *Q.E.D.* But one is entitled to ask: why is it in an age characterized by growing government deregulation and private

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energy research, solar energy advocates are increasingly demanding government subsidies and tax credits for solar technologies? Might one not legitimately have some trouble reconciling the arguments of Lovins and other solar energy advocates that the government cease subsidizing "hard technologies" while offering every type of support (e.g., R&D funds, tax incentives, solar loan banks) for the soft technologies? Either one trusts the market (as the authors state they do) or one does not; one cannot have it both ways.

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Dr. deLeon was formerly with the Solar Energy Research Institute; he is the author of *The Development and Diffusion of the Nuclear Power Reactor: A Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979.

To the Editor:

Amory Lovins and coauthors add little new to their continued attack on nuclear power. Their conclusion that there is no proliferation-proof nuclear fuel cycle has been vociferously made by the nuclear industry and others in the past. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) recently completed by hundreds of experts from some 60 developed and developing nations has reached the same conclusion.

The Lovins *et al.'s* solution to the proliferation problem is to outlaw nuclear power and prohibit the use of uranium. This solution in effect blames the apple for the expulsion from Eden and ignores the snake and human frailty. The central issue underlying the proliferation problem is the perceived security needs and self-interest of each nation when viewed against the arsenals of nuclear and other weapons already in existence. If the major powers and the world community at large agree to eliminate nuclear weapons, then a moral and legal basis for rigid enforcement of the ban becomes possible. Without such agreement there is no means other than unilateral pressure or force to deter nations from weapons development when they believe it is in their overall self-interest. The presence or absence of nuclear power is largely irrelevant. After all, as Lovins *et al.* point out, the basic problem is not plutonium or commercial nuclear energy but uranium itself and this is readily available. Indeed, no nation which has developed nuclear weapons has used commercial nuclear facilities in the process.

The elimination of nuclear power may indeed exacerbate the proliferation problem. Contrary to the impression one may gain from the arguments of Lovins *et al.*, nuclear power is not the cause of proliferation but was introduced as a means to help control it. The United States, after the Second World War, held a monopoly on nuclear weapons and sought to maintain it through a policy of secrecy and lack of commercialization of nuclear power. By 1954, when this policy was changed, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain had already exploded nuclear weapons and there were vigorous nuclear development programs in some 20 other nations. The 1954 Atoms for Peace Program was an attempt to provide order in a world which was proceeding on the independent development of nuclear technology. The resultant world cooperation—bilateral treaties and subsequent nonproliferation treaties (NPT)—provided a legal framework and a moral basis on which the spread of nuclear weaponry could be slowed down, if not completely eliminated. It is true that

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some nations have refused to sign the NPT. But it is hard to believe that these same nations would be willing to sign a treaty foreswearing the use of uranium.

The basic thrust must be to reduce the incentive for weapons proliferation and, more important, the potential for use of weapons. The most likely cause of a future world holocaust is competition for scarce oil supplies located in militarily weak and unstable regions of the world. Lovins *et al.* argue that nuclear power could not make a meaningful contribution to the oil problem. Facts belie this argument. The United States, for example, presently imports about 8 million barrels of oil a day and uses over 1.5 million barrels of oil per day to generate electricity. It also uses the equivalent of over 1.5 million barrels of oil to generate electricity with natural gas. If one diverted the gas so as to replace industrial oil usage and put on the line coal and nuclear plants, one could reduce our oil imports by over 3 million barrels of oil a day. A one-thousand-megawatt electrical generating plant uses about 10 million barrels of oil a year. Nuclear fuel costs are equivalent to less than $6 a barrel of oil. At a cost of $32 a barrel for imported oil, a nuclear plant would save over a billion dollars in four years.

Lovins *et al.*'s argument that nuclear power is uneconomic is based upon the work of Charles Komanoff, which compares nuclear to coal power. Komanoff, an anti-nuclear critic, bases his conclusions on trends which have been interpreted quite differently by others. Completely missing from the piece by Lovins *et al.* is any mention of cost analyses by organizations which build all types of generating plants and can make consistent and detailed comparisions. Such analyses by Bechtel, Stone & Webster, EBASCO, Gibbs & Hill, and others conclude that nuclear power in the future will compete handily with coal and other available energy sources.

It is of course true, as Lovins *et al.* point out, that utilities are not placing orders in the United States for new nuclear plants. A fundamental reason is the regulatory impediments which anti-nuclear organizations have fostered. These impediments have dragged out the construction cycle for nuclear plants to a dozen years or more and produce uncertainties which prohibit a prudent person or organization from risking a billion to two-billion-dollar project. The long construction periods are themselves a cause of high costs, with one-third to one-half of the cost of a nuclear plant now attributable to interest on money tied up during construction. (It might be noted that the construction times for coal plants are similarly being lengthened due to regulatory requirements.) These long time cycles are not a fundamental attribute of nuclear power. Nuclear plants, built by American manufacturers, have recently been constructed in Japan and Taiwan in six to seven years and these plants in all respects meet or exceed the safety standards of American plants.

Contrary to the assertions of Lovins *et al.*, the use of nuclear power to help substitute for oil is generally accepted worldwide. Although the authors assert, for example, that nuclear power is dead in Japan, the fact is that the Japanese, after pausing to assess the Three Mile Island impact, have just announced the initiation of work on four new plants, and their official energy plan proposes a continued commitment of four to six plants per year throughout this decade. Korea, West Germany, and Taiwan expect to commit additional units shortly. Last year the Spanish and Italian programs were reinvigorated and plant construction initiated. The French expect to have half their electricity generation nuclear by the mid-1980s, and a vigorous nuclear program (including

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breeders) continues in the U.S.S.R. and associated countries. Great Britain, Mexico, Greece, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Ireland, the Netherlands and Yugoslavia are planning for future nuclear commitments. Argentina committed itself to a new plant last year. Brazil, with some difficulties, continues its nuclear program and other nations in South America are in the study phase. The recently completed INFCE study summarizes the international consenses and projects a major expansion of nuclear power worldwide.

Finally, a major thrust of the soft energy path is that hard technologies can be largely replaced by conservation, and to demonstrate this Lovins *et al.* point to the reduction in energy growth since the 1973 Arab oil boycott. But the cost in terms of our well-being and our freedoms is not clear. Coupled with the reduced energy growth has been a reduction in U.S. productivity, as well as continous inflation together with high unemployment. Further, we have reached a point in the United States where a person turning on an electric heater at his workplace is now subject to a $10,000 criminal penalty.

The federal government has mandated efficiency standards limiting appliance choice and is about to dictate design criteria for buildings. It was just this sort of government regulation which Mr. Lovins decried in his original paper. In my own state of California, the Public Utility Commission has determined how much energy I am entitled to in both summer and winter, and exacts onerous financial penalties if I exceed their standards. Utilities are now experimenting with remote controls so that they, not I, can determine when my appliances should operate. Proposals and experiments (some mandatory) on time-of-day rates imply forced night-time living for segments of the population, with undefined effects on family life. Lovins *et al.* talk glowingly of the strides made in the soft technology areas in the four years since Mr. Lovins' original article in *Foreign Affairs*. But they carefully avoid indication of the minuscule total contribution of the new technologies to our present energy use. It is true that as the price of oil went up those with woodlots found it advantageous to use wood instead of oil even with the resulting inconvenience and pollution. But the cost of wood for those who must purchase it is not very different from the cost of purchased gas and its price is escalating rapidly.

In the case of solar heating, we have such typical experiences as the White House project where $41,000 was spent on a demonstration solar installation which will result in the savings of $1,000 worth of gas a year. The GAO reports that very few commercial demonstration projects were operating as designed. *Consumer Reports* in June of this year evaluated solar hot water heaters, the optimum target for solar heating because of use both summer and winter; their conclusion, based on substitution of solar water heating for electric water heating, was that an investment of $2,500 would save $68.60 a year. Mr. Lovins would, I suspect, argue that the poor experience is due to incompetence. But he does not offer to expertly design and install your solar devices himself. So the reader will have to rely on local talent.

In summary, the long-term potential of the soft energy path is yet to be demonstrated. Its major characteristic is not its adherents' advocacy of renewable technologies, but its requirement that hard technologies be abandoned. The soft path strategy lacks resilience. For once we abandon the technologies now practical and embark on the soft path it will be difficult to go back.

The path proposed by Lovins *et al.* is not a well-worn trail, but an adventure

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in the wilderness. It's a bet on the future welfare of the nation and the stability of the world. The odds aren't very good and the stakes are too high.

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The authors reply:

Dr. Peter deLeon thinks "the evidence is not as conclusive" as we suggest, but he does not show that any of our evidence is wrong, or why other evidence should be given greater weight. Rather, he objects that we did not give near-equal time to the opposing views which we rebutted. Since those views are already promoted by most governments, all international energy agencies, some sectors of the media, most utilities, and a $100-billion nuclear industry, we thought they were likely to be all too familiar to the sophisticated readers of *Foreign Affairs*.

Our unusually long article still contained only a third of the length and perhaps half the substance of our original manuscript. Under this constraint, which we remedy in the forthcoming book version, some important matters (such as the nuclear arms race) were simply excised from the article and others compressed to mere remnants—among them our treatment of intention. As our draft noted, "Making bombs requires both capability and intention, but these feed on each other. Intention seeks capability to fulfill it, while capability lowers the threshold—in time, money, and political initiative—for developing a matching intention. . . ." Hence our reference to "the latent proliferators who sidle up to the nuclear threshold by degrees, and those easily tempted"—the main concern in most modern writings on proliferation.

While there are well-known disincentives to making bombs, Dr. deLeon's argument from precedent is fallacious because:

—History does not determine the future: recent *n*th-country concerns (Pakistan, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina) involve precisely those countries thought to be pursuing bombs via nuclear power.
—Examples of peaceful use do not make warlike use elsewhere less likely.
—Presently peaceful intentions in no way reduce military utility or constrain future intentions—the point of our Japanese example.
—Nuclear power has already provided (as Fred Iklé remarked) "the essential expeditor, and in many cases the necessary cover," for diffusion of bomb capabilities to and beyond India.
—Separation of plutonium preceded and facilitated the British, French and Indian decisions to build bombs.
—At least in Britain and France—perhaps the two countries with the greatest experience of exercising political control—those decisions were made after the bomb programs were nearly finished, because political control did not work: apparently only in Sweden has the momentum of a bomb program proven reversible.

Dr. deLeon's second complaint is that we cite papers we find persuasive rather than those he finds persuasive. Of course there are many reports which project U.S. energy demands higher, and a few lower, than the one we

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mention. We have elsewhere compared many such forecasts (e.g., Eliot Marshall, "Energy Forecasts: Sinking to New Lows," *Science*, June 20, 1980, p. 1353), partly as an antidote to Dr. deLeon's curious implication that, given a range of estimates, the truth probably lies somewhere near the middle—as if analyses were random variables. But how is it "extreme" to cite a "lowest" estimate, clearly implying that the rest are higher? The SERI report, which we mentioned in carefully guarded terms befitting a draft National Laboratory study commissioned by a Deputy Secretary, is the first authoritative attempt by our government to calculate an economically efficient level of future U.S. energy demand by explicit and detailed engineering analysis. The many higher projections more congenial to Dr. deLeon do not do this and are therefore irrelevant to our thesis that economically efficient energy use would wring several times as much work as now from each unit of energy.

Likewise, our empirically based analysis of soft technologies explicitly assumes "the best . . . in or entering commercial service," "carefully selected and efficiently used." We make no apologies for promoting prudent investment and good engineering. It is of course possible to misdesign solar technologies of any kind to be arbitrarily *un*economic, but that is not our purpose. One can probably find among SERI's myriad reports support for almost any economic proposition, including both those which Dr. deLeon mentions—which we cannot verify without citations—and their opposites. (For example, his solar process heat cost is 30 times that recently estimated for a new SERI design approach, and at least ten times that obtainable from good commercial equipment today.) But we do not regard this natural diversity as a "discrepancy." Rather, differences between competent analyses can generally be traced to different methodologies or assumptions. We have made ours explicit in the article and its citations, and assert, until shown otherwise, that they support our conclusions.

Dr. deLeon is evidently unaware that we have often called for complete desubsidization of the energy sector, *including* conservation and soft technologies. The only justification (except for the external benefits which we ignore) for subsidizing these would be to try to match the far larger tax and price subsidies to hard technologies—currently over $100 billion per year in the United States. (As Duane Chapman of Cornell has shown, even the 55 percent California solar tax credit is smaller than federal subsidies offered to nuclear power and Alaskan gas.) We prefer to eliminate all the subsidies and pay true incremental costs. Unfortunately, many nominal advocates of market competition, when asked to put their shareholders' money where their mouths are, perceive that the Invisible Fist would then crush their favorite technologies, and therefore call for more corporate socialism and higher subsidies to protect them. For example, in round numbers (1977 dollars), a kilowatt-hour from a recently ordered U.S. reactor will cost about 4 cents to generate or about 6½ cents to deliver. But on recent form, it will enjoy subsidies of about 1.6 cents from historic federal budget line-item expenditures (Battelle Northwest), and about 1.8 cents from current-account federal tax breaks and 1.5 cents from rolled-in pricing (Chapman). *Each* of these three terms exceeds the price of an equivalent amount of energy contained in U.S. oil. Together they more than halve the apparent price of delivered nuclear electricity—without counting nearly 20 other categories of unquantifiable federal subsidies. Thus, if we seem to be pummelling a dead horse, it is because a dead horse propped up by

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scaffolding and powered by springs can still kick. As we argue, deactivating and burying the horse now, as part of a synergistic program, offers a unique opportunity to start unwinding proliferation.

Finally, our article does not repeat the 1976 thesis that of the hard and soft energy paths, each encourages perceptions, accretes institutional barriers, and consumes resources in a way that inhibits the other. It is true that most subsequent studies reaffirmed that hard and soft technologies are technically compatible—a platitude we have never denied. But it is also striking, we think, how abundantly events since 1976 have supported our warnings that the decentralized market choices needed for a soft path are incompatible with the Energy Security Corporation/Energy Mobilization Board approach needed for a hard path; that our country cannot afford to pursue every option; and that transitional fuel invested in reactors and synfuel plants, in "an artificial market subsidized and guaranteed by government support," is a step away from energy sustainability and economic rationality. To the unspecified extent that Dr. deLeon thinks nuclear investments are still warranted, he must come to grips with our questions of priorities and of options foregone and foreclosed.

Turning to Dr. Wolfe, it must be said first of all that he directs his criticism at a travesty of our position. We argued not merely that "there is no proliferation-proof nuclear fuel cycle," but that all of them are so strongly proliferative in so many technical and institutional ways (none of which Dr. Wolfe acknowledges) that phasing out nuclear power is a necessary and largely sufficient condition for nonproliferation. We did not assert that nuclear power "is already being phased out" except at the margin. And we were certainly not so foolish as to claim that a soft energy path would solve all social problems, though we have stated elsewhere that it would not make them worse and might indirectly facilitate their solution by separate efforts well beyond our terms of reference.

The first of these distortions leads Dr. Wolfe to represent as "concurrence" with INFCE what was in fact a severe and reasoned criticism of its assumptions and of most of its findings. Though he asserts that we ask for uranium mining and use to be "outlawed" by a rigid international "ban" or "treaty," we actually sought a comprehensive nuclear policy based on economic rationality. This would isolate non-economic motives and make proliferation very difficult, though not impossible, by denying both bomb ingredients and their civilian "cover." In a world where "outlawing" and policing cannot work (as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and we argued at length), our emphasis on unambiguous detection of bomb programs did not ignore but rather was founded upon the presumption of temptation and frailty. Thus we sought ways to increase the perceived costs and reduce the perceived benefits of bombs, rather than the reverse, as Dr. Wolfe unwittingly proposes in urging worldwide propagation of all bomb ingredients in benign guise. An important element of our prescription, which he ignores, was the mutual reduction, aiming at elimination, of existing nuclear arsenals—a key subject given fuller scope in our draft and in the book version.

We did not say nuclear power has been "the cause" of proliferation, but, rather, its main driving force today. To consider it "largely irrelevant" is like saying that whether there are gun shops or ammunition is largely irrelevant to whether people shoot each other. Dr. Wolfe's revisionist history suggests

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that Atoms for Peace was primarily a nonproliferation measure. President Eisenhower's rhetoric did make what Robert Oppenheimer rightly called an "allusive and sentimental" rather than a "substantive and functional" link with nuclear disarmament. But in fact, the proliferative effect was all too substantive, as Dr. Wolfe acknowledges when he says that the United States had earlier sought to maintain its monopoly through "lack of commercialization of nuclear power." U.S. secrecy, reinforced by the McMahon Act, had also gravely inhibited the nuclear programs even of such leaders as Britain, and virtually stifled nuclear development in many other states unable to mount their own Manhattan Projects. America's vast post-1953 programs of training, declassification, subsidy, gift and promotion by word and deed changed all that, and led in the 1960s to just the opposite of the effect Dr. Wolfe claims.

As NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky said of Atoms for Peace, at first:

> . . . Our own bilateral arrangements . . . strictly controlled access to [bomb materials . . . and] our monopoly position provided considerable assurance that our agreements would be kept. Over the years, however, as our bilateral research and assistance programs fueled mushrooming growth of the commercial nuclear power abroad, we paid more attention to the promotional function . . . than . . . to their control provisions.

As for the NPT, the original draft agreed by the United States and U.S.S.R. was essentially limited to controlling bombs. "Peaceful" nuclear explosives and access to nuclear technology were added only as minimal "sweeteners" to make the draft saleable to certain other states.

Dr. Wolfe's second distortion shifts our nuclear economics arguments to a mere claim of uncompetitiveness with coal-fired stations. As we showed, this comparison is irrelevant because *all* kinds of new power stations are grossly uneconomic. To use nuclear fuel (about $6-16/bbl) requires a reactor whose capital charges alone exceed $50/bbl. The price of electricity delivered from a newly ordered reactor (about 8 cents/kw-h in 1980 dollars) is equivalent to the price of the energy content of oil costing over $130/bbl, four times Dr. Wolfe's imported oil price. Compared with overpriced utility-financed weatherization today, his reactor would not save $1 billion but rather *lose* $1.4 billion in four years—and $2 billion would be tied up in plant investment rather than being successively reinvested in about ten different energy-saving projects, heat-yielding about ten times as much energy per dollar. Further, Dr. Wolfe wrongly imputes ambiguity or bias or both to Komanoff's multiple regression on all the historic U.S. nuclear- and coal-plant cost data. Komanoff's study objectively identifies all statistically significant sources of variation and obtains by far the best statistical explanation for observed trends. Though a best fit to the data can never *prove* that an explanation is right, it does place a heavy burden on critics to suggest a better one. Nobody has done so.

We did not (as Komanoff did) cite the nuclear suppliers' cost studies because they ignore the detailed historical trends in favor of unsupported guesses that future nuclear economics will improve. That disreputable game of "mutual intoxication" with optimistic estimates (as Bupp and Derian called it in their *Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved*) has been going on since the first days of "commercial" nuclear power. It is long past time to substitute rigorous analysis of real data. Dr. Wolfe should know: as costs persistently outpaced predictions, his company lost an estimated half-billion dollars on reactor loss-leaders not recouped by later profits.

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Dr. Wolfe tries to blame the collapse of the U. S. nuclear market on "regulatory impediments which anti-nuclear organizations have fostered"—ignoring the parallel collapse in countries (such as Canada) which have no significant impediments.

Dr. Wolfe does not say whether he thinks nuclear power has real safety problems warranting strict, let alone stricter, regulations—the clear message of the Kemeny Report. If he thinks it does not, we wonder what alternative regulatory mechanism or what political process establishing it he would prefer—and why real nuclear costs have risen unrelentingly even in the U.S.S.R.

A survey published in 1978 by the pro-nuclear International Consultative Group on Nuclear Power found that nuclear plant construction times were lengthening in essentially all countries regardless of the political system (though differences in licensing requirements and scheduling make it hard to compare times between countries). We think lengthening lead times reveal an immature technology: just what AEC Chairman Schlesinger implied when he found that only one or two percent of nuclear delay was attributable to procedural interventions, and the rest to late component delivery, low site labor productivity, installation and management errors, and the like. Further, William Mooz of RAND found in a detailed 1978 statistical study for the Department of Energy that there is no statistically significant correlation between licensing delays and U.S. nuclear plant costs—a reasonable finding, since little capital is sunk until construction permits have been obtained.

Our article offered quantitative arguments that, notwithstanding official dogmas, nuclear power cannot provide timely and significant substitution for oil and is the slowest and costliest known substitute for oil. Dr. Wolfe's response is merely to reassert the dogmas, not to argue the merits. Paraphrasing our statement that there is probably a de facto moratorium on reactor ordering in Japan today to read "nuclear power is dead in Japan," he cites new official pronouncements as evidence that the Japanese government has on the contrary overcome the formidable obstacles to siting and financing of new reactors. In fact it has not done so, as we confirmed in discussions there this spring. Of course, most major countries' energy plans still "propose a continued commitment" to many new reactors, and Dr. Wolfe seeks thereby to put a cheerful complexion on the actual collapse of prospects which we described, but our contention was that those reactors should not, and generally could not and would not, be built—for fundamental reasons which Dr. Wolfe does not controvert. In Britain, for example, the Prime Minister has a strong rhetorical commitment to nuclear expansion. But there is no approved reactor design to build, no legitimate procedure for licensing it, no acceptable place to site it, no money to build it with, no organized industry to build it, and no market for its electricity (only a prospect of further demand shrinkage as overcapacity soars over 50 percent and prices become the highest in Europe).

Dr. Wolfe's lament at the decline in U.S. energy growth since 1973 implies that energy use is an end in itself, not a means. He insinuates, but does not argue—because he cannot—that more efficient energy use has *caused* inflation, bureaucratization, unemployment, and reduced labor productivity. (The last two are hard to reconcile even with each other.) Further, we would like Dr. Wolfe to be free to use energy wastefully and to pay the full social cost of doing so; we merely do not want to subsidize his waste. That some govern-

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ments, in pursuing our goals, have adopted policy instruments which we criticize is not an argument against either our ends or our means—least of all when buttressed by the absurd invention that electricity tariffs more closely aligned to true incremental costs "exact onerous financial penalties" beyond these costs or will "imply forced night-time living" for anyone.

It is not only unfair but imprudent for Dr. Wolfe to equate soft technologies with wood stoves: U.S. nuclear power today delivers about half as much energy as U.S. firewood, and is unlikely to exceed it in this century. Of course neither Dr. Wolfe nor we will defend turkeys: we are no happier with the White House solar system than he is with the Morris reprocessing plant. We think we have far more examples of competent, cost-effective design in our technologies than he does in his. If he will consult solar experts, including those responsible for the installation of over 50,000 (mainly successful) active solar systems in his home state in the past few years, he will find that *Consumer Reports* is hardly the last word.

Dr. Wolfe claims, finally, that the long-term potential of the soft path is "yet to be demonstrated." If by "demonstrated" he means "realized in practice," this is true of *any* energy future. If he means "shown plausible by practical existence proofs," the potential, we submit, is already far better "demonstrated" for the diverse components of the soft path than for nuclear power. And although Dr. Wolfe persists in claiming the soft path is built around an ideological or theological rejection of taboo technologies (his), its avowed criterion for choice is simply lowest market cost.

In a detailed, federally sponsored analysis to be published in 1981, we will show that the cheapest route to a resilient energy system is to combine high efficiency with diverse, relatively dispersed, renewable sources that are richly interconnected, yet able to stand alone at need. In contrast, the most brittle, vulnerable energy system we can conceive of is precisely that which Dr. Wolfe advocates. It relies largely on all-purpose use of electricity (which cannot readily be stored in bulk) supplied from rather few, large, precise machines rotating in exact synchrony, strung together by an easily severed network of aerial arteries, subject to catastrophic failure by accident or malice, and each a fat military target containing radioactivity equivalent to the fallout from thousands of Hiroshima bombs.

Dr. Wolfe's concluding paragraph, calling the soft path risky and uncertain, seems to us an apt description of his own policies. But the choice is neither for him nor for us to make. It is a choice for the people of the world; and perhaps unlike Dr. Wolfe, we have considerable faith in the ability of informed people of all backgrounds and persuasions to choose wisely. The world is already, we think, well along in choosing to reject Dr. Wolfe's option in favor of ours. What is not yet clear is whether that choice will be seized as a unique opportunity—perhaps the last—to start unraveling proliferation and the nuclear arms race.

CLASS AND CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR

To the Editor:

The article "Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador" by William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins in your Summer 1980 issue is an important contribution to understanding the turmoil in El Salvador. Although

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I agree with much of what the authors have written, I would point out that there are several factual errors. The authors state, without any supportive evidence, that "El Salvador is burdened with the most rigid class structure and worst income inequality in all of Latin America." There is no evidence which could be used to support the view that El Salvador's class structure is the most rigid in *all* of Latin America. There is some reason to believe that the class structures of at least several other countries are more rigid; for example, Guatemala, Ecuador, Honduras and Haiti. In fact I don't know how this determination could be made, and I doubt if the authors do either.

With respect to income inequality, there is statistical evidence that El Salvador's income distribution is less unequal than in most Latin countries. Hollis Chenery *et al.*, in *Redistribution With Growth*, (published for the World Bank), present income distribution data for 66 countries. According to this source, the richest 20 percent of households in El Salvador received 52.4 percent of total income in 1969. Of the 15 Latin countries for which data are included, only three had a lower percentage of income received by the richest 20 percent; Argentina (47.4 percent), Uruguay (48.0 percent), and Puerto Rico (50.6 percent). Some countries generally considered much more progressive than El Salvador had much higher inequality, including Mexico, Costa Rica and Venezuela. The data used in this publication were all based on estimates made between 1969 and 1971. It should also be noted that the same publication includes data which show that from 1961 to 1969, the annual rate of growth of income of the highest 20 percent in El Salvador was 4.1 percent, while the middle 40 percent increased at 10.5 percent, and the poorest 40 percent at 5.3 percent. In short, the rapid economic growth of this period was accompanied by reduced inequality. In addition, the authors' claim that "a few thousand people . . . received 50 percent of the national income" cannot be true if the income distribution data are only fairly accurate.

The authors' account of political events is excellent but not without some flaws. One important omission in their analysis of the present junta is the fact that Jose Napoleon Duarte, the Christian Democrats' best-known figure, is now a member of the junta. The authors correctly emphasize the importance of the resignation from the junta of Hector Dada, also a prominent Christian Democrat. But Duarte is even better known and his addition to the junta is an important development which should have been discussed, particularly since he replaced Dada.

More important, there is almost no recognition of the difference between the junta's repression of political activists and its attempts to cope with terrorism by the extreme Left. I realize that most of the deaths which have occurred this year have been the work of right-wing extremists and the government security forces. Nevertheless, left-wing terrorism has been a serious threat for almost a decade, and it continues to be. If I interpret the authors' views correctly, the opening up of the political system to the Left would include all of the Left. It is difficult to believe that the junta could risk this, and that the U.S. government could support a move to include ultra-leftists committed to violent revolution.

JOSEPH P. MOONEY
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The authors reply:

We stand by our claim that El Salvador has the most rigid class structure in Latin America. Not only has it been one of the most stratified but, more to the point, it has also been utterly impervious to change. Despite the strong pressures for reform from both civilian political movements and progressive sectors of the armed forces, the oligarchy has maintained its economic dominance. This intransigence lies at the heart of El Salvador's political history and at the core of the current government's dilemma.

Whether El Salvador also has the worst income inequality in Latin America, or merely one of the worst, depends upon which of several existing data sets you choose to accept. We readily concede that the data's reliability is so poor that cross-national comparisons are inevitably uncertain. But we do not believe that this uncertainty affects the logic of our argument. Whatever the relative value of El Salvador's Gini Index, it is still a society plagued with gross disparities between rich and poor, disparities which have contributed directly to the current political turmoil.

Professor Mooney points out, as did we, that the political violence in El Salvador includes terrorism by the Left. But the overwhelming weight of violence comes from the ultra-Right and the security forces. The Right has been less scrupulous in distinguishing between activists and terrorists than Professor Mooney suggests. Since our article appeared, the repression has escalated once again and the *non-combatant* death toll for 1980 is now in the thousands.

Professor Mooney implies that the replacement of Hector Dada by Napoleon Duarte strengthened the junta because Duarte is better known. We emphatically disagree. Dada's resignation was important because it revealed the split within the Christian Democrats over whether to support the junta's strategy of reform with repression. That split has now been formalized by the creation of the Social Christian Movement and its affiliation with the Revolutionary Democratic Front. Duarte's Christian Democrats are only a rump of the former party.

Finally, Professor Mooney suggests that the Left in El Salvador is so fanatical that any attempt to incorporate it into the government is doomed to failure. Past experience does not justify such pessimism. During the short-lived October junta, every *major* group on the Left showed a willingness to cease armed actions and cooperate with the government. The failure of this opening was due to the impotence of the government, not the intransigence of the Left. The creation of the Revolutionary Democratic Front, which includes both the Left and central-Left in one grand coalition, enhances the opposition's receptivity to a political solution short of civil war. The principal obstacle to such a solution is still the government and its security forces.

U.S. POLICY IN THE SAHARA

To the Editor:

Stephen Solarz' article "Arms for Morocco?", in your Winter 1979–80 issue, shows a good understanding of many aspects of the problem but it gets lost on the way to some of its conclusions. Like Congressman Solarz, I have just returned from a trip through North Africa speaking to the parties in the Saharan conflict. Since his article, the American government has granted

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arms aid to Morocco, but the conflict continues and so the debate remains important.

The main point is that negotiations proceed from equality, not from abasement, if the interests of the parties are to be reconciled and lasting agreement achieved. The American arms will not make the crucial difference on the ground—and the Moroccans know that, despite impressions that Mr. Solarz may have gotten—but the American decision to provide arms has given Morocco the needed confidence to press a successful offensive this spring in the Ouarqziz region of its own (pre-1975) territory and redressed the balance in the area. Thus, the arms, which have not even arrived yet in Morocco, are important politically rather than militarily. To be sure, the same effect could have been produced more economically by an American statement showing greater understanding of the Moroccan position, but Mr. Solarz does not seem to want that either, rendering his reasoning contradictory or his position suspect.

As it is, because of the improved Moroccan military position and the plebiscite by the Saharan territories as well as the rest of the country on the recent constitutional amendments concerning royal succession, Morocco is now in a better position to be able to negotiate, and the United States should now press it more strongly to talk. At the same time, the June extraordinary party congress in Algeria has consolidated the position of President Chadli Benjedid, leaving him less vulnerable and more able to enter into discussions than ever before. Thus, the time is riper for talks than it has been for a while, and the arms decision helped make it so, not the reverse. The United States now has a role in urging the parties to seize the moment.

Congress is supposed to be concerned about American interests, not automatically to equate that interest with the contemporary romance of a national liberation movement. There is no telling the likely outcome of the negotiations, but it is evident that an independent Saharan state is not in the American interest, nor even in the interest of Algeria, let alone Morocco. What the world needs least these days is another poor unstable ministate in Africa that will be a continual source of conflict and instability among its neighbors. A new small case of sovereign underdevelopment—another Chad!—will be a power vacuum and target for meddlers for years to come. The Polisario has indeed created a nation, for the moment, but it has done so by disciplining a captive audience in refugee camps that it helped create (as House Subcommittee testimony has brought out) and by mobilizing them for the excitement of desert forays. That is a far cry from holding together a nation in peacetime.

In his congressional reprint of the *Foreign Affairs* article, Mr. Solarz appends a list of small states, presumably to show that they exist. But it is a sorry piece of evidence. For 12 out of the 19 states under 230,000 population (Spanish Sahara has about 75,000) are islands, and all but one of the remaining six are city-states that are historic anomalies. Does one justify present errors by past accidents and aberrations? Can one really claim it to be in anyone's interest to perpetuate the colonial balkanization of Africa carried to the extreme?

Finally, a nagging bias in the article raises additional doubts about the reasoning. We are told that Morocco indeed has been helpful to the United States, but "occasionally it has acted in ways that are not compatible with our regional concerns." Then we are told that Algeria has expressed very different policies, but "privately" and "recently." From there on, the argument

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raises the hurdle of acceptable conduct high for Morocco and low for Algeria. The United States has good reason to keep good relations with both countries. The fact is that Algeria has no reason to show any understanding of American concerns, and Morocco has no reason to continue to be helpful to our policies, if we are not responsive to those who are responsive to us. Thus the United States has a particular obligation to show an understanding of Morocco's position and our best interests lie in preserving the balance between the parties.

I. William Zartman
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Congressman Solarz replies:

While I disagree with some aspects of Professor Zartman's analysis, I am pleased that we seem to have arrived at the same basic recommendation for U.S. policy toward the conflict in the Western Sahara: actively encouraging Morocco to negotiate with its adversaries as part of a broad American initiative in the region. In this connection, I hope that the Administration will consider suggestions by the House Foreign Affairs Committee to link forthcoming deliveries of U.S. counterinsurgency equipment to Morocco to Morocco's demonstrated willingness to negotiate a compromise political solution in the Sahara, provided that the other parties in the conflict are also willing to negotiate.

If the United States does pursue a negotiated settlement, it will, I believe, require a more solidly based analysis of past policies and a broader conception of our national interests than those propounded by Professor Zartman in his letter. There is no evidence, for example, that the American decision to provide arms suitable for use in the Western Sahara gave Morocco "the new confidence to press a successful offensive" in the Ouarqziz region last May. According to military analysts, Morocco's modest success stemmed from changes in military command-and-control structures after the disastrous Moroccan defeat in the Ouarqziz two months earlier, not from any psychological boost provided by U.S. weapons that had been promised but not yet delivered.

Professor Zartman asserts that one possible outcome of a negotiated political settlement—an independent state in the Western Sahara—is antithetical to U.S. interests because it would produce a small underdeveloped country that would inevitably fall prey to its neighbor's ambitions, spawning larger regional conflicts. However, one could just as well argue that the failure to achieve independence within the established Spanish colonial borders has generated the current conflict. Furthermore, it would presumably be the function of any overall political settlement in the region to at least reduce the potential for such conflicts. It appears that Professor Zartman is also opposed to alternative means of assuring the Polisario some role in the region, such as the confederation of the Saharan entity with Mauritania or other states. My own feeling is that, while we may not have an interest in the establishment of an independent Saharan state, neither do we have any real interest in preventing the emergence of such a state if its creation is the basis for negotiated agreement among the various parties to the conflict. Indeed we have a far

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greater interest in facilitating a mutually acceptable accord than in advancing or opposing any particular solution to the problem.

Professor Zartman urges Congress to concern itself with "American interests" rather than equating them with "the contemporary romance of a national liberation movement." I don't know whether he was able to visit the Polisario base and refugee camp at Tindouf as I did last August, but whatever else this Brooklyn boy found—a desolate landscape, 130 degree temperatures, sandstorms, an endless tent city of refugees—it was certainly not romance.

Professor Zartman detects in my article a "nagging bias" toward Algeria at the expense of Morocco. Readers can judge for themselves, but I would like to call special attention to the discussion regarding U.S. interest in "a close and constructive relationship with Morocco" and my support for defensive military sales and increased economic and humanitarian assistance to Morocco.

Finally, what I missed most in Professor Zartman's analysis is a conception of U.S. national interest in the Western Saharan conflict that goes beyond our specific stakes in Algeria and Morocco. In the formulation of policy on this issue, the United States should also take into account the views of key African and Third World countries and of interested European allies such as Spain and France (neither of which has recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara) and assess the implications of limited U.S. military engagement for our overall strategic credibility, our interest in preventing further internationalization of the conflict, and our efforts to maintain restrictions on the utilization of U.S. arms exports. It was these broader considerations of national interest as well as our specific interest in North African relations and human rights developments which led me to the conclusions presented in my article.

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MR. SOLZHENITSYN AND HIS CRITICS

To the Editor:

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's article, "Misconceptions about Russia Are a Threat to America," in your Spring 1980 issue contains a number of factual errors which, coupled with the author's intense biases, deny any validity to his argument. Part of what he has to say is important, for instance, on the necessity to distinguish between the U.S.S.R. and Russia. However, if Mr. Solzhenitsyn's advice were followed in the United States, it would preclude a coherent policy toward the Soviet Union.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn makes errors about virtually every aspect of Imperial Russian history he mentions. He writes that "all criminal investigations were conducted in strict compliance with established law, all trials were open and defendants were legally represented." Hardly: instead, the "Extraordinary Measures" of 1881 gave provincial governors and other local officials power to hold closed trials or transfer cases to military courts whenever this was necessary "to protect public order and calm." The vagueness is typical of tsarist law, which was justly famous for its arbitrariness as well. Particularly after the 1905 Revolution, thousands of peasants and workers were tried by military court martial and condemned to death. As for criminal investigations, they were often bypassed in favor of quick administrative action, especially in political cases. By 1912 only five million Russians did *not* live under one of the Extraordinary Measures; they were the real constitution of the country, as Richard Pipes has pointed out.

"The intelligentsia was not restricted in its activity." In fact, the organizations of the intelligentsia, for example doctors' and teachers' groups, were under constant surveillance by tsarist police, public lectures were often banned because of political content, journals were shut down, and all levels of education were carefully monitored and regulated by the state. By 1914 there were many, many signs of severe discontent with tsarism among the Russian intelligentsia.

"Institutions of higher education enjoyed inviolable autonomy." On the contrary, it was only because the regime was forced to the wall by the events of 1905 that it granted (more precisely, regranted) autonomy to the universities; yet within a few years tsarist ministers of education had once again begun to interfere deeply in university affairs. The most notorious case involved Moscow University in 1911, when the current minister sent police onto the campus and fired the rector. The result was that more than 100 faculty members resigned in protest. In other higher educational institutions, for example Moscow's municipal university, state interference was less spectacular but nonetheless regular and effective.

"Religious and philosophical views of every shade were tolerated." The case of the Jews alone refutes this point, though other examples could be offered: perhaps their religious views were "tolerated," but the Jewish people were largely restricted to a certain geographical area, were subject to narrow quotas in admission to the universities, and were sometimes the victims of officially condoned or sponsored pogroms. This is hardly a progressive religious policy.

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When he turns to the Soviet Union, Mr. Solzhenitsyn's accuracy does not improve. He states that "Soviet conquerors never withdraw from any lands on which they have once set foot." On the contrary, there are at least four examples of Soviet withdrawal: after World War II from part of Finland, northern Iran and Manchuria; in 1956 from the U.S.S.R.'s sector of Austria.

The point of this recital of his errors is not to show that tsarist Russia was "bad" and the Soviet Union is "good," for that would be a tragic perversion of history. In many ways, of course, Mr. Solzhenitsyn's belief that the old regime was better than the Bolshevik state is justified. The communist government has allowed far less freedom of expression and religion, used far more coercion and slaughtered people on a scale far greater than the tsars ever dreamed of. But these judgments are of virtually no help in understanding the Russian empire and its fate or in fathoming the Soviet Union today.

American scholars have long conducted a lively debate over the question of "whither Russia": on the eve of the First World War, they asked whether democratic evolution or revolution lay ahead. Was it largely the devastating effects of the war which led to tsardom's collapse or was it more the result of long-standing, deeply rooted forces?

For Mr. Solzhenitsyn, there is no debate, no doubt about the reasons for Russia's downfall. "She collapsed out of loyalty to her Western allies, when Nicholas II prolonged the senseless war with Wilhelm instead of saving his country." But one must ask how could two-and-a-half years of combat destroy loyalties so quickly that in February 1917, during riots in the capital, all of the front-line army commanders refused to support the Emperor? Not even the conservative politicians rallied to help Nicholas. The country's disaffection included the *institutions* of tsarism: there was almost no positive response to Nicholas' proposals that his son, and later his brother, take the throne. Russians wanted an end to the system they had lived under for centuries.

In *From Under the Rubble*, Mr. Solzhenitsyn recognizes that the eight months of 1917 from the fall of the monarchy to the Bolshevik takeover constitute the only period of democracy Russia has known. He does not go on to say that the trend away from tsarism was so strong that by the end of that time the question which dominated politics, which occupied the thoughts of the vast majority of Russians, was what form of socialism the country should adopt. In elections held in the fall of 1917 to choose delegates for the Constituent Assembly, socialists of various parties won over 87 percent of the vote. Thus the Russians, at their freest according to Mr. Solzhenitsyn, moved in a direction which is anathema to him.

It seems to me that Mr. Solzhenitsyn is no better in touch with the Soviet present than he is with the Russian past. I recently spent ten months doing research in the U.S.S.R., where I had many opportunities to speak with people at various levels of society. As part of an exchange group, I was not subject to many of the constraints Mr. Solzhenitsyn aptly describes as hampering the ability of most Westerners to know the country in any depth. I found loyal and disloyal citizens, yet I had a strong general impression of both Russian and Soviet patriotism. The other participants in the program, whose political views spanned a wide range, largely agreed. Among the reasons for this patriotism are the government-sponsored but genuinely popular cult of the Second World War, official and popular fear of the United States, a much greater fear of China, and awareness of the many past invasions of the country.

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I also noted a widespread pride in the material progress the Soviet Union has made; the people's basis of comparison for this feeling is, of course, tsarist Russia. I believe that for many Soviets these factors balance to a fair degree the many negative aspects of their lives.

From my experience in the U.S.S.R. and my study of Russian and Soviet history, I must conclude that an appeal by the United States to Russian national sentiment within the Soviet Union might meet with some covert sympathy but would be angrily resented by most citizens, Russians and non-Russians alike, as crude interference in their affairs. The need for a strong country, perceived by many Soviet people, means sticking together.

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To the Editor:

I am afraid that the real misconception about Russia, which I believe is a threat to America, lies with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. If we would accept his conception about Russia and try to derive an adequate foreign policy from it, we would do the greatest service to the Soviet Union and the greatest disservice to the United States.

For this particular danger, that is, Russian imperialism, it is not at all politically relevant how anyone perceives Russia or the history of Russia and the discussion could be left to historians.

No doubt anyone should feel respect and admiration for the "spiritual life of the Russian people and its view of the world—Christianity." However, these and similar features of the Russian people are not proof that there does not exist a real Russian imperialism, which today is the great danger to our civilization. As a matter of fact this Russian imperialism entered the scene of world politics after the Second World War to replace the German Nazi imperalism.

We are entitled to speak of German Nazism and imperialism though we have no right to disregard the "spiritual life" of the German people and "its view of the world—Christianity." For many years the German nation was regarded as the nation of poets and thinkers and gave the world even more and greater thinkers, scientists, poets and musicians than Russia. Nevertheless Nazism was German and very specifically German. Fortunately after the defeat of Hitler in Germany, many German thinkers, politicians, writers, poets, etc., did recognize the German role in Nazism and tried together with ordinary people and particularly with the young generations of Germany to create a new Germany. While condemning not only Nazism but also its historical roots in the German nation, we should not accept the concept of collective guilt, just as we should give full support and credibility for all anti-Nazi and humanistic efforts that appeal to the better traditions of Germany, while the Hitlerites appealed to its worst traditions. However, these worst traditions did exist and were German.

The same applies to Russia. There is no doubt that there existed a Russian imperialism and Russia was regarded and called the "gendarme of Europe,"

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being the most reactionary government at the turn of the century and the ally of all oppressive governments. Russian imperialism had its specific features as it emerged from an Asiatic feudalism typical of tsarist Russia. The tsarist dream of world domination caught the soul of the Russian nation and, unfortunately, survived to become even more pronounced under the rule of Russian communism, which also has its typical Russian features, just as the Chinese version of communism has its Chinese features and the Yugoslav communism its Yugoslav features.

Strangely, Mr. Solzhenitsyn himself shows that Russia is to blame for what the Soviet Union stands for when he speaks about the historically proven fact that the Ukrainians, and for that matter the Baltic nations, welcomed the Nazi invaders, and the Ukrainians were particularly willing to join the German Nazis in their fight against the Soviets. Thanks to the Nazis' arrogance and their belief that they were a superior nation, however, Hitler did not accept the Ukrainians as allies and treated them as subhumans. For this blunder Hitler most probably lost the war against the Soviet Union; many military experts agree that he might have been able to enter Moscow and subdue the Soviets.

On the other hand, when German armies entered Russia proper, the Russian people did not act like the Ukrainians. In 1946 Stalin was perfectly right when he evaluated the situation and declared that no other nation but the Russian nation was willing to make such fantastic sacrifices and had the will to fight and defeat the German invader. He thus admitted that only the Russian nation identified its national interest with the Soviet Union. This manifestation of Russian nationalism was a component of the old Russian imperialist tradition.

If we want to fight Soviet imperialism, we must be aware that the majority of the states in the Soviet Union are oppressed nations, more than simply oppressed individuals. They exist as discriminated nations: the economy is run from Moscow according to interests that are first of all Russian interests. Russian culture and language is the preferred one all over the Soviet Union. Between these nations and the Russians exists an explosive tension.

As we know, the problem of suppressed or discriminated nations is an explosive political force even in democratic countries. We see this problem in Canada, Britain, Spain, etc., and it exists naturally in the Soviet Union. It is therefore necessary to fight the Soviet Union by emphasizing the issue of self-determination of nations, to find ways and means to support the most human and humane desire of self-determination in order to weaken the Soviet hinterland, and make the Kremlin aware of an active opposition even if it does not take dramatic forms. Any increase in the resistance of the oppressed nations will weaken the military potential of the Soviets and be a contribution to peace.

I fully agree with Mr. Solzhenitsyn that the policy of détente may turn out to be the great catastrophe for the United States, and that communism, or more specifically any regime based on the Marxist philosophy, inevitably leads to a dehumanized world. The oppressed nations within the Soviet empire are potential allies of the West and particularly of the United States, and it is essential for the peace and survival of our civilization that the United States and the West should not support the oppressors in the Kremlin and its agents in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union committed itself in the Atlantic

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Charter, the United Nations Charter, and at Helsinki to the right of self-determination of nations. The centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy should be the self-determination of nations.

EUGEN LOEBL
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Loebl was formerly the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of Czechoslovakia.

To the Editor:

In the Summer 1980 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, you printed two responses to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Spring issue essay: one by Professor Robert C. Tucker of Princeton and another by Mr. Silvio J. Treves of New York City. The responses were both so energetically hostile as to send me back to Mr. Solzhenitsyn's article, which I read carefully a second time. I think I now understand Mr. Solzhenitsyn's recurrent use of the term "astonishment" when he relates his perceptions of the West. There's no better word for it: after rereading Mr. Solzhenitsyn's article, I was astonished by the responses of Professor Tucker and of Mr. Treves.

Neither response reflects a careful reading of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's article. Professor Tucker decries in Mr. Solzhenitsyn "the acrimonious and disdainful tone of a person who desires to discredit those who think differently"—yet Professor Tucker devotes six full pages, in small type, to a rambling rebuttal aimed at less than two full pages of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's 37-page article. Professor Tucker scores a few interesting debater's points, but in one glaring and lengthy portion of his rebuttal he does so against a straw man. Professor Tucker quotes Mr. Solzhenitsyn's remark that in tsarist Russia "camps there were none" and then lectures Mr. Solzhenitsyn on the fact "that governmental use of forced labor existed in tsarist Russia"—a point which Mr. Solzhenitsyn clearly concedes on the same page of his article, when, after "camps there were none," he refers to "nonpolitical prisoners at forced labor in those days."

Nowhere in his response, for example, does Professor Tucker confront the central question raised by Mr. Solzhenitsyn's article: whether the West has indeed, particularly over the past 35 years, drifted into a pattern of inadvertent complicity with communist tyranny. Professor Tucker replies as if he himself and his scholarship were the sole topics of the article.

Mr. Treves, for his part, calls Mr. Solzhenitsyn "so arrogantly biased that he absolves nineteenth-century Russia of any crime of violence, repression or persecution." But Mr. Solzhenitsyn does nothing of the kind; he simply points out, correctly if bitterly, that tsarist repression was not remotely so pervasive, unrelenting, indiscriminate, or ferocious as twentieth-century Soviet brutality has been and continues to be. In fact, Mr. Treves' tirade against Mr. Solzhenitsyn's latest broadside strikes me as disingenuous. I wonder whether Mr. Treves read the article at all.

Come to think of it, how many people in the West have read Mr. Solzhenitsyn at all? I have had students in my college English classes, students with majors in history and political science, who have never heard of the Soviet Gulag. I have talked with educated people who allow that they don't read Mr. Solzhenitsyn "on principle"—by which I gather they mean on the strength of their preferred faith in the hostile articles and reviews directed against Mr. Solzhenitsyn by so many Western intellectuals. How is one to

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account for the strident Western reaction to Mr. Solzhenitsyn, typified by Mr. Treves' admittedly uninformed letter attributing "bad manners" to the discomfiting Russian exile? Surely the West, and especially America, is no stranger to trenchant criticism; but I don't recall a Marxist ever coming under such fire or contempt from the intellectual community as Mr. Solzhenitsyn has encountered in the West.

JOHN R. DUNLAP
San Jose, California

To the Editor:

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's article tells us more about the author than about either Russia or America. It abounds in its own misconceptions about both countries.

I have admired Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn for his behavior in the Soviet Union, his courage, his integrity, as well as for his literary masterpieces. If it is painful to challenge his views, I do so only because to leave them unchallenged would be an even graver failing.

The essay contains its share of inaccuracies and exaggerations. More than once the author speaks of "sixty million victims" of the Soviet regime ("not counting war casualties"): we deserve to be let in on the peculiar arithmetic that yields these figures. But whether the true figure is 13 or 30 million, the human costs of Stalinism were terrible enough to require no inflation.

One need by no means be a sympathizer of the Soviet regime to challenge his statement that ". . . subsistence at such an abysmally low level—for half a century—is leading to a biological degeneration of the people that is intensified . . . by the suppression of every form of culture . . . where the minds of its children are systematically robbed." It does not alter my opposition to that regime one iota to recognize that in the postwar years the Soviet standard of living has gone up at a rather impressive rate; that evidence of "biological degeneration" is dubious at best; that at least the politically "safe" forms of culture are valued at least as highly as in the United States; and that public education has made significant strides.

What is at stake is not merely factual accuracy. As Aleksandr Isayevich himself states, he spent "the entire 55 years of [his] Soviet life in the remoter areas of the U.S.S.R." His own experience, in and out of military service and the Gulag Archipelago, thus gave him little opportunity for reliable insights into the motives and functioning of Soviet policymakers. His angle of vision is a particular one; his own truth is that of the victim, a searing truth which pervades his outlook and his values, one which he passionately translates into his apocalyptic vision. The qualities which made him a hero and a prophet are not the same qualities that are needed for political analysis or for statesmanship.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn is an ardent Russian patriot. We may admire him for it. But why does this patriotism require an uncritical defense of "old Russia"—the tsarist era—or, better yet, in his view, the Muscovite era prior to Peter the Great, before Russia was contaminated by the "corrupting" West? Why not admit that old Russia was socially, politically, morally, deficient in many ways? To be sure, there were remarkable achievements, say, in economic development prior to the 1917 Revolution; but surely this is not the yardstick by which he would wish Soviet accomplishments measured. Whether he likes it or not, there were good reasons why, by the time the Provisional Government

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(not the Bolsheviks) replaced the Tsar's rule in 1917, the *ancien régime* had lost virtually all support in all social strata. Mr. Solzhenitsyn's own intellectual forerunners were the outstanding Russian emigré intellectuals of the nineteenth century about whom he keeps remarkably silent—the Herzens and Turgenevs and the Plekhanovs, who could not freely write and work in the Russia of their day either.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn makes a passionate and elaborate appeal to differentiate between Russia and the Soviet Union, between the people and communism, which (as he put it elsewhere) was after all a "dark un-Russian whirlwind that descended on us from the West." Damning the West both in its bourgeois and its Marxist versions, for its lack of ethical values, much as did the Russian Slavophiles of a century ago, he would turn his back on it to keep (or make) his mythical Russia pure.

As Robert C. Tucker explained in his contribution to this exchange (*Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980), it is ludicrous to deny that there were *some* things in the Russian soil—be they products of heredity or of environment—that were receptive to the peculiar adaptation of Marxism that we call Leninism. Among Americans dealing with Soviet affairs, I personally probably place less weight on traditional Russian elements in bolshevism and Soviet conduct than do most of my colleagues, but I cannot write them off and ignore them. Whether or not one accepts all of the elements in Professor Tucker's analysis, it is either naïve or disingenuous to deny that Soviet policy too has in varying proportions been a blend of distinctly communist elements and Russian national aims and impulses. Of course many Americans fail to remember that "Russian" is not the same as "Soviet" (a distinction which not all Soviet citizens observe either), but the distinction must not be absolutized: Mr. Solzhenitsyn cannot rewrite history to undo Leninism's Russian roots, nor can he deny the recent growth of Russian national self-consciousness in the U.S.S.R.

No less troublesome are his attempts to argue that, by becoming communist, people everywhere "turn their back[s] on [their] own nationality" and "embrace inhumanity." One third of the Italian electorate freely chooses to vote communist; is he suggesting that they thereby cease to be Italian? Millions followed the Chinese communists to power; does he mean to argue that they stopped being Chinese? Today the 16 million party members in the U.S.S.R. comprise more than half of all urban males between the ages of 25 and 50 with a college education; are these no longer Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Georgians or whatever their nationality happens to be?

To be sure, it is troublesome to witness the "appeals of communism" around the world. At least for short periods, communist movements have included both some of the best and some of the worst specimens of mankind in many lands. But, whether people join or support communist parties out of ideological commitment, or for personal reasons, purposes of practical politics, or as a "union card," we cannot blithely deny them either their humanity or their nationality. Mr. Solzhenitsyn has known too many decent former communists for him to do so either. In fact, in a number of instances communism has served as an instrument for the advancement of national movements or interests.

Nor, finally, can it be seriously questioned that the Russians constitute the ruling nationality of the Soviet Union. I am not one of those who see the nationality problem as the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system (as some

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prominent Nazis did and as some American analysts do today). Mr. Solzhenitsyn correctly points to such nonsense as the quixotic defense of nonexistent ethnic entities like Idel-Ural and Cossackia. And to be sure, some of the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union have benefited from more rapid economic development, precisely because they started out so far behind. But by all measures, political and military rule in the Soviet Union remains overwhelmingly in Russian hands; it is the Russian language and culture that members of other nationalities must master if they hope to move ahead; non-Russians face all the problems Russians face, plus the special problems of being non-Russians too.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn has repeatedly asserted that in its essence the Soviet system has been monolithic and unchanging; that there are no "good" or "bad" communists but that they are all alike; that there are no distinctions between Leninism and Stalinism but only one communism. This is a question of considerable importance for American policy. It is impossible to make a systematic exposition here of what any college student studying the Soviet Union learns—how Stalin's rule differed from the Lenin era; the many ways in which the Khrushchev era differed from the Stalin years that preceded it—the most obvious differences being the absence of a one-man dictator à la Stalin and the end of mass political terror which resulted in the release of Mr. Solzhenitsyn (along with millions of others) from the Gulag.

Regrettably, Mr. Solzhenitsyn accepts the Soviet argument, made in the Stalin era, that Stalin was "the Lenin of today." Stalin was one among a number of possible successors to Lenin—politically and ideologically perhaps as legitimate as the others but surely no more so. The point is that it *did* make a significant difference who wound up on top. Compared to Trotsky and Bukharin or all other serious contenders, Stalin was unquestionably the worst. Similarly it *did* make a difference that Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the leader in the late 1950s: erratic and impulsive, he was nonetheless a greater force for change and for a more open Soviet society than his rivals and challengers, from Molotov to Suslov, would have been.

As studies of Soviet politics have shown, the Soviet regime is not immune to internal dispute—be it factionalism among members of the Politburo and Party Secretariat over issues of power, personalities and policies; or the equivalent of interest groups seeking special advantages and policy decisions congruent with their preferences; or rivalries among different geographic and functional constituencies; or finally disputes over détente, resource allocation, the need for foreign technology, energy policy, arms control, or "socialist legality." Such disputes were more overt in the Khrushchev era than before or after, but they continue and are probably endemic in any complex system in the contemporary world. Of course these men are not democrats. (Neither is Mr. Solzhenitsyn.) What is important is the fact that, in a number of instances, it makes an enormous difference what person, what faction, or what orientation winds up in power—both for the peace of the world and for the welfare of the Soviet population. Rather than dismiss all this in advance as insignificant, as Mr. Solzhenitsyn does, we need to study more systematically and more skillfully such differences in outlook and values within the Soviet establishment, among Soviet experts and consultants, and in the Soviet public at large, and the ways in which under Soviet conditions such attitudes are shaped, aggregated, and expressed.

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It would be naïve to assert that all citizens of the U.S.S.R. are firmly dedicated to the Soviet regime. It is no less simplistic to assert that "the oppressed peoples are allies of the West." If on the one hand the Soviet leaders cannot any longer be simply "immeasurably indifferent to . . . the Russian people whom they have exploited to the point of total exhaustion and near-extinction," (as our author asserts with characteristic hyperbole), they have on the other hand secured the basic acquiescence and support of at least significant parts of the population who share in their country's pride over its achievements, be it by cosmonauts or in chess; many have been effectively socialized into believing what they are taught; others have had opportunities for training and advancement for which they are grateful to the system.

Our author is profoundly mistaken if he sees the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba as the reification of "communism." If there is a threat facing the United States from the communist world, it is Soviet military force (and this is not the place to discuss how serious a threat it is), not communist ideas or beliefs. In any case, the attraction of communism as an ideology inspiring and motivating men and women has been receding; what has been growing is Soviet power. The evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute from arguments primarily ideological in nature, a generation ago, to a conflict of rival nation-states today, is a good example in point.

No less important, the role of communist elements in the world view and motivation of Soviet (and other communist) leaders has changed importantly over time. These are admittedly difficult matters to probe, if only because of the frantic insistence of Soviet spokesmen that they never depart from the canons of orthodoxy. What is more, and I am embarrassed to state such self-evident observations, the formal commitment to a body of doctrine tells us nothing about its role in motivating (rather than justifying) behavior or in shaping perceptions. Marx and Lenin had mighty little to say about matters on which the men in the Kremlin must make decisions, day in and day out—ICBMs, garbage disposal, cloning, or computer hardware. Those men are increasingly dependent on the advice of specialists whose competence, in science and technology or in world affairs, appears to be on the increase (some high Soviet officials consider such reliance dangerous in itself, but that only adds another dimension to the internal dialogue which Mr. Solzhenitsyn does not wish to recognize).

Mr. Solzhenitsyn's familiarity with the American scene is limited at best, as some of his earlier speeches and writings have made clear. It is understandable therefore that he cannot make a fair judgment of American scholarship on the Soviet Union or of foreign policy attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. His arbitrary selection of specimens amounts to little more than a caricature of American writing. He ignores both the valuable work that has been done and the wide diversity of views, many of which he lumps together in his polemic.

Most deplorable perhaps are the pot shots which he contemptuously takes across the entire landscape of American public and academic life. He has—it pains me to say—a lot to learn about the morals of public denunciation in our society. I yield to no one in my fundamental disagreement with the political views of Richard Pipes. But I will defend him as an honest and dedicated scholar, well informed in the areas of his genuine expertise. Perhaps Mr. Solzhenitsyn has unwittingly absorbed more of the political culture of his

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native milieu than he is aware of if he insists on maligning those he disagrees with in such a familiar "amalgam" of charges.

His essay argues, as earlier ones have, that we are on the eve of a global battle between good and evil, between "world humanity" and "world communism" (never mind that the latter has irreversibly fallen apart). "To coexist with communism on the same planet is impossible," he asserts.

Such a passionate ideological perspective is a poor counsel for an intelligent American foreign policy. From Woodrow Wilson to Jimmy Carter our experience with the pursuit of ideological objectives abroad has been little short of disastrous. Mr. Solzhenitsyn's single-minded belief in the efficacy of armed force in combating the Soviet Union reinforces the unfortunate proclivity in American politics to rely on brute military force as a substitute for political expertise and for the use of diplomacy, trade, or cultural affairs to cultivate Soviet-American relations.

Simplicity, Henry Adams once wrote, "is the most deceitful mistress that ever betrayed man." Soviet reality is so much more complex, the trends in Soviet policy and society are so much more varied, ambiguous and open-ended than his dialectic allows, that his approach to both Soviet and American problems must be deemed seriously misleading.

This is not the place to examine the depth of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's political values. No one will wish to challenge his right to develop and propound them. He stands in a long tradition of Russian writers, such as Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoyevsky, who similarly liked to evolve idiosyncratic political and philosophical ideas. It remains to hope that, like those other great Russian writers, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn will be remembered first and foremost for his marvelous works of fiction, as well as his books resting on personal experience.

ALEXANDER DALLIN
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Mr. Solzhenitsyn has replied as follows:

THE COURAGE TO SEE

Involvement in political polemics exposes one to a chorus of hackneyed accusations: I am said to idealize the Russian past, to be ignorant of the history of my own country, and of course to lack all understanding of America and the modern world (no doubt because I spend little of my time chatting at filling stations). In my essay I cautioned against malicious distortions of Russian history; this is now being represented as my complete system of views. The history of the Russian Revolution has been the object of my research for over 40 years now, and I am presently completing an account in eight volumes which will begin appearing in Russian in 1982 and perhaps three years later in English. A large-scale literary analysis of this sort reveals flaws and errors in the development of Russia over the ages that are far more substantial than anything my ardent opponents can point out to me from superficial newspaper reports and the latest fads and fashions. While political polemics, which inevitably coarsen the issues, are no place for the writer, it is painful to hear flimsy and irresponsible judgments pronounced with a scholarly air, even while witnessing the West's astonishing helplessness and lack of resourcefulness

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in the current world situation, especially in the realm of ideas and in the caliber of those entrusted with their execution. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to delay speaking out for another five years.

I

A good indicator of the viability of any system is its receptiveness to criticism. I had always assumed that the American system desires criticism and even appreciates it. This belief was shaken after my Harvard address, when amid the torrents of journalistic fury there was no mistaking the cries of "mind your own business," "shut up," and even "get out." It was a surprise, frankly, to hear the same notes sounded in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* (Silvio J. Treves). I had no intention of "lecturing" anyone; I wished to share the experience of living under communist rule. Nothing could be simpler for me than to keep my peace and leave the concern for America's future to Mr. Treves and those who share his views. Once they have experienced it all on their own backs, we shall understand each other perfectly. Yet it remains true that fear of criticism and fresh ideas is the mark of a doomed system.

Robert W. Thurston's response reads as if it had been written with the express intent of illustrating my point about how easy it is to fool a Western visitor to the U.S.S.R. With unconscious humor, he cites his ten months of personal experience—ten months of living as a foreigner under surveillance in the Soviet capital, in expertly staged showcase conditions—an experience which he intrepidly juxtaposes to the 50-year experience of a native Soviet subject in the forbidden depths of the country. Hence the result: Mr. Thurston's discovery of "Soviet patriotism" and of "a widespread pride in the material progress the Soviet Union has made" (in metallurgy? in military production?), when in fact there is not enough to eat, sounds like an insulting quotation from *Pravda* or *The People's Daily*. A dispute about the various juridical details bearing on pre-revolutionary Russia (which, incidentally, Mr. Thurston distorts) would be out of place on the pages of *Foreign Affairs* or in the present discussion. But one marvels at his rashness in basing his conclusions about the "socialist sympathies" of Russia on the "elections" for the Constituent Assembly, elections which were held after the Bolshevik coup, when non-socialist parties were harshly restricted in their activities. The American concept of what constitutes an election has here been mechanically transferred to the peasant Russia of 1917, which did not even grasp the processes involved and which was as yet incapable of making any conscious and deliberate use of its vote. (In 1945 Americans asked Soviet citizens, "If you dislike Stalin so much, why don't you vote him out of office?")

One feels more awkward when a Sovietologist of Professor Dallin's stature assures us that half a century of first-hand observation in the areas of the Soviet Union inaccessible to foreigners is less important than "reliable insights into the motives and functioning of Soviet policymakers." To achieve such insights, it seems, one need only meet with these people and study *Pravda* closely. Yet Mr. Dallin admits elsewhere in his essay that Soviet officials *conceal* their motives. The results of such meetings are evident enough in the long succession of Western failures. Has Professor Dallin ever set eyes on the subject of his research—the expanses of this enslaved country and the inhabitants of its provincial and rural areas? Upon what data does he base his confident assertion that the Russian village is not becoming impoverished and that "the

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Soviet standard of living has gone up?" His pronouncements about the moon would have been more accurate, for at least the reports of the astronauts are more reliable. With reference to the Soviet provinces, where potatoes run out before spring and other foodstuffs are entirely unavailable (just because Mr. Dallin finds this hard to imagine does not make it "hyperbole"), my opponent writes in all seriousness about widespread pride in the achievements of cosmonauts and chess players. Or else he consoles us with the supposed flourishing of "politically 'safe' forms of culture." What does this mean? The humanities are shot through with lies, the exact sciences are placed in the service of the military, so what kind of "culture" does this leave? (As for the provinces, they lack even this.)

Mr. Dallin legitimately inquires about how the figures on the victims of the regime were arrived at, given the secrecy of Soviet statistics. But the calculations of Ivan Kurganov, a professor of statistics, were published in the United States 16 years ago (*Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, April 12, 1964) in a language accessible to Professor Dallin, and it is strange that he is not aware of them. A new attempt to calculate our losses, by the recently arrested Iosif Dyadkin, was reported in *The Wall Street Journal* of July 23, 1980. One might also mention the figures compiled by Maksudov in *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviètique*, Vol. 18, No. 3, July-September 1977. The totals arrived at by all these various calculations are of the same order of magnitude—tens of millions of victims. It will of course be a long time before we possess precise data: the Soviet maw does not yield up its secrets, even in confidential meetings with Soviet policymakers.

Eugen Loebl advises us to abandon excursions into the history of communism in the U.S.S.R. and to focus our attention upon the threat that confronts us today. And yet it is true of every field of knowledge that a phenomenon can be properly understood only through an awareness of the history of its development. A great deal depends on whether one perceives communism today (including the Cuban, Vietnamese and Chinese varieties) as a phenomenon that has a predominantly Russian pedigree or, on the other hand, as an international or even metaphysical entity: each view will call forth a different response, be it disastrous capitulation (familiar since Franklin D. Roosevelt's day) or an attempt to stand firm. Mr. Loebl's contention that communism is national in essence, just like national socialism, is entirely unpersuasive; Nazism always manifested itself in national forms and never laid claim to internationalism; it coined the concept of the *Herrenvolk* and did not lay waste its "own" nation with fire and sword, as communism has hastened to do wherever it has come to power. And it was precisely this trait which led Nazism to declare openly (in a way which communism is too devious ever to do) its intention of turning the inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. into slaves—a fact which, as Mr. Loebl correctly notes, led to its downfall. However, the author is imposing his own views upon my essay when he would have me say that only Ukrainians and Balts were ready to support Hitler. In fact I testified that all the occupied Russian lands also expected the war to bring liberation, and that this was the reason why the Red Army fled with such alacrity. But Hitler had declared war upon the Russian people as such, leaving them no way out. And it is this same advice that is repeatedly offered to the contemporary West by those who regard the threat now looming over the world as Russian, rather than communist. Such counsel can only have the same devastating outcome.

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In totalitarian states the restoration of historical truth is viewed as the most subversive of activities, one that merits persecution of the harshest type. But even in the West truth cannot be established as long as careless and uninformed statements are tolerated. To quote Mr. Loebl, Russia was "the most reactionary government at the end of the century and the ally of all oppressive governments." One wonders what governments Mr. Loebl could have in mind? In point of fact, at the end of the nineteenth century (from 1892 on) Russia had only one ally—republican France. In 1907, in addition, Russia became formally allied to England. Mr. Loebl writes that, "the tsarist dream of world domination caught the soul of the Russian nation." But in the nineteenth century the only "Tsar" who nurtured dreams of world conquest was Napoleon. Nowhere else were these aspirations to be found, except perhaps in the vast British Empire sprawling over five continents. Can Mr. Loebl point to anything in Russian literature, art, or folklore that might suggest a thirst for world domination? Or did he use some other method to detect this desire in the "soul of the Russian nation"? "Russian culture...is the preferred one all over the Soviet Union," writes Mr. Loebl. He can be forgiven for not knowing what constitutes Russian culture, but he should not pass judgment on the basis of journalistic hearsay. I can attest that *Russian* culture was crushed and destroyed with a vengeance in the very first decade of Soviet rule. What we are seeing today is an atheistic and anti-national *Soviet culture* masquerading as "Russian culture"—and moreover doing so in a sullied and bastardized form of the Russian language. The interests of communist Moscow are "first of all Russian interests," claims Mr. Loebl, who has evidently skipped entire sections of my essay, where I point out that no nationality under Soviet rule has been ravaged to the extent that the Russians have.

Mr. Loebl is not an exception and one can come upon instances of similarly irresponsible statements among still more prominent Americans. Thus Professor Stephen F. Cohen, Director of Russian Studies at Princeton University, writes in *The New Republic* of December 29, 1979: "During the first and second five-year plans [i.e. 1928-1937]...a mostly backward...society was transformed into a predominantly industrial one...with many of the benefits of a modern welfare state." A fantastic statement! Were it known in my country, it would be read as sheer mockery: these words are applied to a decade which saw wholesale destitution, hunger, bread rationing in peacetime, six million deaths from starvation in the Ukraine alone, the extermination of 15 million sturdy peasants, the end of agricultural abundance, an abrupt halt to the production of consumer goods, acute shortages of clothing, footwear, and household goods throughout the land--and all this in the name of heavy industry and showplace stores for foreigners in Moscow. During this era of atavistic privation and brutality, which Professor Cohen likens to a "modern welfare state," the last prewar year of 1913 seemed like a long-lost miracle to the population of my country. And in the past 70 years our country has never so much as approached the abundance of that "tsarist" year.

When the Director of Russian Studies at a leading university commits such a blunder one cannot really be surprised to hear one of the American presidential candidates, Edward Kennedy, declare that meat shortages are no threat to the Soviet leadership: they would "simply" feed the population chicken instead. Here is a man who aspires to direct the politics and economics

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of the world, yet has no inkling of the simple but telling fact that chicken is worth its weight in gold in the U.S.S.R., and is not even available to patients on special diets.

This comfortable bed of illusions, this seemingly deliberate self-deception, is a characteristic trait shared by the Western press and many Western politicians; wishful thinking is sustained by verbal incantation. For example, in June 1945, *The New York Times* lent its authority (why?) to the allegation that the Katyn murders were committed by the Nazis, rather than by the communists. This urge to deal in illusions rather than in facts, which has since become almost universal, together with the ready acceptance of unscrupulous fables about Russian and Soviet history, serves to blind the West in this time of danger, preventing it from grasping its true predicament and from finding a way out. It is as if the West actually does not *want* to know the truth until the moment when this knowledge has ceased to be of use.

II

It is clear that Robert C. Tucker's essay reflects not only his personal opinions but the established views of a milieu which exerts a formative influence upon U. S. policy: whether Democrats or Republicans are in power, and regardless of who is in the White House, the leading experts and advisers are drawn from these same circles. (It is symptomatic that Professor Dallin concurs with the essential arguments of Professor Tucker.)

At the core of the problem lies a misunderstanding of the nature of communism: a failure to acknowledge it as the quintessence of dynamic and implacable evil (of course "evil" today is considered an unscientific concept, almost a four-letter word, for instead of "good" and "evil" there exists only a multiplicity of opinions, each one as valid as the next), a failure to recognize it as an international and universal historical phenomenon (an extreme manifestation of socialism), rather than a local Russian episode. And this leads to a wider misunderstanding of contemporary Soviet reality.

Anyone who takes the time to read Mr. Tucker's letter carefully will discern the author's sympathy for a "pure" communism, for its early Leninist phase, as well as the absence of any condemnation of Marxist doctrine. Mr. Tucker might well be reluctant to express this today in so many words, but it is apparent in the very structure of his thought. That is why he is obliged to shift all the evils of communism onto the Stalin years and thence to probe back into the Russian sixteenth and fifteenth centuries in his search for origins. Mr. Tucker doubts whether the Lenin period had a Gulag system, denies that forced labor as such existed in Lenin's concentration camps, and even seems to justify these camps on the grounds that they were set up only "to imprison opponents of the Bolshevik regime," while in reality anyone who stood out from the crowd would end up in the camps alongside all those whose behavior or social origins happened to displease the Bolsheviks. (This is all set forth at sufficient length in *The Gulag Archipelago*, and I invite Professor Tucker to undertake a task which the Soviet regime has not so far ventured to tackle: to refute my book point by point.)

The time has come to call a spade a spade: it is time to admit that the October coup masterminded by Lenin and Trotsky against the weak Russian democracy was an act of villainy; that it was carried out with significant financial aid from Wilhelm's Germany; that the communism of the early

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years was a system every bit as sordid, devious, cruel and inhuman as was communism under Stalin; that credit for inventing the Gulag system of forced labor with its multi-million convict population belongs to Trotsky (his forced "labor armies"); that Trotsky is likewise the immortal inventor of an early version of the "gas chamber"—barges scuttled at sea with hundreds of prisoners aboard; that he too is responsible for the mass execution of draftees who refused to fight for the Bolsheviks; that the genocide on the Don, the slaughter of 1.2 million Cossack civilians, was launched by the same two luminaries. The idea of granting the peasants land as a propaganda gesture, then promptly reclaiming it, harvest and all, belongs to Lenin. It was he who declared war on the well-to-do peasants (whose prosperity was actually less than that of an average American farmer), with the thousands of executions this entailed. It was Lenin who drove peasants into tightly regulated communes and artels, Lenin who suppressed every non-communist publication, and Lenin, together with Trotsky, who smashed the labor unions and the independent workers' movement (the so-called Congresses of Factory Representatives). It is inordinately euphemistic to refer to this regime as "authoritarian," as Mr. Tucker does—yet he seems unable to bring himself to pronounce the word "totalitarian" with respect to it.

Reading through the correspondence of Marx and Engels, the most complete edition of which has been published in Russian (and hence is accessible to Professor Tucker), we might well be staggered by the two conspirators' total lack of principles and scruples and their "fierce insistence on orthodoxy" (a Russian trait, Mr. Tucker assures us), were we not already familiar with innumerable later examples from communist states around the world. In the formulations of Marx and Engels we can readily identify both their ferocious atheism (the philosophical core of their system), and their equally ferocious intolerance and hatred of every rival faction within the party. This vehement hatred was, upon occasion, even directed against entire Slavic peoples. Here are some samples of their more celebrated pronouncements:

"There is only one way of shortening, simplifying, and concentrating the bloodthirsty death-throes of the old society and the bloody birth pangs of the new—revolutionary terror." (Marx and Engels, *Sochineniia* [*Works*], Second Edition, Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955-77, Vol. 5, p. 494.)

"We are pitiless and we ask for no pity from you. When our time comes, we shall not conceal terrorism with hypocritical phrases," (*Ibid.*, Vol. 6, p. 548.)

"The vengeance of the people will break forth with such ferocity that not even the year 1793 enables us to envisage it." (*Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 515)

"[Workers must] counteract the efforts of the bourgeoisie to restore calm, and force the democrats to implement their current terroristic statements...Not only [should they] not oppose so-called excesses, those popular acts of vengeance directed at hated individuals or official buildings,...but [they should] take the lead in these matters."(*Ibid.*, Vol. 7, p. 263.)

"Coercion (i.e., state power) is also an economic force." (*Ibid.*, Vol. 37, p. 420.)

"Political freedom...is worse than the most abject slavery." (*Sochineniia*, First Edition, Moscow-Leningrad: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1928–48, Vol. 2, p. 394.)

"Looking into the future, I can discern something that will strongly smack of high treason; this seems as inevitable as fate itself." (*Ibid*, Vol. 22, p. 138.)

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"...thanks to the perplexity and flabbiness of all the others, our party will be forced into government one fine morning...we shall be constrained to undertake communist experiments and extravagant measures, the untimeliness of which we know better than anyone else...until the world is able to form a historical judgment of such events, we shall be considered ... 'beasts,' which doesn't matter!" (*Ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 187.)

Marx and Engels reiterated on many occasions that "once we are at the helm, we shall be obliged to reenact the year 1793."

Lenin, too, was not one to conceal his historical origins, nor did he ascribe them to Russian traditions. He constantly cited Marx and Engels, swore by their names, and applied their theories in practice (which does not make communism a German phenomenon). He also followed them in expressing unabashed admiration for Jacobin terror—both for the wholesale executions and mass drownings of condemned prisoners. He used to say that "terror renews a country, " and made no secret of the fact that he was following Babeuf's injunction that the conquered classes must be completely destroyed. (But neither does this make communism French.) It was during the time of the French Revolution that violence came to be meted out according to class allegiance. Both in name and structure the "revolutionary tribunals" and even the "extraordinary commissions" (known as "Cheka" in Soviet times from the Russian abbreviation of this phrase) are based on Jacobin models and have nothing to do with Ivan the Terrible or the sixteenth century. The similarities between Bolsheviks and Jacobins in both theory and tactics are utterly obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to study the historical evidence. (This is true down to the smallest details: the prohibition of a free press; the crushing of rival factions; the proclamation of dictatorship as "the highest form of freedom"; monolithic unity of the entire population; the merging of the state with the party, with the latter dictatorially controlled by a single individual; even food requisitioning detachments sent out to rob the peasants, the physical destruction of churches, the melting down of church bells, and the confiscation of church valuables.)

Curiously, Professor Tucker seems never to have heard of any of this or else has never given any thought to these direct and obvious continuities. In what purports to be a scholarly exposition, he adduces a remarkably frivolous argument in support of the "profoundly Russian" origins of Bolshevism, namely that Berdyaev thought so!

Has not mere invocation of other authorities long ceased to serve as a substitute for reasoned argument in any branch of scholarship? I venture to note, furthermore, that there was something decidedly whimsical about Berdyaev's philosophical views. At least twice, and arguably three times in the course of his career, Berdyaev underwent a 180-degree change in perspective, in each case attacking his former views as something completely alien to himself.[1] His book on communism in Russia does not amount to an objective historical study or an analysis of historical data; instead it is a manifestation of his personal and inconstant philosophical tendencies, which culminated in his decision to fly the red Soviet flag from his house. Many processes familiar the world over he implausibly ascribes to Russia alone, such as the substitution

[1] See for example, N. Poltoratzky, *Berdiaev i Rossia: Filosofiia istorii Rossii u N.A. Berdiaeva* (Berdyaev and Russia: N.A. Berdyaev's Philosophy of the History of Russia), New York, 1967, in Russian.

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of social forms of activity for religious ones. He even goes so far as to call the inhuman teachings of Marxism an "ethical doctrine," and to declare that Marx and Lenin "wished to do good"—words which resound like blasphemy over the corpses of tormented millions and before the brutal visage of today's world-conquering power. Berdyaev concedes that Russian history has experienced "interruptions in its organic evolution"—yet simultaneously, and in complete contradiction, bases his whole argument on an "organic tradition," which he derives at will either from Muscovite Russia or from its virtual antithesis, St. Petersburg Russia, whichever seems more convenient.

Berdyaev, however, was writing in 1937, when the phenomenon of communism had yet to emerge in its full historical dimensions. But how can anyone still maintain in 1980—when communist regimes control 25 countries, span four continents and represent every race on earth—that communism, including its far-flung International of Terror in some 20 other countries, is shaped by peculiarly Russian features?

Mr. Tucker's notion that the Stalinist phase of the communist leviathan was created by drawing on the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries of Russian history is not merely unscholarly, but has an impressionistic, fantastic ring. How can one seriously argue that Stalin needed the example of Ivan the Terrible before he could lop off the heads of his foes and strike terror in the hearts of his subjects? Does this mean that but for Ivan the Terrible he would never have hit on the idea? Are tyrannies so few and far between in the history of the world? The great profundity that a tyrant should keep his people in fear and trembling Stalin could have picked up from any primer in world history, or from the history of feudal Georgia, or even before that from the recesses of his own cunning and malevolent heart. For whatever else we may say, this much at least he could grasp intuitively from the outset, and without recourse to books. Or again, Mr. Tucker traces the origins of the Gulag system back to the practice of forced labor under the Peter the Great. It would thus seem that forced labor was a Russian invention! But why not cite the pharaohs of Egypt, or closer in time, the democracies of England, France and Holland, all of which employed forced labor in their colonies, while the United States made use of it even on in its own soil—in each case after Peter's time. And what schoolboy has not read about galley slaves? (The point of Professor Tucker's quotation from George Kennan is altogether obscure, unless he wished to demonstrate that foreign observers were granted access to the hard labor prison system [*katorga*] in pre-revolutionary Russia, no less than they were to the law courts. It would not be difficult to find more vivid descriptions of hard labor in New Caledonia in French literature, but what does that prove about the Fifth Republic?)[2] Territorial aggrandizement is likewise proclaimed a primordial Russian trait, even though England had seized a good deal more territory and France did not lag far behind. Are we to conclude from this that the English and the French are inherently predatory peoples? And last but not least the collective farm, that embodiment of the universal socialist

[2] When the translation of Dostoyevsky's *Notes from the House of the Dead* was first published in England (in 1881), a review in one of the leading British journals noted that Dostoyevsky's description points to laxities and indulgences in the Russian treatment of convicts "the idea of which would horrify an English warder" (*The Athenaeum*, No. 2788, April 2, 1881, p. 455). The considerably greater privations of British convicts were also noted in *The Academy* (Vol. 19, No. 467, April 16, 1881, p. 273).

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principle of the commune, is interpreted by Mr. Tucker as a manifestation of Russian serfdom.

Is it scholarly procedure to announce as a fact the transfer of various governmental and institutional features across four centuries of history in the absence of any transmitting or transferring agents, be they parties, classes, or individuals, and with casual disregard for the obliteration of all social institutions in 1917? This must clearly have been some kind of mystical transference, evidently via the genes. (Or, to adopt Professor Dallin's more elegant formulation: there were "*some* things in the Russian soil—be they products of heredity or of environment" that must have been receptive to Marxism.) And what curious scholarship leads Mr. Tucker simultaneously "not to notice" the direct and obvious line of succession whereby each of the essential traditions and institutions of the Stalin era was inherited ready-made from across an interval of a mere five to ten years—inherited from Lenin and Trotsky: the same Cheka- GPU-NKVD, these same troikas (or "special boards") in lieu of trials (why bring in Alexander III?), the same Gulag (already in existence), the same Article 58, the same mass terror, the same party, the same ideology—and all this within the same generation and through the agency of the same individuals (who had an opportunity to murder in both periods), and the same principle of intensive industrialization put forward by Trotsky, whereby the needs of the people are suppressed and all is cast into the voracious maw of heavy industry. (The "ambiguities" in the legacies of Lenin and Trotsky which Mr. Dallin seeks are simply not there to be found.)

I refuse to believe that Professor Tucker could be so utterly blind to all these facts. I can only regard this as a conscious effort to whitewash the early communist regime, to pass over its iniquitous crimes and institutions as if they never existed but were invented later by Stalin (the alleged "destroyer" of bolshevism), in emulation of the Russian tradition. What "revolution from above" (the threadbare Marxist term adopted by Mr. Tucker) is Stalin supposed to have carried out? He consolidated the Leninist legacy dutifully and consistently within the forms in which he had inherited it. But even if Mr. Tucker (and the many who share his views) were able to achieve the impossible and to prove that the Cheka, the revolutionary tribunals, the systematic use of hostages, the robbing of the people, the rigidly enforced uniformity of opinion, the party ideology and dictatorship, were all inspired not by fellow communists and not by the Jacobins, but by Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great—even then Mr. Tucker's theory of a "Russian tradition" would miss the mark. For in fact nationally minded Russian thinkers have long regarded both of these Tsars as objects not of adulation but of censure, while in the popular awareness and in folklore the first of them has been damned as a villain and the second as an "anti-Christ." The fact that Peter did much to *destroy* the Russian way of life, its customs, consciousness and national character, and to suppress religion (in the teeth of popular revolt) is too obvious and familiar a point to dwell on.

Worldwide communist subversion, the practice of economic sabotage, terrorism, insurrection, and ideological warfare—can all this represent a primordial Russian tradition? The explosive situation in central Asia today clearly illustrates the difference. It is true that Russia seized the emirate of Bukhara (not Afghanistan) during the nineteenth century, at a time when the democratic states of Europe also felt no moral qualms about waging wars of

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conquest (England, too, tried to take Afghanistan, but failed). I acknowledge with sorrow and shame that my country participated along with the rest of Europe in the subjugation of weaker nations, but the 50 years of the Russian protectorate in Central Asia were at a time of peace: religion, customs and personal liberty were not suppressed, and there was not so much as a movement for revolt. Lenin, by contrast, had scarcely seized power when he began preparing, in 1921, to lay hands on Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan under the pretext of a "revolutionary federation." By 1922, the methods used by the communists in the Khiva and Bukhara regions provoked a Muslim insurrection similar to that in Afghanistan today. It raged for ten years into the period of Stalin's rule when it was finally crushed by unprecedented reprisals against the population. That is the "tradition" to which the invasion of Afghanistan belongs.

I am well aware that the term "Stalinism" (as both Mr. Tucker and Mr. Dallin point out) was coined in the 1920s by the Trotskyite faction in its struggle with Stalin. But its present-day usage—to describe a fully developed 25-year period in the evolution of a vast communist state—is a diversionary tactic calculated to mask the irreconcilably antihuman essence of communism, the main threat to the world today.

Does the fact that communism is an international phenomenon rule out the possibility of any national peculiarities or local variants? Not really, since communism has to operate in a real world, among an actual people, and must, like it or not, avail itself of that nation's language, (albeit mutilating it to suit its own purposes). Thus, in China wall posters are suppressed and in the U.S.S.R.—*samizdat.* Russian city dwellers are herded out to gather potatoes and Cubans to harvest sugar cane. In the Soviet Union people were exterminated by exile to the tundra, in Cambodia they were driven into the jungle. Yugoslavia adopted its own set of tactics: after hastily getting his mass murders out of the way in 1945, Tito turned meek as a lamb in order to obtain Western aid. And Ceausescu adroitly secured a measure of independence in foreign affairs, but only at the cost of a massive intensification of the totalitarian climate within his country. East German communism would have it that there is no need for national reunification. North Korean communism claims the opposite. (I am not sure what gave Mr. Dallin the idea that I regard every Italian who votes communist and every Uzbek who joins the Party under pressure as having surrendered his nationality. What I said was that nationality is suppressed by the communist *system* and is forfeited by the leaders and zealots of that system. There was thus no real need for Mr. Dallin to make this logical error. "In a number of instances," Mr. Dallin assures us, "communism has served as an instrument for the advancement of national movements or interests," and this is indeed a view once held in the United States with respect to North Vietnam. Of late, however, such confidence appears to have been dispelled. Is it not now obvious to one and all that neither in Estonia nor Poland nor Mongolia nor anywhere else has communism ever served national interests?)

Why not bolster communist propaganda with a clever play on national sentiment? Communist governments do so without a qualm. But does this really mean that "communism varies from country to country"? On the contrary, it is everywhere alike: everywhere totalitarian, everywhere bent on crushing individuality, conscience, even life itself, everywhere backed up by

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ideological terror and everywhere aggressive. The ultimate goal of world communism in all its variants is the subjugation of the entire planet, America included. One can understand why Professor Dallin should take professional offense at such a distasteful simplification of the problem. Kremlinologists would prefer to see it discussed in terms of the finer shades of ideological commitment among the communist leaders. Yet ideology commits these leaders to actions, regardless of their personal convictions, commits them in particular to an endless series of takeovers throughout the world which make no sense in terms of their personal interests: as if in a frenzy they seize Angola, then Ethiopia, then Afghanistan. It does poor service to the interests of American foreign policy to propose playing upon the "subtle variations" among the different forms of communism.

In a bid to prove me wrong, my own personal experience is trotted out as proof of the visible evolution of communism: after all, under Stalin Solzhenitsyn was in prison, under Khrushchev, *Ivan Denisovich* was published, while under Brezhnev, the man was deported. This handy motif, which has gone the rounds from one essay to the next, duly turns up in Mr. Tucker's response! Could this be because no other positive example apart from *Ivan Denisovich* has been found for the last 63 years? (And if *Ivan Denisovich* had never appeared, it would no doubt have been even more convenient for my critics, for they could then have argued either that there had been no camps whatever under communism, or else that the Russian people are incapable of saying anything about them on their own.) But the case of Khrushchev is precisely the exception that proves the rule: of all the communist leaders he alone was overthrown by intraparty strife for his occasional stumbling steps away from communist dogma and toward humanity; certainly none of the others in the Lenin-Trotsky-Sverdlov-Stalin-Molotov-Brezhnev succession ever strayed in this direction by so much as a foot. And even Khrushchev remained true to that fundamental and demonic tenet of Marxism: its virulent hatred of religion.

In its time communism has made use of tactical maneuvers a good bit more ambitious than *Ivan Denisovich*, such as the New Economic Policy, Stalin's hypocritical "restoration" of the concept of Church and Motherland, the "struggle for peace" during the years when America had a monopoly on nuclear arms, "letting a hundred flowers bloom," "peaceful coexistence," even the Soviet withdrawal from Austria and now "détente." What is demonstrated by all of this is not the changing nature of communism, but its flexibility and relentlessness.

It is regrettable that in taking issue with me, Mr. Tucker (and Mr. Dallin too) evades the crucial question of whether communism (in its "pure"Marxist form) is evil or whether it is not. Is it capable of becoming "kind" and healing itself? Does it threaten to crush the rest of the world in its serpentine coils or does it not?

While steering clear of this question, Mr. Tucker is quick to warn the world of an incomparably greater danger, "a most malignant form of extreme [Russian] nationalism" which is "germinating" among the vanquished, leaderless, devastated, and barely surviving Russian people.

III

The fruitfulness of any political theory may be judged by its practical results. The theory that communism is an essentially Russian phenomenon,

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that communism and the Russian people are indivisible and that they must be fought as a single foe, reduplicates the insane and self-defeating tactics of Hitler. But that is not the only way in which this theory fosters illusions at the expense of reality, for it would have us regard the communist Soviet Union of today as heir to the former Russia, *ergo* as a "normal" state, one which pursues its own interests and those of its citizens, a state with which we may deal along traditional lines, entering into sensible agreements, negotiations, and compromises, and apportioning spheres of influence. Yet this *could scarcely be further from the truth*: no communist government cares about the interests of its citizens or relies upon public opinion; indeed they are even ready to sacrifice their populations in the interests of international victory. (Perhaps the example of nearby Cuba is easier to recognize.) As a result, no real compromise with communism is possible; there is no way of placating, bribing, or appeasing it, and the series of concessions which the West has made serves only to weaken its own position. It is quite wrong to think that the Soviet regime is pursuing its own interests as a state: this endless aggression the world over and the outlay of capital and human life on one continent after another bring nothing but hardship to the peoples of the Soviet Union. Yet nothing, and this includes the personalities of individual rulers, can arrest communism's expansionist impulse. The very existence of other countries in the world which enjoy economic advantages or greater civil liberties is intolerable to the communist states for it confronts their populations with an enviable alternative way of life. It is imperative that such countries be conquered and crushed. Communism is simply not explicable in diplomatic, juridical or economic terms.

But communism's greatest success involves not military conquest but a propaganda victory: the rest of the world accepts that it has "mellowed" and believes in the "good" variants of communism. The Western world obligingly adopts the very *language* of communism, calling the tyrannical regimes of Eastern Europe "people's democracies," and the subversive campaign to undermine the West from within—"détente." In the early months of the communist regime in Cambodia, some Western newspapers, parroting the official line from Phnom Penh, referred to the ongoing genocide as a "peasant revolution." At the same time, the pages of leading American newspapers are open to Soviet agents who ridicule the very existence of Soviet aggression and deceitfully lull Americans into the belief that communism is not an international movement and thus threatens no one. Conversely, it seems inconceivable to the Western reading public that malnutrition is rife in the Soviet Union and China today, that the population lacks basic commodities, and that food rationing is commonplace. In fact, this is dismissed as "anti-communist propaganda." A real war has been going on for 35 years, there has been a long string of Western retreats and the loss of more than 20 countries, and yet the West persists in referring to this Third World War as "peaceful coexistence." Presidents have come and gone and with them their Secretaries of State and their advisers in the White House and State Department, but the same old thinking persists and there are no new ideas: we see the same precarious balancing act based on ever more "subtle distinctions" between various brands of communism, factions and their leaders—which in reality means concessions and capitulations, each one dragging the West steadily deeper into the abyss. (The next batch of concessions may well be maturing in the State Department at this very moment.) And now we hear the clamoring of an idea that does

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claim to be new: instead of warning us against the mighty juggernaut that has already crushed one-half of mankind and is set to destroy the remainder, they would have us fear a rebirth of a nationally conscious Russia, a renascence which can only be salutary.

There are no new ideas, and it would be strange were any to arise amid the smug secularism which cannot see beyond itself.

In matters more important than the sale of a particular batch of goods, the theory of "subtle distinctions" between various types of communism (or, as Mr. Dallin puts it, "significant variations within communism," "variations, gradations and changes," "a more differentiated and balanced understanding," and "a sophisticated approach") is not only ineffectual, but could actually prove fatal to the West. At a time when America itself is menaced by this pernicious supranational force, it is proposed that we put our faith in a sudden outburst of benevolence which will lead communism to renounce its aggressive ways, that we believe in the existence of "peace-loving Soviet leaders" (notably Brezhnev), and in the advent of a new, more mellow and amenable generation. Hopes are held out that the communist governments of Eastern Europe and Asia might suddenly withdraw their allegiance from Moscow (the West drew no significant strength from the defections of Albania and North Korea, while that of Romania brought only hardship to its own people); to that end trading concessions are used in a bid to win these countries over (thus easing the economic burden of the U.S.S.R.). We are encouraged to expect a split in the European communist movement (the French Communist Party's dabbling in independence was fairly short-lived, and every communist party would readily volunteer the services of its personnel and organization to rule the country the moment it was occupied). We are told that the Vietnamese, Cuban, Angolan, and Ethiopian communists and other malignant offshoots of communism throughout the world will pursue their own national interests and willingly be reconciled with the United States. It is even suggested that Islam will prove the undoing of the communist movement.

Not one of these fanciful hopes has yet borne fruit except for the Sino-Soviet split, and this has now become the cornerstone of American plans and aspirations. China is already perceived as if it were not a communist country at all, as if it did not persecute its billion-strong population. But China, just like the Soviet Union in the 1930s, urgently needs technological aid from the West and is prepared to that end to don the mask of respectability. But one can be sure that in the depths of the country, hostility toward America and hatred of the American way of life are inculcated in the Chinese people just as before; the authorities could turn the nation against the United States almost overnight. And even this "moderate" China of today, as unyielding in its conduct of foreign affairs as any other communist state, is pressing the Americans to abandon their defense of Taiwan and now proposes that they withdraw from South Korea. In due course China will begin to weigh the relative advantages of confrontation or accommodation with the Soviet Union. (The dismantling of the cult of Mao that we see in China today is a step in this direction.) The failure of American diplomacy with regard to China is an all too familiar one: it consists in regarding as a "normal state" what is in reality a latent communist aggressor which is still gathering its strength.

For 35 years—one third of a century!—the United States and the West as

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a whole have chosen the path of self-induced defeat. The pattern has by now assumed historic proportions and its consequences can no longer be averted. When the United States began its withdrawal it could still boast an overwhelming military superiority, but today Washington is jolted by the discovery that the balance of world power has shifted against the West: smug complacency has allowed the scales to tilt the other way. Having given way in the past, the West finds it all the harder now to stand its ground, and harder still to make up for its losses. But the greatest weakness of all is not military but psychological. Everyone, from young men of draft age through government leaders, is banking on things turning out well in the end and shrinks from making bold and selfless decisions before it is too late and these same individuals are forced to fight in defense of their own soil. The West is morally unprepared for confrontation and strife, and will not face up to the extent of the danger, which by now may well be irreversible. The West continues to pin its hopes on a spurious "détente," which for the U.S.S.R. is the most convenient form of protracted warfare, and the one most likely to end in victory. The Soviet leaders would certainly prefer to achieve their international objectives by means of "détente," terrorism and coups d'état: why should they desire a global war, especially a nuclear one? (It is doubtful, most fortunately for mankind, that nuclear war has any real place in the strategies of the two sides: the Soviet leaders have every reason to believe that they can conquer the globe without it, while the West is morally inhibited from launching a nuclear attack except in retaliation. In any case, the "success" which the West could hope to achieve from nuclear weapons would be a hollow one, since it would be annihilating not so much its actual enemies as its potential allies, the enslaved nations.) Although this illusory "détente" enables the West to delay still further the moment of direct confrontation, this only means that the eventual clash will take place under circumstances immeasurably less to its advantage. Soon enough the United States will feel the temperature rising along its southern border; as it is, the Cuban pistol has been aimed at the soft underbelly of the American mainland for 20 years. All it needs is for the United States to increase still further its present encouragement of the Nicaraguan communists and of the Panamanian revolutionaries—a policy which has already drawn praise from that accomplished butcher Castro—and the Southern Front against the United States will be ready. For 20 years this Cuban pistol aimed with impunity at the United States has served as a daily reminder to the world of the humiliation of American principles and of America's progressive enfeeblement. American foreign policy today amounts to a series of limp and timorous maneuvers designed to placate and curry favor with potential enemies. (But it will achieve nothing in Zimbabwe, Angola or Nicaragua, and supplying nuclear technology to India with the thought of enticing it away from the U.S.S.R. will prove to be another empty hope.) Even those who favor dealing firmly with communism still cling to the illusion that communism may be pressured into undertaking internal democractic reforms. Not a chance!

Only if we acknowledge the reality of the threat to the world and the essentially international nature of communist strategy, only if we understand that the West cannot avoid a conflict with communism and cannot even postpone it for very much longer—only then will the West be capable of abandoning its squalid accommodation with oppressive regimes and under-

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taking a proud, principled and open defense of freedom throughout the world—from Cuba to Tibet and from the Volga to Berlin. Only an insight into the implacable essence of communism can provide guidance for a realistic course of action, one which may yet save mankind in spite of all the surrenders and squandered opportunities of the past. The crucial point is that *all* nations enslaved by communism, from the Cubans close to your shores to the Russians in the stronghold of your adversary, are victims and enemies of communism, and hence your natural allies. The West is so sensitive to the wishes of the Third World nations, yet so deaf to the aspirations of those living in communist lands. The only sound policy for the United States is to abandon its flirtations with every insurgent in every precariously neutral land, to stop trying to ingratiate itself with every Soviet emissary, the representative not of his people but of a ruling coterie, to give up its hair-splitting attempts to strike a balance between imaginary rival factions within the communist ranks—and instead to side openly with each and every enslaved nation against the universal slave driver which is communism. It is time to open a propaganda offensive as powerful and effective as that conducted against your country by the communists for 60 years, without fearing the abuse that the mendacious *Pravda* will spew out in response. In my essay I expressed astonishment at the mindless way in which the West has relinquished the mighty non-military force which resides in the air waves and whose kindling power in the midst of the communist darkness cannot even be grasped by the Western imagination. This could be the way of establishing direct contact with the subjugated peoples and of furthering the growth of their self-awareness and emancipation. (The radio and television stations of the West are, in their present form, far from ready to assume this role. The "Russian Section" of Radio Liberty, for example, despite its many years of experience, has come to be disastrously out of touch with the Russian population and with Russian interests as a result of its systematic aloofness from and even hostility to the Russian national consciousness.) All this will take a radical break with the traditions of international "etiquette," which in any case have long since been trampled by the communists, and which have shown their true worth in Tehran.

To rescue the West from the situation in which it finds itself today will require bold decisions by outstanding leaders and a rejection of routine thinking.

I might just as well not have hurried to present all these arguments. It is becoming increasingly clear that no essay of mine, nor ten such essays, nor ten individuals such as I, are capable of transmitting to the West the experience gained through blood and suffering, or even of disturbing the euphoria and complacency that dominate American political science. I might just as well not have hurried, for we are on the threshold of events which will themselves irrefutably convince the West of its own miscalculations.

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A contemporary version of the *trahison des clercs*, this critique of the New Left trends in the 1960s, and of the role of the West's university intellectuals since, is argued, sometimes over-argued, with verve and bite. The message is an important one for the future of the democratic polity.

THE THIRD WORLD REASSESSED. By Elbaki Hermassi. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 230 pp. $15.00

Elbaki Hermassi, a specialist in North African affairs, expands his thinking to the entire Third World. He is rightly skeptical of the approaches of Western scholars, who have been entranced with their own theories based largely on Western experience; skeptical also of most Third World thinking, which is "impregnated by the intellectual hegemony of the West." The future of the Third World "remains to be invented."

CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Mohammed Ayoob. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 261 pp. $27.50.

Up-to-date essays on familiar areas of conflict (South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Horn, Southern Africa, Cyprus), each self-contained but all highlighting the theme of the interaction of great power and Third World interests. The book reflects the high standard of scholarship of the Australian National University.

REPORT ON A NEGOTIATION: HELSINKI—GENEVA—HELSINKI, 1972–1975. Edited by Luigi Vittorio Ferraris. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff/Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1979, 439 pp. $46.00.

Italian participants in the long negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe here recount their course objectively and in almost day-to-day detail. The result is an invaluable book of reference for those who would know how the Helsinki Agreement came about, as well as those with responsibility for what happens within its framework in the future.

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IN SEARCH OF PEACE. Edited by Waris Shere. Smithtown (N.Y.): Exposition Press, 1980, 226 pp. $12.50.

An anthology of pieces on international security, areas of conflict and the prospects for peace, by public figures and scholars from the West and the Third World. Many of the contributions first appeared in *Foreign Affairs*.

BUILDING THE FUTURE ORDER. By Kurt Waldheim. New York: Free Press, 1980, 261 pp. $12.95.

A superior scissors-and-paste job, a "synthesis" of the Secretary-General's reports and statements over the past few years. Following a schema based on the main sections of the U.N. Charter, well-chosen pieces illustrate both the limitations of the office and the discreet and modest approach of Mr. Waldheim, but also manage to convey the long-term hopes for a peaceful world which he strives to keep alive.

WORLD LABOUR RIGHTS AND THEIR PROTECTION. By James Avery Joyce. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 190 pp. $22.50.

Labor rights described in the context of the entire range of human rights, including existing international legislation, the procedures of the U.N. and the ILO, and the problem of enforcement in sovereign states. While the author is mainly concerned with providing information, he does not hide his own views, which are particularly sharp when he takes up the U.S. decision in 1975 to withdraw from the ILO.

THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945–1951. By Philip R. Piccigalo. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979, 292 pp. $15.00.

The merit of this book lies in its careful research, bringing together in convenient summary the origins, procedures and decisions of the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo and of the national military commissions (involving some 5,700 accused) in various allied states. It touches on but does not go deeply into the legal and political issues that have so preoccupied writers on the trials of German war criminals.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1980s: FROM WEAKNESS TO STRENGTH. Edited by W. Scott Thompson. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980, 524 pp. $8.95 (Paper).

Those who want to know the thinking of Ronald Reagan's advisers should pay close attention to this recent, quickly published paperback. Most of the authors are on his foreign and defense policy team and many could well become part of a new Administration. Eighteen short papers providing a policy agenda are presented; even more interesting is the discussion of them. The common thread is "the heritage of weakness," as evidenced by the strategic nuclear balance favoring the U.S.S.R. and the lack of adequate conventional forces for Persian Gulf and other Third World requirements. The authors make their cases for a number of "quick fixes" for problems ranging from nuclear forces and intelligence capabilities to expanding defense production and industrial mobilization. They call for greater attention to

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geopolitical strategy. This book makes clear that there is a coherent set of assumptions in the worldview of many of Reagan's advisers.

THE REAL WAR. By Richard M. Nixon. New York: Warner Books, 1980, 341 pp. $12.50.

Described by the former President as a *cri de coeur* to "take hold before it is too late," this book presents a somewhat alarming view of the world situation. World War III with the Soviet Union began before the Second World War ended, and the West is rapidly losing. The next two decades will be a time of maximum peril for America and the West. The language is colorful and direct—Saudi Arabia is "the Big Enchilada." Nixon clearly enjoys being in the geostrategist's chair. He draws upon his memoirs but goes beyond them in this survey of contemporary affairs; it is, nevertheless, a book of opinion rather than history, and documentation is thin. A nagging question remains: if we are in such terrible shape, why was our decline not arrested between 1969 and 1974?

WORLD POWER TRENDS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1980s. By Ray S. Cline. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1980, 228 pp. $20.00 (Paper, $8.95).

This updated assessment of the capabilities of individual states is meant to serve as a basis for U.S. foreign and defense policy planning. The author, who is Director of Studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, continues his earlier attempts to develop a unique methodology for looking at global power relationships. The system he uses to measure national strength indicates that in the past decade the United States has fallen 30 percent in perceived power, while the Soviet Union has registered a 20 percent gain. To remedy this, the author proposes that the Free World nations unite in a voluntary peacetime "All-Oceans Alliance" for the protection of the sea lanes vital to their trade.

ENERGY ISSUES AND ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS: THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN. By Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980, 71 pp.

An excellent summary of the combination of critical factors which are involved in this subject—energy scarcity and Western oil dependence, the development of nuclear power, future Soviet energy needs, political instability in the Persian Gulf, contingencies for the use of military force, and related issues among the Atlantic Alliance nations and with Japan. The author's close familiarity with both military and resource problems allows him to interrelate them exceptionally well.

ATOMIC ENERGY: A NEW START. By David E. Lilienthal. New York: Harper, 1980, 124 pp. $8.95.

David Lilienthal's longtime involvement with atomic energy gives him unique credentials. This is an elegant, philosophical book, written for the interested layman, similar to his *Change, Hope and the Bomb* (1963). Taking the Three Mile Island accident into consideration, he believes that there is no turning back from nuclear energy. But he makes a strong appeal for safer technology than the light water reactor, for a greater American contribution toward easing the world's energy shortage, and for a renewed attempt to restrain the spread of atomic weapons.

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NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES: AN INVESTIGATION INTO POSSIBLE WARS. By Nigel Calder. New York: Viking, 1980, 168 pp. $10.95.

The former editor of *New Scientist*, having written on a variety of scientific subjects, now turns his attention to nuclear weapons. The result is disappointing. Although Calder has picked up many facts, his tone is too breathless and apocalyptic to be persuasive.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. By A. Y. Yefremov. Moscow: Progress, 1980, 313 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $6.40).

Despite its careful documentation and use of both Soviet and Western source material, this history of arms control negotiations is a one-sided account of the efforts of the superpowers and their respective allies to curtail the nuclear arms race. As this book tells it, Moscow has long been, and still is, the champion of nuclear disarmament, only to be thwarted by the irresolution and sometime deviousness of the United States and its Western allies.

STRATEGY AND POLITICS: COLLECTED ESSAYS. By Edward N. Luttwak. New Brunswick (N.J.) Transaction Books, 1980, 340 pp. $16.95.

Edward Luttwak has emerged in the past decade as one of the most stimulating, provocative and controversial strategists of our time. This collection brings together many of his articles and book reviews, all separate from his longer works. Many have appeared in *Commentary*, but readers may have missed others such as those from the *Times Literary Supplement* or the *Tibetan Review*. The breadth of his interests, knowledge and judgments is impressive.

THE WAR SYSTEM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH. Edited by Richard A. Falk and Samuel S. Kim. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton), 1980, 659 pp.

An "etiological" inquiry into the causes of war, this collection brings together 27 essays from a wide range of disciplines including anthropology, socioeconomics and psychology. The selections have been carefully chosen and are preceded by useful introductions.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980s: ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATES. Edited by Roy Godson. Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980, 223 pp. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, distributor, $7.50).

The second study in a series, this volume contains the papers and discussions of the more than 60 experts on intelligence who gathered for a two-day meeting on "analysis and estimates" last winter. It offers a critical assessment of the current state of the U.S. intelligence community and makes recommendations for improved analysis, the most significant of which is that intelligence analysts should be more questioning and skeptical and less given to relying on the "conventional wisdom."

SCIENCE ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT. Edited by William T. Golden. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1980, 266 pp. $50.00 (Paper, $9.95).

In 1973 President Nixon abolished the President's Science Advisory Committee, and it has never been restored. This special double issue volume of *Technology in Society* is a collection of essays on presidential science advising and is aimed at getting the PSAC reestablished. The collection includes pieces by all but two of the past Presidential Science Advisers, as well as contributions by other leading government officials including former President Ford.

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A SOLDIER REPORTS. By General William C. Westmoreland. New York: Dell, 1980, 605 pp. $2.95 (Paper).

Originally published by Doubleday in 1976, this personal and detailed chronicle is almost entirely devoted to a history of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War from the vantage point of one of America's top-ranking generals on the scene. Providing an account of his role in Vietnam during the mid-to-late 1960s—as well as describing the military career which led him to this point—the author offers some insight into the reasoning behind many of his decisions, and at the same time gives his views on Washington's motivations. He is strongly critical of the indecisiveness of Washington civilian policymakers and the lack of discipline and poor leadership of the South Vietnamese.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Isaiah Frank. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, 199 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $5.95).

What businessmen have to say about their own activities is often not the most interesting reading. This volume, however, gains very high marks. The 90 multinational corporations with headquarters in 11 countries were acting separately, not as a group, when they responded to interviews shrewdly designed to raise an extraordinarily large number of issues that preoccupy people in developing countries. While some of the results are predictable, many differ substantially from what would have been said some years ago. Professor Frank notes that quite a few of the businessmen had never thought much about some of these issues. Overall he sees a considerable willingness on the part of businessmen to adapt themselves to the aims and aspirations of Third World governments.

THE LENDING POLICY OF THE WORLD BANK IN THE 1970s. By Bettina S. Hürni. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1980, 170 pp. $20.00.
THE WORLD BANK AND THE POOR. By Aart van de Laar. Boston: Nijhoff, 1980, 269 pp. $15.00.

When the World Bank decided to concern itself in a major way with poverty, education and rural life, it exposed itself to a large number of criticisms. Quite a few of them are taken up in these two interesting investigations which try to check claims and aims against results. Miss Hürni, a Swiss, is a good deal more satisfied with the Bank's performance than is Mr. van de Laar, a Hollander who used to work there. He thinks too little has been done for the poorest people and poorest countries and wants more developing-country influence in the Bank, more publicity and less Bank influence on the whole process of development finance.

AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER: A STUDY OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES. By Robert F. Meagher. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 301 pp.

Stimulated by the initial success of OPEC, the developing countries embodied in the Charter, which won a large majority in the U.N. General Assembly at

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the end of 1974, major demands for changes in the international economic order. It did not get the support of the Western industrial countries on such key matters as investment and commodity agreements. Professor Meagher provides a rich and meticulous analysis of the negotiations on these matters up to 1977. He shows what the main differences are concerning law and policy, and suggests that the process of "redistribution" will continue.

OPEC OIL. By Loring Allen. Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1979, 320 pp. $20.00.

An admirer of "those five spunky little countries . . . who put their heads together in 1960 to found OPEC," Professor Allen strikes three main notes as he tells the oil story. There is power—OPEC acts the way you would expect those who control the oil to act. There is ability—"OPEC members are managing the crude oil industry with greater prudence than that exercised in the past by the companies and consumers." There is cooperation—marked within OPEC though not necessarily lasting, possible between OPEC and the consumers if the consumers see their own long-run interest clearly enough.

WHY THE POOR GET RICH AND THE RICH SLOW DOWN. By W. W. Rostow. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980, 456 pp. $19.95.

The effort to figure out what is wrong with the world economy has turned people increasingly to long-cycle theory. Professor Rostow is an old hand in these matters, as historian and as student of the process of growth, so it is very helpful to have a collection of his papers dealing with a number of aspects of the subject, including technology, price and the North-South questions.

UNITED STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by Robert Hellawell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, 442 pp. $30.00.

There is a great deal of valuable factual material in these papers on how U.S. taxes relate to those of developing countries and how they compare with those of other countries. There are some fairly controversial estimates of the effects of the taxes and helpful reviews of the major proposals for changes.

GLOBAL FOOD INTERDEPENDENCE: CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Raymond F. Hopkins and Donald J. Puchala. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, 250 pp. $20.00 (Paper, $7.50).

More leadership by the United States, closer international cooperation and more use of multilateral agencies, a little more stability in the commercial market, more food aid and more production of food in developing countries—these are the key recommendations of the two political scientists who have provided a valuable and succinct analysis here of problems that are likely to get worse than they have been in recent years.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION MAKING: THE ECONOMIC POLICY BOARD. By Roger Porter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. $18.50.

The former Executive Secretary of the Economic Policy Board gives a detailed, lucid account of how this innovation by the Ford Administration worked. His analysis, using records and many interviews, focuses largely on procedure and administrative effectiveness. For many readers the high spots will be the case studies of the 1975 tax proposals, the U.S.-Soviet grain agreement, and the treatment of shoe imports.

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THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES: SELECTED PAPERS OF C. FRED BERGSTEN, 1977–1979. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1980, 389 pp. $28.95.

Public office does not seem to have slowed down Mr. Bergsten's rate of output. The 37 papers printed here from his first three years in office cover a wide range of subjects interestingly (and, one assumes, authoritatively).

TRADE PROBLEMS BETWEEN JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE. By Masamichi Hanabusa. New York: Praeger (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1979, 138 pp. $21.95.

U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS: COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND CONFRONTATION. Edited by Diane Tasca. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press (with the Lehrman Institute), 1980, 135 pp. $16.50.

Western European countries generally have restricted imports from Japan more than has the United States, and have been slower to concentrate on selling to Japan. Mr. Hanabusa of the Japanese Foreign Office is remarkably objective in what must be the fullest account in print of the discontents on both sides and the facts underlying them. He does not expect very rapid changes but sees some possibilities in Japanese investment in Europe and some joint ventures. The Lehrman Institute's volume joins a rather long list of studies of Japanese-American trade problems, but deserves a place for the candor of some of the contributors about current practices on both sides and the risk that things will get worse.

UNCOMMON MARKET. By Stuart Holland. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 183 pp. $19.95.

This book's complaints about what is wrong with the European Community are mostly clear, debatable and sometimes original. But the points do not add up to a sustained analysis, much less a prescription for the changes this British Labour MP would like to see.

LABOR RELATIONS IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES. Edited by Benjamin Martin and Everett M. Kassalow. New York and Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1980, 224 pp. $10.00.

Worker participation in management, dealing with multinationals, improving life on the job, the similarities and differences in industrial conflict in several Western nations, and the relation between trade and employment are looked at here by specialists from a number of countries.

DEEPSEA MINING. Edited by Judith T. Kildow. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980, 251 pp. $17.50.

These papers for MIT seminars contain much interesting information about what resources people think are under the sea, how they relate to world metal supplies, and who is interested in them. Not surprisingly, the participants are sharply divided over the merits of the regimes proposed by the Law of the Sea Conference and the merits of unilateral action by the technologically strong countries.

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY. Edited by Robert M. Lawrence and Martin O. Heisler. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1980, 218 pp. $22.95.

THE GOVERNANCE OF ENERGY. By Dudley J. Burton. New York: Praeger/Palo Alto: Cambria Press, 1980, 387 pp. $19.50 (Paper, $8.95).

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BRITAIN'S OIL. By Guy Arnold. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980, 388 pp. (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, distributor, $25.00).
DIRECTIONS IN ENERGY POLICY. Edited by Behram Kursunoglu and Arnold Perlmutter. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979, 519 pp. $38.00.

International Energy Policy is a good collection of papers on the experience of different countries. Burton provides a wordy analysis of American problems and is pessimistic about getting governance under control. Arnold tells a readable, comprehensive story of British oil experience. In the last volume a number of original pieces of broad import are interspersed with quite technical papers.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE PROGRESSIVE PRESIDENTS: ROOSEVELT, WILSON, ROOSEVELT, JOHNSON. By John Morton Blum. New York: Norton, 1980, 221 pp. $11.95.

Thoughtful essays on the two Roosevelts, Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson—leaders who expanded the power of the presidency. Blum, self-described "conventional liberal," defends these Presidents against radical criticism of Right and Left.

JACK: THE STRUGGLES OF JOHN F. KENNEDY. By Herbert S. Parmet. New York: Dial Press, 1980, 586 pp. $14.95.

Herbert Parmet is a master of the old-fashioned, detailed political history. This large volume, the first of two, carries JFK's career to the beginning of the 1960 presidential campaign. It is based on extensive interviews and thorough use of the unpublished materials in the Kennedy Library. The "struggles" are largely against poor health.

OF KENNEDYS AND KINGS: MAKING SENSE OF THE SIXTIES. By Harris Wofford. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980, 503 pp. $17.50.

Harris Wofford was Special Assistant to President Kennedy and Associate Director of the Peace Corps, and a close friend of Martin Luther King. His book is half history, half personal memoir, and an important addition to the literature of the Kennedy years. He is devastating on the subject of J. Edgar Hoover.

KENNEDY AND ROOSEVELT: THE UNEASY ALLIANCE. By Michael R. Beschloss. New York: Norton, 1980, 318 pp. $14.95.

A fascinating, highly readable examination of Joseph Kennedy's ambiguous relationship with FDR: two shrewd, ruthless, but very different men using each other, mixing admiration with hatred, being truthful only when expedient, striving always for power.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS: SECOND SERIES, January 1, 1937—August 31, 1939. Edited by Donald B. Schewe and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. New York and Toronto: Clearwater, 1980, 5 vols.

The first five volumes of a projected 14-volume set containing the personal correspondence of FDR on foreign affairs in facsimile reproductions of the original documents, with Roosevelt's marginal notes and queries. Virtually

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every significant letter and memo of the period is included; most have not been previously published. Robert Dallek has contributed the foreword. This is a continuation of the three-volume series *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs*, published by Harvard/Belknap in 1969, which covered the foreign policy correspondence of the first Roosevelt Administration.

YEARS OF ESTRANGEMENT: AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1941. By Thomas R. Maddux. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1980, 238 pp. $15.00.

This book fills a gap in the historiography of Soviet-American relations, but with emphasis almost exclusively on the American side of the equation. Maddux shows how numerous were the obstacles within the United States to Roosevelt's desire for improved relations with the Soviet Union. FDR's own inadequacy as a negotiator was not the least of these obstacles.

THE SEVENTY-SIXTH CONGRESS AND WORLD WAR II, 1939–1940. By David L. Porter. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979, 236 pp. $19.50.

This is a carefully researched corrective to the exaggerated emphasis most historians have given to the dominance of President Roosevelt over foreign policy on the eve of American entry into World War II. Porter argues that from September 1939, with the outbreak of war in Europe, "internationalists determined the course of American foreign policy." FDR is depicted as timid and cautious.

HENRY CABOT LODGE AND THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By William C. Widenor. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 400 pp. $18.50.

Henry Cabot Lodge (1850–1924) is too often presented in caricature as the imperialist friend of Theodore Roosevelt and the bitter foe of Woodrow Wilson. This superb intellectual biography explicates the full range of Lodge's thought, and in the process illuminates the nature of American nationalism and tensions in foreign policy which still affect our perceptions and actions.

THE PULSE OF POLITICS. By James David Barber. New York: Norton, 1980, 342 pp. $14.95.

Professor Barber, renowned for his study of *The Presidential Character* (1977), here examines the historical growth of the press, printed and electronic, in shaping presidential campaigns since 1896. His somewhat forced argument is that each campaign has one of three dominant themes—conflict, conscience, or conciliation—and that the themes follow each other with an unvarying pulse. 1980 is to be "conciliation." Not likely. Nevertheless, the book is full of insight, anecdote and wit.

THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT. By Todd Gitlin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 350 pp. $12.95.

The author was president of the Students for a Democratic Society in his college days and is now a sociologist specializing in mass communications. He maintains that the New Left in the 1960s was thwarted by grossly oversimplified and distorted television and press coverage.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EF-

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FECTIVE USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE. By Alexander L. George. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1980, 267 pp. $24.50 (Paper, $10.00).

A mature, perceptive disquisition—based on deep familiarity with theory and history—on how presidents can organize an advisory system in order to produce sound decisions. The analysis is both clear and sophisticated—a rare combination.

THE PEACE REFORM IN AMERICAN HISTORY. By Charles DeBenedetti. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, 245 pp. $18.50.

A brief, sympathetic analysis of the thinking and tactics of Americans who, from colonial times to the present, have opposed war. The author concludes that "the peace movement stands as a minority reform in America because it constitutes a subculture opposed to the country's dominant power culture and power realities."

FRIENDLY FASCISM: THE NEW FACE OF POWER IN AMERICA. By Bertram Gross. New York: M. Evans, 1980, 420 pp. $15.00.

A rambling, sometimes cloudy, sometimes insightful lament over the growth of centralized power by business and government in alliance under the direction of faceless managers who mean no harm but are, so the author claims, replacing democracy with a form of benevolent fascism.

ASSASSINATION ON EMBASSY ROW. By John Dinges and Saul Landau. New York: Pantheon, 1980, 411 pp. $14.95.

An enthralling, deeply disturbing account of the assassination in Washington in 1976 of Orlando Letelier, Chilean diplomat and member of the Allende government. The responsibility of DINA, the Pinochet government's secret police, is amply described, as is the nature of right-wing terrorism in Latin America.

FROM PEARL HARBOR TO VIETNAM: THE MEMOIRS OF ADMIRAL ARTHUR W. RADFORD. Edited by Stephen Jurika, Jr. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1980, 476 pp. $15.00.

Admiral Radford's naval career culminated with two terms as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Eisenhower presidency. These memoirs, in manuscript when the Admiral died in 1973, deal primarily with the years 1946 to 1957: the unification struggle, the B-36 controversy, Korea, Indochina. Basically personal recollections, only lightly backed up by documents.

OIL, WAR, AND AMERICAN SECURITY: THE SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL POLICY ON FOREIGN OIL, 1941–1947. By Michael B. Stoff. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980, 249 pp. $15.00.
SEARCH FOR SECURITY: SAUDI ARABIAN OIL AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1939–1949. By Aaron David Miller. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980, 320 pp. $19.00.

Two excellent complementary books on the same subject. Stoff is more succinct and analytical. He concentrates on the wrangling over oil policy within the U.S. government. Miller presents a fuller, sometimes overly detailed picture of conditions in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East in general. He describes American events largely through the eyes of diplomats.

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The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

DIARY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION. By Carlos Franqui. New York: Viking, 1980, 546 pp. $25.00 (Paper, $16.95).

Franqui was a charter member of the Castro movement who broke away after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. As custodian of the state archives, he began in 1961 to make microfilm copies of documents, letters, interviews and records of all kinds. Reproduced here, the materials cover the period from 1921 to 1959, with emphasis on the final four years. The personality of the revolution emerges in vivid colors.

POLITICS OF COMPROMISE: COALITION GOVERNMENT IN COLOMBIA. Edited by R. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman and Mauricio Solaún. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books (for the Center for Inter-American Relations), 1980, 488 pp.

This most recent of the publications of the Center for Inter-American Relations continues the high standards of its predecessors. The subject—the United Front in Colombia, well defined here as "an elite-dominated, bipartisan 'hegemonic' regime [which] replaced the traditional system of elite-dominated party hegemonies"—is inherently significant and deserving of close study. The contributors give the Front generally high marks as they explore the implications in full range and depth. The final interpretive chapter is helpful.

U.S.-MEXICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS. Edited by Barry W. Poulson and T. Noel Osborn. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 442 pp. $30.00.

Every facet of economic relationships, however peripheral, seems to be represented in these 30 essays that cover topics as diverse as capital flows, the brain drain, international trade, human capital, migration, energy. Some treatments are broad, some narrowly technical, and others theoretical.

LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM. Edited by John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1980, 271 pp. $24.50.

Academic in origin, these nine essays are divided equally into three categories: perspectives on Inter-American relations; U.S.-Latin American relations; and human rights and U.S. policy toward Latin America. U.S. hegemony is seen as the principal constant governing the Inter-American system. A discouraging note: "As the decades flow by, the Inter-American relationship appears to focus upon the most pressing issue of the moment. If there is none, the region is ignored."

UNEQUAL ALLIANCE: THE INTER-AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEM, 1938–1978. By John Child. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1980, 250 pp. $22.00.

The author, a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel and faculty member of the Inter-American Defense College, provides a detailed study of the Inter-American military system and its cycles of growth and decline. He notes Latin American fears of U.S. domination and of militarization of the system, and the changing significance and priority of Latin America for the United States.

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Western Europe

Fritz Stern

FIRE IN THE MINDS OF MEN: ORIGINS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FAITH. By James H. Billington. New York: Basic Books, 1980, 677 pp. $25.00.

This major work explores the European dream of revolution. With what patience and what imagination Billington, a well-known historian, evokes the lives and thoughts of revolutionaries from pre-revolutionary France to the time of Lenin! The book focuses on "the spiritual thirst of those who think rather than on the material hunger of those who work." The relevance of the past to the present, through the audacious effort of an author alive to the unplumbed wealth of the one and the often unrecognized needs of the other, is triumphantly—if a little laboriously—demonstrated in this extraordinary study.

THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF APPEASEMENT: FINLANDIZATION AND OTHER UNPOPULAR ESSAYS. By Walter Laqueur. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1980, 283 pp. $16.95.

The author himself is a phenomenon of our times: prodigiously prolific, he is at home in several countries, institutions and disciplines. This collection of articles, mostly from *Commentary* of the past few years, shows him in his best known role: the political essayist, Cassandra of the West, troubled (as who is not?) by signs of decadence, by a tendency toward European neutralism. Stimulating, clever, versatile, distinguished more by breadth than depth.

UNSETTLING EUROPE. By Jane Kramer. New York: Random House, 1980, 320 pp. $9.95.

According to the *colon* woman, newly fled from Algeria: "You take a sapling and replant it, and it thrives. But an old tree like me, a tree with roots—out of its own soil that tree will die." These four portraits evoke the lives of migrant workers, refugees, all sorts of forced wanderers in Europe: exemplars, finely studied and recorded, of transplants who neither thrive nor perish. A splendid collection, the product of a fine eye and ear and of an energetic style that but occasionally strays to the artful. Easy to read and difficult to forget.

RADIOSCOPIE DES ÉTATS-UNIS. By Jacqueline Grapin. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1980, 353 pp.

A well-known French journalist analyzes the changes in recent American politics and relates them, with uncommon good sense, to the problems of European cooperation and defense. An essay of realistic appraisal, hence useful in the present climate of uncertainty.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, EUROPE, AND THE WORLD: PERSPECTIVES ON WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Martin Saeter. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980, 119 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $15.00).

A Norwegian political scientist examines the historical development and likely direction of West German foreign policy. He covers largely familiar ground and argues reasonably that the Federal Republic, though the dominant power in Europe, needs to gather European support in order to realize its potential strength.

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DIE OSTVERTRÄGE. By Benno Zündorf. Munich: Beck, 1979, 375 pp. DM. 38.

A close juridical and political analysis of the various treaties which assembled constituted the legal basis of Ostpolitik. Written under a pseudonym by a participant in the negotiations and a "convinced supporter" of this policy, the author emphasizes the special importance that the German negotiators attached to recognizing the existence of the "national question," including the hope for the renewed unity of the German people in peace and freedom.

VATICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE JEWS DURING THE HOLOCAUST, 1939–1945. By John F. Morley. New York: KTAV, 1980, 327 pp. $20.00.

A Catholic priest and teacher focuses on the response of Nuncios and Papal Secretaries of State to anti-Jewish laws and atrocities. The study, largely based on published Vatican sources, regrets what one document of the time called—approvingly—"the prudent delay and enlightened reserve" of Pope Pius XII. The author measures official inaction by papal claims, and his judgments are naïve and repetitive. A contribution, nonetheless, to our growing awareness of the role of the passive bystander in the unfolding of the Holocaust.

COMRADES AND CHRISTIANS: RELIGION AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN COMMUNIST ITALY. By David I. Kertzer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 302 pp. $24.95 (Paper, $6.95).

An American anthropologist spent 1971–72 in a working-class district of Bologna and now presents his informative findings, emphasizing *inter alia* the anti-communist crusade of the Church and the Christian Democrats. In deliberate contrast to earlier accounts of communism as pathology, he presents a rather benign view of the local communists and sets their success in the context of Italian society. A pleasant work, but slight and somewhat dated.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

MARXISM-LENINISM AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, 424 pp. $40.00.

A weighty treatise, largely for academic specialists, which explores its chosen subject from many angles, from the writings of Marx and Engels to the praxis of the Brezhnev era, and from West to East and back again. Intended to fill what the authors see as a big gap in Western research and in the West's approach to the problems of dealing with the U.S.S.R., it is not quite as novel as promised but is always closely reasoned and is larded here and there with original thought.

WORLD COMMUNISM AT THE CROSSROADS: MILITARY ASCENDANCY, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND HUMAN WELFARE. Edited by Steven Rosenfielde. Boston: Nijhoff, 1980, 334 pp. $19.95.

Contributors to this symposium are well qualified in their chosen subjects, but their studies touch on widely differing and often narrowly limited developments in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and China. World communism is never defined and analyzed, the main emphasis, especially the editor's, being on the Soviet push for military superiority.

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NATIONAL LIBERATION. By R. Ulyanovsky. Moscow: Progress, 1978, 397 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $7.25).

Ulyanovsky's voice has been an influential one in explaining Soviet Third World policy, and probably also in contributing ideological content to that policy. In this series of essays general and specific (the latter on India, Burma and Africa), Western readers have a useful text on Leninist theory and Soviet practice, both by definition "correct," but no key to Soviet motivation or policy in any given case.

SOVIET POLITICS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND REFORM. By Ronald J. Hill. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1980, 256 pp. $27.50.

The author contends that Soviet "political science" is more than a meaningless charade, citing many academic publications to show how political practice (e.g., elections, pressure of public opinion, the role of the Party) is publicly discussed, within given limits, and may be subject to change as a result. An interesting thesis, well argued, but the book is written for political science types only.

THE TRUTH ABOUT AFGHANISTAN: DOCUMENTS, FACTS, EYEWITNESS REPORTS. Edited by Y. Volkov and others. Moscow: Novosti, 1980, 157 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $2.50).

For those who may wish to have at hand Moscow's official version of events in Afghanistan, here are texts and excerpts from Brezhnev, Gromyko, Soviet journalists and foreign communists, plus—as a result of what must have been an exhaustive search—other friendly comment from around the world.

THE EDUCATION OF A TRUE BELIEVER. By Lev Kopelev. New York: Harper, 1980, 328 pp. $15.95.

A well-known Soviet dissenter who continues to publish in the West, and to live in the Soviet Union, tells the story of his early years when he was an enthusiastic supporter of Stalin's regime and was only gradually disillusioned as the discrepancy between his inculcated beliefs and the evidence before his eyes became more and more apparent.

THE MORTAL DANGER. By Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn. New York: Harper, 1980, 71 pp. $8.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Solzhenitsyn's latest warning to the West, his essay in the Spring 1980 issue of *Foreign Affairs* republished as a book.

CHURCH AND STATE IN YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1945. By Stella Alexander. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 373 pp. $34.50.

The author has done a remarkable job of recounting in detail the relations between the communist authorities and the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, considering the difficulty of getting material and the political delicacy of the subject. As she concedes, the story necessarily has gaps, and the hardened line of the regime since 1971 makes extensive research on developments of the past decade impossible.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

COUNTERCOUP: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF IRAN. By Kermit Roosevelt. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980, 217 pp. $12.95.

With the publication of this exciting story, told well and in detail, there is little mystery left about the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953. Not

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just the CIA but the Shah himself, key Iranians, and the support the Shah then had in the armed forces and the populace made success possible. At the center of planning (from 1951) and operations was Kermit Roosevelt, acting with the backing of the highest officials of the U.S. and the British governments. Although the Americans assumed that Mossadeq had become an ally or instrument of the Russians, the book provides no new evidence on the Soviet role.

ROPES OF SAND: AMERICA'S FAILURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Wilbur Crane Eveland. New York: Norton, 1980, 384 pp. $14.95.

More revelations of the CIA and its works, these from a middle-rank official who dealt with Middle East matters for the Agency, the Pentagon and the National Security Council in the 1950s. The book is autobiographical, self-advertising, and filled with fascinating glimpses of the policies, "operations," and personalities of that time. Whether all that is said would be corroborated by those personalities is another question.

IRAN: FROM RELIGIOUS DISPUTE TO REVOLUTION. By Michael M. J. Fischer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, 314 pp. $17.50.

A Harvard anthropologist explains the nature of Iranian Shi'ism and its role in society and politics. His account of the revolution of 1977–79 is of familiar events, but the prior background material gives it added dimensions, without, however, providing a key to the country's future.

IBN SA'UD: ROI BÉDOUIN. By Yves Besson. Lausanne: Éditions des Trois Continents, 1980, 284 pp.

More than a biography of Ibn Saud, this is an excellent history of his kingdom up to the conquest of the Hejaz and the achievement of international recognition in the mid-1920s. The author, a Swiss scholar-diplomat, makes good use of material in the British archives, especially important because of Ibn Saud's relations with Britain.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LIBYA. By Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1980, 230 pp.

Serious studies of Libya's politics and society under Qaddafi have been virtually nonexistent, perhaps because it seems so hard to take him and his "Green Book" seriously. This survey by an American and a Libyan scholar is therefore welcome. It is informative and analytical; and although it leans over backward to be understanding of the revolutionary transformation in progress, it is not entirely uncritical.

ARABS IN THE JEWISH STATE: ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL MINORITY. By Ian Lustick. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980, 385 pp. $19.95 (Paper, $10.95).

More than a descriptive account of the status of the Arabs in Israel (not including the Occupied Territories), this penetrating study by an American scholar looks closely at the means by which Israel maintains control (isolating the Arabs, keeping them economically dependent, and coopting the Arab elites), and also points to the ultimate political choices which may have to be made when the Arabs are no longer so quiescent.

DECISIONS IN CRISIS: ISRAEL, 1967 and 1973. By Michael Brecher. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 496 pp. $24.95.

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Michael Brecher continues his inquiries into national decision-making in critical situations. In this superior work of research and analysis, he goes about as far as one can go both in the play-by-play description of Israel's decisions in the two major wars of 1967 and 1973, and in relating those events to his complex comparative model of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis behavior.

THE SINAI BLUNDER. By Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye. London: Cass, 1980, 240 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $24.00).

The "blunder" of the title should be in the plural, for General Rikhye's measured assessment finds a combination of mistakes of judgment—by Nasser, by U Thant, by Israel, and by the big powers—responsible for bringing on the Six-Day War of June 1967. His book is also noteworthy for its factual, hour-by-hour account of his experience as the commander of the U.N. Emergency Force, first in dealing with the crisis precipitated by the Egyptian demand for its withdrawal, and then during the war itself when UNEF was caught between the warring armies.

CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN LEBANON: CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Walid Khalidi. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1980, 217 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $6.95).

Walid Khalidi is a Palestinian Arab, a resident of Beirut, and a scholar who has made his mark in the West. No better analysis of the Lebanese war of 1975–76, with its complex interaction of internal and international forces, has been written.

EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By Albert Hourani. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 240 pp. $18.00.

Professor Hourani draws on his long experience and deep knowledge of both the Middle East and the West to give us these perceptive, largely historical essays. They do not deal with the current international scene but could help some of today's "experts" to understand it.

THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA. By Ali A. El-Hakim. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1980, 293 pp. $27.00.

This mainly technical study of the status of maritime law and of the numerous disputes over rights of sovereignty and navigation in various waters in or near the Middle East is primarily for specialists, but is of interest to all concerned with the political dynamite which lurks in some of these disputes over straits and islands crucial not only to the local states but to the security and commerce of the world.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD AFFAIRS (4th ed.) By George Lenczowski. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1980, 862 pp. $29.50 (Paper, $14.95).

This new edition of a well-known survey is worth noting for the extensive additional material covering 18 years of kaleidoscopic events, and because it remains remarkably comprehensive and reliable both as an introduction to the region and as a reference work.

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Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

CHINA'S TRANSITION TO INDUSTRIALISM. By Thomas G. Rawski. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980, 211 pp. $16.50.

For anyone who doubts that the groundwork for an industrial revolution has been laid in China during the past 30 years, this book is required reading. The gross value of factory output has grown at a pace of more than ten percent per year during the past quarter-century. The producer sectors of industry have grown even faster, leading to steady and rapid structural change. Textiles and food processing, which accounted for half of factory output in 1952, comprised only 13.9 percent in 1973. In their place stand the greatly enlarged engineering, metallurgical, and chemical industries that now account for a combined total of roughly two-fifths of gross output value. Rawski argues that the Chinese system outperforms the orthodox Soviet system of industrial management because of its unique combination of command and atomistic economies, and because of its highly motivated corps of grass-roots leaders who are technically competent, sensitive to national priorities, flexible in implementing those priorities, and capable of exercising the entrepreneurial skills needed to bring local resources to bear on the key problems of the day. In all, this is one of the most stimulating works on the Chinese economy yet written.

CHINA'S FOUR MODERNIZATIONS: THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION. Edited by Richard Baum. Boulder (Colo.): Westview press, 1980, 307 pp. $18.75 (Paper, $9.50).

This is a very timely and solid collection of articles on one of the core issues in China's modernization drive: China's ability to acquire, use and disseminate modern technology. The authors offer different responses to one crucial question: How effective can a highly bureaucratized political system be in encouraging innovation and disseminating technology in the absence of a market mechanism? Communist countries have been notoriously poor in this respect. Can China do the job better than Russia? In one revealing section, experts on China's defense establishment seem agreed that there are a number of constraints impeding the rapid modernization of the defense sector; in this area, they conclude, China will have enormous difficulty catching up with the United States and the Soviet Union.

CHINA'S GLOBAL ROLE. By John Franklin Copper. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1980, 181 pp. $7.95 (Paper).

A very hard-nosed, realistic assessment of China's national power capabilities. Using numerous comparisons and a variety of carefully compiled statistics, Copper succeeds in demystifying the "sleeping dragon" theory and concludes that China must be regarded as a second-rank power.

BROKEN IMAGES: ESSAYS ON CHINESE CULTURE AND POLITICS. By Simon Leys. New York: St. Martin's, 1980, 156 pp. $17.50.

Leys has been accused of a monomaniacal determination to expose Maoism. Others compare him to George Orwell. Both views have some validity. This book of essays, like Leys' earlier classic *Chinese Shadows*, should not be read as an introduction to contemporary China. But as part of an advanced course

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for those who have already been through basic training, it contains some stunning insights. And it is, above all, a delight to read. I know of no one else who conveys the human side of Chinese life so well.

THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN: A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION. Edited by Victor H. Li. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1980, 200 pp. $17.50.
OVERSIGHT OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. May 14, 1980, 44 pp. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: THE FIRST YEAR. June, 1980, 61 pp. TAIWAN: ONE YEAR AFTER UNITED STATES-CHINA NORMALIZATION. June, 1980, 170 pp. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington: G.P.O., 1980.

Few Americans realize that, despite the considerable progress in U.S.-China relations since normalization in January 1979, the future of Taiwan is still an unresolved and potentially very troublesome issue. The question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remains to plague China, and the political stability of Taiwan can no longer be taken for granted. Li's well-edited book is the result of a conference attended by 15 Chinese-Americans, most of them natives of Taiwan, who express widely differing views on Taiwan's future relations with the PRC. The three congressional reports released by Senator John Glenn, chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, include the results of a Subcommittee hearing, a staff report and a two-day workshop. Anyone interested in the future of U.S.-Chinese relations during the next decade would do well to ponder the many issues raised in these provocative inquiries.

THE NEUTRALIZED UNIFICATION OF KOREA. By In K. Hwang. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1980, 186 pp.

A thoughtful, if arguable, case for neutralization as a step toward possible rapprochement and eventual unification between the two Koreas.

WAR AND HOPE: THE CASE FOR CAMBODIA. By Prince Norodom Sihanouk. New York: Pantheon, 1980, 256 pp. $10.95.

Although the former leader of Cambodia has no magic solution to the country's present tragedy, his book does shed a great deal of light on the events that led up to the Vietnamese invasion in late 1978. What emerges clearly from his account is that Sihanouk despises the Khmer Rouge even more than he does the Vietnamese, for whom he has some grudging respect, and that any collaboration—being urged by the Chinese and some others—between the Prince and the Pol Pot forces is out of the question.

THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM. By Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen and Brian M. Jenkins. New York: Crane, Russak, 1980, 267 pp. $14.50.

A unique and poignant military history, this report is a summary of statements made by 27 former high-ranking South Vietnamese military officers and civilians on their perceptions of the causes of South Vietnam's collapse in 1975. These leaders believe there were grievous shortcomings in South Vietnam's political and military leadership, planning and organization; they found much to criticize in their own institutions and behavior. But, in one way or another, they consider the overarching cause of the debacle to be the American role in the drama: before the Paris Agreements, that of "a gigantic but somewhat blind and often oppressive 'super-ally'" who did not understand the nature of the war, the society or the enemy; after the Paris

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Agreements, the role took the form of a "callous and incomprehensible" abandonment.

SOVIET POLICY FOR ASIAN PEACE AND SECURITY. By Ivan Kovalenko. Moscow: Progress, 1980, 293 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $8.40).

Although described simply as "a Soviet historian," Kovalenko is in fact a ranking official dealing with Asian affairs in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Thus, for anyone interested in an official Soviet perspective on Asian security problems (the Soviets include the Middle East in their definition of "Asia"), this volume can be very instructive. It provides the most authoritative view available of the Soviet concept of "Asian collective security."

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

WHICH WAY IS SOUTH AFRICA GOING? By Gwendolen M. Carter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, 256 pp. $12.95.

THE APARTHEID REGIME. Edited by Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980, 376 pp. $8.95 (Paper).

MARTYRS AND FANATICS: SOUTH AFRICA AND HUMAN DESTINIES. By Peter Dreyer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980, 255 pp. $11.95.

Each of these three books addresses the question inevitably posed about South Africa: Where is the country headed, and to what end? Carter's study provides a great deal of up-to-date information on a broad spectrum of issues—separate development, trade unionism, contenders for black leadership—and temporizes on the main question. The contributors to Price and Rosberg's first-rate collection, including some of the most distinguished South African analysts, draw equally cautious conclusions. Most thought-provoking is Lawrence Schlemmer's essay on changing attitudes among whites and blacks, indicating broad white acceptance of a multiracial parliamentary scheme going significantly beyond current government policy, as well as substantial approval among a group of urban blacks for a black-white condominium in the country. Dreyer's is the wild card here—veering from the saga of jailed Afrikaner poet Breyten Breytenbach to a moving chronicle of individual blacks suffering at the hands of the white security system, and finally to a brief against the activities of white communists within the main South African liberation movement. Through sharply delineated historical and contemporary images, the expatriate South African journalist conveys the pervasive fear on both sides of the black-white divide, from its inception to the present moment.

A DRY WHITE SEASON. By André Brink. New York: Morrow, 1980, 316 pp. $10.95.

This novel about the ultimately fatal revolt of an Afrikaner teacher against the South African system is banned in South Africa by government order; it is in fact an extremely powerful indictment of the coercive apartheid apparatus as it is suddenly experienced by the apolitical and uncomprehending protagonist. Beyond its moving representation of the progressive isolation of an

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individual from his social milieu, the book depicts black-white relations in urban South Africa with impressive accuracy.

U.S. BUSINESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MORAL ISSUES. By Desaix Myers, III. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, 375 pp. $17.50.

These studies carried out by the staff of the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Washington provide the most detailed and comprehensive review to date of U.S. business in South Africa and its spotty record at improving the economic position of black workers as well as integrating the workplace.

BEYOND UJAMAA IN TANZANIA: UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND AN UNCAPTURED PEASANTRY. By Goran Hyden. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 280 pp. $18.50 (Paper, $7.95).

This Marxist critique of dependency theory argues, interestingly, that the main obstacle to development in Africa is not the relationship between capitalist metropole and African periphery, but rather the ability of African subsistence farmers to opt out of the modern economy. Having somewhat belabored this point, however, Hyden fails to justify his hasty conclusion that the African peasants' independence must be overcome by forcibly applied socialism.

AFRICAN REALITIES. By Kenneth L. Adelman. New York: Crane, Russak (for SRI International), 1980, 192 pp. $16.50.

The author, formerly an aide to Donald Rumsfeld in the Department of Defense, vigorously assails the Carter Administration's "Africanists" and their ilk for "seeking cheers" from Africans and propagating myths about the irrelevance of the cold war to Africa. His own alternatives, only vaguely defined, emphasize "backbone," promoting Western values, and dealing with South Africa on "elements of mutual security."

ZAÏRE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT. Edited by Guy Gran. New York: Praeger, 1979, 352 pp. $22.95.

The international, national and local exploitation of the Zaïrian people is exhaustively documented in these essays. No hopeful change appears in view for this firmly entrenched though unstable system; nor do the authors suggest any viable policy alternatives for Zaïre's Western or World Bank patrons.

THE USSR AND AFRICA: NEW DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET GLOBAL POWER. By Morris Rothenberg. Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980, 280 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $8.95).

As the foreword itself declares, "the message of this book exceeds its subject matter." The author, who has also written about the Soviet threat to Latin America and China, leans heavily on Soviet source materials depicting Africa as a seedbed for revolution and largely avoids the question of the U.S.S.R.'s actual impact there.

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Janet Rigney

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ERRATA

Summer 1980

1. "Nuclear Power and Nuclear Bombs," by Amory B. Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins and Leonard Ross:

a. On page 1145, note 8, line 2: for *Internationales Gutachten Gorlebens für Niedersächsisches Sozialministerium* read "*Internationales Gutachten Gorleben*" *für das Niedersächsische Sozialministerium.*

b. On page 1150, line 14: for 32 read 26.

c. On page 1152, note 19, line 4: for *Wirtschaftswachstum bei sinkenden Energieverbrauch* read *Energiewende: Wachstum und Wohlstand ohne Öl und Uran.*

d. On page 1160, note 29, line 5: for "Niedersächsische- und Landesregierung" read "Niedersächsische Landesregierung."

e. On page 1161, note 31, line 1: delete "(or fuel cell)."

f. On page 1161, note 31, line 7: for "or Bust," read "at the Very Least!."

g. On page 1163, lines 8-9: delete "of a 'soft' energy strategy" and run in with previous line.

h. On page 1166, note 40, line 3: the address of IPSEP is 124 Spear St., San Francisco, CA 94105.

i. On page 1169, line 8: for ". . . and" read "and . . ."

j. On page 1170, fifth line from bottom: for 81 read 78.

k. On page 1176, line 22: for "some national" read "subnational."

2. In "Recent Books on International Relations," on p. 1189: *Welfare in a Fragile World* should read *Warfare in a Fragile World.*

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

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

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